United Nations Development Programme

Evaluation of UNDP Contribution

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

IRAQ

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ACRONYMS

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
AIS/VTS	Maritime Automatic Identification Systems/ Vessel Traffic Services
APMAC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AWPs	Annual Work Plans
BCPR	Bureau of Crisis Prevention & Recovery
BEL	Government of Belgium
BIAP	Baghdad International Airport
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CoR	Council of Representatives
COSIT	Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CPR	Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CSO	Civil Society Organisation(s)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DEN	Government of Denmark
DEVAW	Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DGTTF	UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund
DMA	Directorate for Mine Action
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EM	Evaluation Manager
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
EU	European Union
EUJUST-LEX	European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GoI	Government of Iraq
HCMA	Higher Committee for Mine Action
HDI	Human Development Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICAA	Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IDMS	Iraq Development Management System
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Support
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisations
IHEC	Iraq High Electoral Commission
INMAS	Iraqi National Mine Action Standards
IREP	Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme
IRFFI	Iraq Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq

ITF	Iraq Trust Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KDMS	Kurdistan Development Management System
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KRSO	Kurdistan Region Statistics Office
LADP	Local Area Development Programme
LTA	Long Term Agreement
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDP	Multi-Dimensional Poverty
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MoEnv	Ministry of Environment
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHR	Ministry of Human Rights
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MoO	Ministry of Oil
MOP	Ministry of Planning
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOWR	Ministry of Water Resources
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NAVAID	Navigation Aid for Approach Channel
NDP	National Development Plan
NDS	National Development Strategy
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisation
NHDR	National Human Development Reports
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PMAC	Prime Minister's Advisory Council
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PSD	Private Sector Development
PSDP-I	Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq
PSFMA	Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent
PSFMS	Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent
RMAC	Regional Mine Action Centres
RMEK	Regional Ministry of Electricity of Kurdistan
ROL	Rule of law
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
S/C	South/Central
SALW	Small Arms Light Weapons
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SGBV	Sexual Gender Based Violence
SME	Small-Medium Enterprise
SOC	Southern Oil Company
SOE	State-Owned Enterprises
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TB	Tuberculosis
TFRR	Total Fertility Replacement Rate
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
TTF	Thematic Trust Fund
UN	United Nations

UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nation Development Assistant Framework
UNDG ITF	United Nations Development Group – Iraq Trust Fund
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIAS	United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The Assessment of Development Results (ADRs) in Iraq is an evaluation conducted in 2013 by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The ADR in Iraq aims to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP's strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results.

ADRs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy. [1] The IEO is headed by a Director who reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibility of the IEO is two-fold: (a) provide the Executive Board with valid and credible information from evaluations for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; and (b) enhance the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function, and its coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, EO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with the national Government. The purposes of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country;
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level; and
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

This is the first ADR for Iraq conducted in 2013 towards the end of the current UNDP programme cycle of 2011–2014 with a view to contributing to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme as well as the forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).

1.2. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the ADR in Iraq are to:

- Assess UNDP's contributions to development results in Iraq since 2008. This includes contribution of UNDP's programme activities to human development in Iraq and the well-being of its people; focusing on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the programme activities in achieving intended programme outcomes, and the potential sustainability of the results achieved by the activities.
- Analyse the strategic positioning that UNDP has taken; focusing on synergies with national development strategies and priorities, values espoused by the United Nations.
- Draw general conclusions and make recommendations to improve the programme's future strategy and approaches.

1.3. SCOPE

Considering this is the first ADR conducted in Iraq by IEO, the ADR covered the country programme activities implemented for the period 2008-2010, when UNDP had not yet developed its own country programme and operated under an integrated UN assistance framework, the United

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[1] See UNDP Evaluation Policy: www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf. The ADR will also be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (www.uneval.org).

Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy (UNIAS); and the ongoing country programme for 2011-2014, during which period UNDP operated within its own framework.

The ADR examined contributions to development results made by programme activities implemented through projects in achievement of the programme outcomes outlined in respective programme documents. For 2008-2010, the assessment was made with regard to the projects in two outcomes— governance, and economic recovery and diversification — where UNDP had the lead responsibility in the UNIAS programme for 2008-2010[2]. The continuity of many projects of the previous programme in the current one facilitated the assessment of contribution to results.

The ADR assessed the strategic positioning of UNDP support in transition and development. The ADR covered particularly important time for Iraq, in its efforts towards reconstruction and transition to development. UNDP programme has operated in the context of United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period. This was also period of implementation of UNDG ITF, when the UN in general and the UNDP in particular, had access to vast reconstruction and development funds. The scope of the evaluation therefore included the interface of UNDP programme with UNAMI which has a Security Council mandate[3] to advise, support and assist the people and the Government of Iraq, including in the areas where UNDP provided assistance and to which UNDP contributed.

1.4. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The ADR followed the framework provided in the IEO's *ADR Method Manual 2011*, using multiple data collection methods and applying standard ADR evaluation criteria to generate findings and make assessments. The standard ADR evaluation criteria used to assess contributions through programme activities were:

- Programmatic relevance: How relevant have UNDP's programme activities and outputs been in achieving intended programme outcomes and addressing challenges they aimed to address?
- Effectiveness: How effective have UNDP's programme activities and outputs been in achieving intended programme outcomes and addressing challenges they aimed to address?
- Efficiency: Has there been any reasonable way to achieve more results with the same resources, or the same results with fewer resources?
- Sustainability: Have the results achieved by the programme been sustainable, or produced in such a way that they are likely to be sustainable?

The assessment of UNDP's strategic positioning entailed an analysis of strategies used by UNDP in responding to the national context of Iraq, including the development assistance provided by other actors. For this, the following criteria were applied as per the standard ADR methodology:

- Strategic relevance and responsiveness: How relevant have UNDP's programme and strategy been to national development challenges and Government priorities, and how responsive has UNDP been in responding to emerging challenges and shifting priorities to keep its programme relevant?
- Use of UNDP's strength and comparative advantages: How has UNDP made use of its strength and comparative advantage such as its strategic position in the country or development knowledge and expertise, to maximise its contribution to development results?
- Promoting UN values from a human development perspective: How has UNDP incorporated promotion of UN values such as equality and human rights in its approach and programme activities?

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[2] Since UNIAS covered the programme areas of all UN agencies, it had other programme outcomes that were not directly relevant to UNDP's work.
[3] The original mandate of UNAMI is in S/RES/1483 (2003), which was most recently renewed in S/RES/2110 (2013).

EVALUATION CHALLENGES

A challenge for the evaluation was the security restrictions during the conduct of the evaluation. With the exception of Kurdistan, meetings in with national stakeholders was extremely difficult for international team members. The national members of the team were however able to travel with less restrictions and have meetings with the national counterparts.

DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESS

The evaluation team based its conclusions on the triangulation of evidence from primary and secondary data sources, including desk review of documentation and information and data collected during interviews with key informants.

Theory of change for each programme outcome was outlined to assess the contribution of UNDP and to guide data collection. The projects, however, were not designed as integral parts to achieve programme outcome, but designed rather independently from each other with their own objectives. Therefore, while the assessment was made on the contribution of each project, it could not be aggregated to provide an assessment of the outcome.

The desk study included a wide variety of information sources: programme and project documents, reports relating to project performance, audit reports, meeting minutes and presentations, successive national development plans, national statistics, and studies and reports produced by other international agencies and research institutions. In particular, data and studies issued by the Joint Analysis Unit were used analysing the context. Additional documents and records were collected during the field research.

The ADR built on the outcome evaluations carried out by the country office. Findings of the following outcome evaluation reports in particular were used to substantiate ADR findings:

- Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Governance, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq (2009)
- Evaluation of "Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development" — Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011-2014 (2012)
- Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 — Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards (2013)

Interviews were held with programme managers, project implementers, project counterparts which are mainly government officials, beneficiaries where relevant, funding partners and agencies working in collaboration or in the same area of work.

Field visits were organized to conduct the data collection activities which covered 10 out of 18 Governorates in Iraq, namely: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil, Ninewa, Quadissiya, Salah al-Din, Sulaymaniya, and Thi-Qar.

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides the context in which UNDP has been working in the past decade and describes challenges it faced. Chapter 3 outlines UNDP's programme response and financial portfolio. In Chapter 4, assessment is provided on UNDP's contributions to development results through achievement of its intended programme outcomes. Findings are further analysed from the viewpoint of UNDP's strategic positioning in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions of the evaluation, as well as recommendations for the forthcoming programme of UNDP in Iraq.

CHAPTER 2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

Until two decades ago, Iraq was highly regarded in the Middle East for its public sector management capability, its effective growth strategy for an emerging economy and its social welfare programmes. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the years of war and international isolation have led to deterioration in infrastructure and underinvestment in public service. The hierarchical bureaucracy and inefficiencies of the socialist system, as well as the secrecy and the patronage system under centralized rule led to inefficiencies in public service delivery and a lack of transparency in governance, the remnants of which the country still suffers from today.

Post 2003 military operations by the international coalition force, Iraq was administered by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). In early 2005, the transitional National Assembly was formed to write the new Constitution of Iraq. The Constitution of Iraq was adopted in October 2005 in a national referendum. A general election was then held under the new Constitution in December 2005, and the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) was elected as the permanent parliament; after months of negotiations, a new coalition Government was formed in May 2006. The first governorate council elections took place in 2009 generally without serious incident. The second federal elections were held in 2010, and after protracted negotiations the incumbent government was established.

Despite the consecutive elected governments, a critical challenge for Iraq has been the high levels of 'security incidents' beginning in 2007 and 2008 followed by a reduction up to 2012 and then an increase in security incidents in late 2012 rising dramatically in 2013.[4] This chapter discusses some of the development challenges faced by Iraq, which has implications for UNDP contribution.

2.1. NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES

A fully nationally-owned National Development Plan (NDP) 2010-2014 was developed aiming to: achieve Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 9.4 percent per annum; generate 3 to 4.5 million new jobs; diversify the economy away from oil and into agriculture, industrial sectors, and tourism; and create a stronger role for the private sector, both in terms of investment and job opportunities. To achieve these goals requires a mobilisation of $186 billion in investment, create 3.5 million new jobs, and cut unemployment by half from 15 percent. The Plan focused on environmentally sensitive economic and social development using available natural resources in a sustainable way. The strategy aims to reduce poverty rates by 30 percent from 2007 levels by focusing on comprehensive rural development and providing basic services such as education and healthcare, particularly for vulnerable groups such as youth and women. It also aims to strengthen the role of local governments to bring service delivery and economic development closer to the people.[5]

In September 2013, the National Development Plan for the years 2013 – 2017 was launched, which replaces the NDP 2010-2014. The new plan is complementary to the earlier plan and aims to reduce the gap between rural and urban areas, strengthen the role of local governments in the implementation of NDP and promote private sector. [6]

2.2. ECONOMY

Iraq experienced sustained economic growth after 2008, led by rapid expansion of hydrocarbon production and exports. Growth reversed 30 years of economic stagnation and volatility that began in the 1980s. Strong economic performance and development achievements of the 1960s and 1970s ended during the 1980s. A regional war with Iran (1980-1988) was followed by international

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[4] Joint Advisory Policy Unit, UNAMI, Baghdad
[5] Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2010-2014, Government of Iraq.
[6] Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2013-2017, Government of Iraq.

sanctions (1990-2003) and two military occupations (1991 and 2003). Iraq's economy contracted a further 30 percent in 2003, under the weight of sanctions, invasion and occupation. These events accumulated to severely damage Iraq's economic institutions and infrastructure, with much of Iraq's resources being re-directed into war efforts.[7] As a result, per capita GDP declined by one third between 1980 and 2008,[8] and did not return to the adjusted 1980 level of USD 3,042[9] until 2009.[10]

Economic growth between 2004 and 2007 was modest, and constrained by the effective collapse of state institutions and ongoing conflict. After 2008, relative improvements to security and political stability combined with the expansion of Iraq's hydrocarbon sector to increase the pace of growth. GDP growth ranged between 5.8 per cent in 2009 and 8.6 per cent in 2012, with the growth rates for 2013 and 2014 projected at between 8 and 9 per cent.[11] These rates were below consecutive *National Development Plan* targets but robust enough to make Iraq one of world's best growth performers in recent years.[12]

Iraqi per capita GDP also increased, tracking growth in the economy. From an estimated USD 900 in 2004, per capita GDP increased to USD 4,278 5 in 2010 and USD 6,305 in 2013.[13]. Iraq moved through the ranks of Low Income (2004) countries to achieve Lower Middle Income (2008) and then Upper Middle Income (2013) status in the space of just 12 years.[14] Growth rates demonstrate both the depth of Iraq's economic decline between 1980 and 2003 and progress made since 2008.

Iraq's improved economic performance has been driven largely by the hydrocarbon sector. Government now estimates the sector's contribution to annual GDP at almost 19 percent.[15] Both the production and export of oil increased between 2009 and 2013,[16] with production recovering to the peak 1979 level of 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2012/13. Government estimates that production increased 9 per cent annually between 2009 and 2011, less than the 11 percent target but enough to drive a significant growth to both GDP and State revenues.[17] Government forecasts that production will increase to 9,500 million bpd by the end of 2017, although other estimates are more

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[7] With economic expansion and social investment policy during the 1960s and 1970s, Iraq became a regional leader in public sector and economic management, social service delivery and in raising living standards. Progress ended in 1980, with the Iran-Iraq war. Economic resources were re-directed from productive activities and social investments to financing the war effort and resisting sanctions, and Iraq's infrastructure gradually deteriorated from years of neglect. Post-2003 reconstruction needed to address not only war damage caused by the invasion, but the accumulation of 23 years of decline and isolation.

[8] World Bank, Country Partnership Strategy for Iraq FY13-FY16, November 2012, para 5

[9] International Monetary Fund, Iraq Programme Note, April 18, 2013

[10] Data summarised from Government of Iraq, National Development Plan 2010- 2013, pages 42 and 43.

[11] GDP data is cited from UMISS Joint Analysis Unit, Synthesis Paper; Preparation for the UNDAF 2015- 2019, 25 November 2013, pg. 3. The IMF further projects growth rates of between 8 and 10 percent for the 2014- 2018 period, as investments in oil and infrastructure projects and government capital spending both increase. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries

[12] International Monetary Fund, Iraq Article IV Consultation; IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013. See Para 6, Iraq: Selected Economic Indicators, 2010–18.

[13] Joint Analysis Unit, Synthesis Paper; Preparation for the UNDAF 2015- 2019, 25 November 2013, pg. 3

[14] The World Bank classifies Lower Middle Income countries as having an annual per capita GDP of USD 1,035 or less. Middle-income countries range from USD 1,036 to USD 4,085, while Upper Middle-Income Countries are between USD 4,086 and USD 12.615. Within this scale, Iraq achieved Upper Middle-Income status in 2013, http://thecurrencynewshound.com/2013/07/13/world-bank-iraq-moves-to-the-category-of-upper-middle-income-countries/
The IMF estimates that per capita GDP could reach USD 8,601 by 2017, at the end of the current National Development Plan period (International Monetary Fund, Iraq Article IV Consultation; IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013. See Table 1. Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2010–18)

[15] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, Table (3-7). Estimate is for 2014, calculated in 2012 fixed prices.

[16] Iraq has the world's fifth largest oil reserves, estimated at 1.43 billion barrels (GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, p. 73). Low extraction costs give Iraq an additional advantage. Iraq is currently the second-largest OPEC oil producer and the third-largest oil exporter in the world (IMF, Iraq: Selected Issues, 2013, para 2).

[17] Earlier growth was affected by the 2008 global economic crisis, with declining international prices resulting in an income loss of approximately 10 percent of GDP for that year (IMF, Iraq: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report No. 10/72, March 2010)

modest at the 6 million bpd range.[18] All estimates are subject to fluctuations in the international price of oil, to which Iraq is highly vulnerable, and to internal security and political stability.

Growth in non-oil sectors was less robust, limiting employment creation for Iraq's growing workforce. By 2012, the hydrocarbon sector generated up to 60 percent of Iraq's GDP, and accounted for most Government revenues. The *National Development Plan* for 2013- 2017 estimates that oil revenue generated 88.47 percent of the 2009 budget, decreasing to 85.68 percent in the 2010 then back up to 90.19 in the 2011.[19] Other estimates range as high as 97 percent of State revenue being derived from the oil sector in 2013, making Iraq one of the most oil dependent countries in the world.[20] Government estimates that non-oil sources comprised 10 to 14 percent of its revenues during the evaluation period, of which tax revenue was 6.04 percent in 2009 and declined to 1.78 percent in 2011.[21] Low tax revenues demonstrated the weakness of tax policy and the revenue linkages between the State and society; the State does not depend on taxpayers for its income.

While the hydro carbon sector expands, growth in Iraq's non-oil sectors has been less robust and relatively stagnant as a share of overall GDP growth. Their real relative contribution to GDP growth has declined since 2010, as expansion of the hydrocarbon sector accelerated. Agriculture, traditionally an important employer grew at approximately 7 percent between 2009 and 2012, while manufacturing grew at 6 percent. Non-oil sectors showing stronger growth, such as construction and sectors related to infrastructure depend heavily on federal Government expenditures and public investment. The State plays the dominant role in determining how these sectors are developing and what economic actors are involved.[22] With economic resources concentrated in the State, there has been limited progress diversifying Iraq's economy away from its dependence on oil, or strengthening the role of the private sector as a strategic actor in Iraq's development. A robust private sector has not yet emerged, as a strategic actor in Iraq's development or as an alternative source of employment or State revenue through taxation. Rather, growth in the private sector continues to be crowded out by the State-managed economic system.

Table 1: Oil and Non-oil GDP Growth 2010 to 2013[23]				
GDP (percentage change)	2010	2011	2012	2013
Real GDP Growth	5.9	8.6	8.4	9.0
Non-oil real GDP	9.7	5.7	6.3	6.0

Larger private businesses are emerging in the Information and Communications Technology sector (mobile communications), construction, transport and infrastructure and in some manufacturing and light industry. However, these are highly dependent on government spending, given the limited direct spill over from the hydrocarbon sector. Otherwise, Iraq's private sector is dominated by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) operating mainly in the retail and trade, construction and transportation sector, and in light industry. The majority of MSMEs are either owned by sole

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[18] The IMF predicts production will increase to 5,7 million bpd by the end of 2017, noting constraints resulting from insecurity, political instability, complex contracting procedures and the ongoing need to improve production and export infrastructure (IMF, Iraq; 2013 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 13/217, June 2013, para 6).

[19] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p. 86

[20] The estimate of 97 percent is cited by UMISS Joint Analysis Unit, Synthesis Paper; Preparation for the UNDAF 2015-2019, 25 November 2013, pg. 3, and is consistent with IMF and World Bank data. The OECD estimated that Iraq was the second most oil revenue dependent country in the world in 2010, after Angola (OECD DAC, Fragile States 2013; Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World, 2013, Table .2

[21] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, p.6

[22] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, Table (3-7). Also see page 53- 56 for agriculture data.

[23] IMF Iraq; 2013 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 13/217, July 2013, Table 1, Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators

proprietors or as family partnerships. Using mainly low technology methods, they account for most employment non-public sector employment. [24]

On the basis of these trends, the *National Development Plan 2013- 2017* concludes that private sector "has not held a strategic role in overall economic development activities" (2013: 25). As selected indicators:

    a. The private sector's contribution to fixed capital formation during the evaluation period did not exceed 6.4 percent. In contrast, the public sector was the biggest investor during 2009-2010, accounting for 96.3 percent of fixed capital formation in 2010.[25]

    b. Both public and private sector contributions to the GDP for 2009-2010 were characterized by relative stability, with the State making the dominant contribution. Public sector expenditures accounted for 65.4 percent of GDP in 2010, while private sector contributions to the GDP were 34.6 percent.[26]

2.3. GOVERNANCE

In the area of governance, institutional capacity is a key challenge. Weak legal mechanisms and widespread corruption constrain development. Iraq ranks 169 of 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012.[27] Institutional capacity for public finance management has limitations, and this has implications for effectively managing oil revenues. Iraq faces challenges in delivering basic services, which limits popular confidence in the government and hence peace consolidation.

The devolution of powers to provinces is evolving in Iraq, although at a very slow pace. The constitution of Iraq allows for governorates to form into regions and recognises Kurdistan as a region, providing it a special status. A law establishing the process of regionalisation was established in 2006. One of the challenges facing Iraq is the lack of a policy on implementation of federalism. At present one province is given special status, while powers are yet to be devolved to other provinces. Iraq is yet to make the choice whether it would like to pursue a federal model or one that devolves power to local bodies. While Iraq has supported a reform process for decentralized political and administrative government, challenges remain in the devolution of authority for the delivery of services and transfer of revenues to local governments.

2.4. POVERTY REDUCTION

Iraq achieved the status of a "middle income country" in 2011, with moderate levels of income, multi-dimensional poverty (MDP), and low income inequality. Since 2008, rapid economic growth and improvements to public service delivery have contributed to a significant reduction in income poverty, and more modest reductions to non-income poverty. Progress notwithstanding, Iraq's development profile in 2013 is characterised by significant spatial and demographic inequalities, many of which were outlined in the *National Development Plan 2010- 2014*.

Income poverty is the most important contributor to multidimensional poverty in Iraq, again with marked spatial (urban-rural and Governorate) and demographic (male female and age) inequalities. Deprivation from education is the most important contributor to non-income poverty for both

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[24] The National Development Plan 2013- 2017 estimates that "large enterprises increased from 412 in 2009 to 420 in 2010, while medium-scale enterprises increased from 50 in 2009 to 55 in 2010. The number of small businesses increased from 10,289 in 2009 to 11,126 in 2010 (2013: 5). Most private sector growth, therefore, remains in the MSME sector. However, it is not a source of innovation with the capacity to provoke structural change. A 2012 study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that 85 percent of SMEs were owned by a single individual, 93 percent did not have a bank account and 73 percent did not have internet access. Few SMEs had introduced new products or business techniques since 2003, citing the lack of financial as an important constraint (ILO, Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Iraq; A Survey Analysis, 2012, See Executive Summary).

[25] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p. 4.

[26] GoI, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013

[27] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012.

females and males. Other contributors to non-income poverty vary by location and are strongly influenced by access to public goods and services. Women fare poorly across all of the multi-dimensional poverty indicators, particularly those in rural areas and/or with lower levels of education.[28]

In 2013, Iraq was ranked as country 131 out of 189 on the UNDP's *Human Development Index* (HDI). Its relative position improved from 135 in 2006, with Iraq now among the countries in the "medium human development" category. Iraq's actual HDI improved from .567 in 2007 to .59 in 2012.[29] The UN Iraq calculated the country's HDI higher at .683, based on the results of a 2011 UNICEF *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey* (MICS) assessment that was based on *National Development Plan 2013-2107* priorities.[30]

There were marked inequalities in HDI between governorates notwithstanding the overall improvements to Iraq's ranking. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Baghdad Governorate have the highest HDI (between .7 and .76), while the Governorates of Muthanna, Ninewa and Missan were among the lowest (between .6 and .65) (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Human Development Index across Iraqi Governorates[31]

Iraq has achieved two Millennium Goal targets as of 2013; Goal 1 (Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger)[32] and Goal 6 (Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). UNDP reports that Iraq was also on track to meet some specific MDG indicator targets in the following areas: universal primary education enrolment and youth literacy, for both girls and boys (Goal 2); maternal health, with a significant improvement in the number of attended births (Goal 5), and; access to improved sanitation (Goal 7). Good progress was also shown against Global partnership indicators (Goal 8). Although internet access remains low (6%), Iraq exceeded MDG targets on computer ownership and cellular subscriptions. It also benefited from external debt reduction, from USD 114bn to USD 31bn, under the Paris Agreement signed with the IMF.

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[28] See National Development Plan 2010- 2014

[29] UNDP, Iraq; Human Development Indicators, 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ

[30] UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, p 4

[31] Table XX is taken from UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, "Figure 1: The Human Development Index Across Iraq Governorates"

[32] Some concern remains for the national prevalence of underweight children, which at 8.5% is above the target of 4.5%, UNDP and the CSO, 2015 Millennium Development Goals, UNDP Iraq Country Office, 2013, p 3

Progress notwithstanding, the status of the remaining six MDGs is listed as "ongoing", with large gaps between progress and targets on some indicators. There was particular concern for: low net enrolment in secondary education and adult literacy (Goal 2); poor overall performance on all indicators related to gender inequality, with the exception of girl's primary school enrolment (Goal 3). Despite significant progress reducing the child mortality rate (50 per 1000 in 2006 to 32 per 1000 in 2011), it is still twice the 2015 target of 17 per 1000 live births (Goal 4), and; access to potable water (Goal 7). The report concluded that limited access and quality of public services in many rural areas was a key contributing factor to performance gaps.[33]

There was a modest decline in the number of economically active Iraqis, as a percentage of the overall population. Forty-two percent of Iraqis were active in 2011, compared to 46 percent in 2009.[34] Government attributes the fall in activity rates to slow growth in job creation relative to demographic growth, among other factors. There were also differences in labour force participation rates among governorates. The rates of participation are the highest in Anbar, Najaf, and Wassit (47-48%), while the rates are lowest are in the governorates of Dahuk (37.6%), Thi-Qar (40.5%), and Muthanna (40.6%).[35]

There were significant variations between the participation rates of males and females; 73 percent of males are active, compared to only 14.7 percent of women.[36] Male participation declined slightly (75% in 2007 to 73% in 2012), while female participation showed a modest increase of approximately two percent, up from the 13 percent reported in the 2007 Household Survey.[37] Government also reported a gradual decrease in the in the gap between male and female participation rates in urban areas, while the gap is growing in rural areas.

The national unemployment rate for 2012 was 11 percent, declining from 15 percent in 2009. With the reduction, Government reported that Iraq was on track to meet its 2014 target of "reducing unemployment to acceptable levels".[38] However, concerns remain for the demographic and spatial profile of unemployment, and the quality of jobs in the private sector. These remain contributors to multi-dimensional poverty.

2.5. GENDER INEQUALITY

Iraq has a high level of gender inequality. The national Gender Inequality Index (GII) of .57 placed Iraq at position 117 out of 146 countries globally in 2012, and the third to last position in the MENA region.[39] Government reported it is not expected that gender equality in Iraq will be achieved [in the near term] due to cultural and social factors.[40] The GII varies, between .7 in Al Muthana Governorate to .47 in Suleimanya (Figure 2). Overall, the three Kurdistan Governorates have the lowest levels of inequality. At the national level, the UNDP reports that inequality is driven by high maternal mortality, low representation in parliament, low participation in the labour market and the small

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[33] UNDP and the CSO, 2015 Millennium Development Goals, UNDP Iraq Country Office, 2013, p 3
[34] Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p 8. Economically active refers to persons over 15 years of age that are either working or seeking employment. The United Nations reports 43.8% of Iraqis were economically active in 2011, slightly higher than the Government estimate (UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, p 15). The 2008, 46 percent activity rate was well below the MENA average rate of 67 percent, largely owing to the low participation of women.
[35] UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, p 15
[36] Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p 8. Iraq has the third lowest rate of female economic activity in the MENA region, after Yemen and Saudi Arabia (World Bank, Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa, 2013, Figure .03)
[37] World Bank, Confronting Poverty in Iraq, Main Findings, 2011, p. 39. From 2007 data, the report estimated that only 11% of women were active in the labour force, noting that a large number of these were unemployed. Accordingly, 87% of women were outside of the labour force in 2007, compared to 85.3% in 2012. The figures include women actually working and those unemployed but seeking jobs.
[38] Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p 8
[39] UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, p 5 The GII is based on an assessment of three indicators: reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participation. A score of 1 shows absolute inequality between men and women, while a score of 0 shows equality.
[40] Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan 2013- 2017, 2013, p 21

number of females above 25 with secondary level education or greater. Also, the Governorates with the highest Human Development Index correlate as having the lowest inequality levels.[41]

Figure 2: Iraq Gender Inequality Index

2.6. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

After the invasion in 2003, a substantial amount of official development assistance (ODA) was provided to Iraq, mainly as a response to the humanitarian crisis and as support for the reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure (see Figure 3). When the new government was formed in 2005, total ODA reached over USD 20 billion.

This was an important source of revenue for the Government of Iraq. The aid-to-GDP ratio for 2003-2010 was 22 percent, making Iraq the world's 14th most aid-dependent country. Iraq was one of the seven largest recipients of ODA throughout this period.[42] At its peak in 2005, allocations to Iraq accounted for 40 percent of all aid flows into fragile states. Of equal importance to financing was the transfer of technology, modern equipment and access to international advances in all fields, after 13 years of isolation.[43]

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[41] UNAMI, Governorate Level Vulnerability Mapping, Joint Analysis Unit, DRAFT, Baghdad, December 2013, p 5
[42] Data on international assistance to Iraq taken from OECD DAC, Fragile States 2013; Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf. Approximately 50 percent of total assistance came from the United States. The allocation of ODA to fragile states tripled during the decade ending 2012, as a percentage of total aid flows. From approximately 10-12 percent of ODA in 2001, the 47 countries classified as "fragile" received 38 percent of total ODA in 2010, or approximately USD 50 billion. Over 50 percent of ODA allocations during this period went to seven countries, identified by donors as situations where their national security interests intersected with state fragility and conflict. Iraq was the largest recipient in 2005, and among the top seven recipients between 2003 and 2010. However, the aid to GDP ratio declined after 2005, as national GDP began to expand and with the sharp reduction of international assistance beginning after 2007.
[43] In this context, Donors channelled almost USD 1.43 billion through the United Nations Development Group's Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF), which closed new programme funding in 2010. See the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund site for programme and financial information, http://mptf.undp.org/.

Figure 3. Net ODA inflow and government expenditure 2003-2011

Figure 3. Net ODA Inflow and Government Expenditure 2003-2011

The turning point came in 2009. Almost all donors except United States of America and multilateral agencies have drastically cut their ODA to Iraq. United States of America continued to provide sizable ODA but nevertheless reduced the amount year-by-year. This could be explained by the fact that, with the oil revenue, Iraq is classified as a middle-income country and, after the first tenure of the government, the country was considered as having restored self-financing capacity (as seen in Figure 3) and 'graduated' from the post-conflict emergency status to a middle-income country. The financial crisis of 2008 may also have played a factor in this precipitous drop. In this context, ODA fell to USD 1.9 billion in 2011, or 1.7 percent of Gross National Income, down from USD 9.2 billion in 2007.[44]

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[44] OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/IRQ.gif Total ODA to Iraq for 2011 was estimated at USD 1,904 billion, of which 75 percent originated from the United States. Support to governance, social service delivery and infrastructure comprised almost 90 percent of the portfolio. Also see Table 25, ODA Receipts and Selected Indicators for Developing Countries and Territories http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm

CHAPTER 3. UNDP RESPONSE

UNDP has partnered with the Government of Iraq for over 35 years (since the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement in 1976) and supported development and recovery and reconstruction efforts. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of the United Nations assistance strategy coordinated by UNAMI. The UNDP support aligned with the successive National Development Plans, UNIAS 2008-2010, and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Since the launching of this funding mechanism, UNDP participated alongside UN agencies and other international organizations in administering United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF).

At the request of the Government of Iraq, UNAMI was established by the 2003 Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1500. As a political mission, its role was greatly expanded in 2007 with SCR 1770. It is mandated to assist the Government and people of Iraq in advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national reconciliation; assist in the electoral process and national census planning; facilitate regional dialogue between Iraq and its neighbours; and promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform.[45]

UNAMI thus became an integrated mission, covering not only the peace and security issues but also humanitarian interventions and recovery. It is headed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Iraq, who is assisted by two Deputies, one in charge of political affairs and the other in charge of development and humanitarian affairs. The latter position is assumed by the UN Resident Coordinator who provides linkage between UNAMI and the UN Country Team (UNCT) comprising sixteen UN and associated agencies engaged in development and humanitarian work.

Early in 2004, the multilateral International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq was launched to help donor nations channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction and recovery of Iraq. This funding facility was made into two trust funds, one was the UNDG ITF), which amounted to USD 1.33 billion and the other was the USD 496 million trust fund for the World Bank to implement. Over nine years, the fund disbursed approximately USD 1.4 billion to participating UN agencies. Nearly a third of the ITF, or approximately USD 400 million was disbursed to UNDP, which meant UNDP had an average of nearly USD 50 million per year from ITF. Further, UNDP was mandated to act as the Administrative Agent of the trust fund and actively coordinate the use of the fund by UNCT agencies. For the use of this facility, UNCT was requested to focus on quick-impact and transition activities to be implemented in a rapid and flexible way. With a view to supporting the integrated mandate from SCR 1770, UNCT developed UNIAS for 2005-2007 and 2008-2010 to provide a coordinated approach to humanitarian, reconstruction and longer-term development assistance.

This chapter discusses the UNDP programme strategy, programmes carried out by UNDP in coordination with UNAMI and UN.

3.1. UNDP PROGRAMME- 2008-2011

In order to introduce a coherent approach to programming, UNDP has prepared Interim Country Strategy 2008-2010, which replaced the approval for UNDP assistance to the country on a project-by-project basis. The Strategy introduced a coherent approach to programming for the first time since 1989.[46] Aligned with priorities identified in the NDS 2007-2010, SCR 1700, and the International Compact with Iraq,[47] the UNDP programme focused on the two main areas of (1) governance and (2) economic recovery and poverty alleviation. UNDP focused heavily on financing

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[45] S/RES/1500 (2003); S/RES/1770 (2007)
[46] UNDP Iraq Interim Country Strategy 2008-2010
[47] International Compact with Iraq Resolution: http://www.uniraq.org/ici/ICI_Resolution_EN.pdf

reconstruction efforts and generating employment, including the rehabilitation of multiple power generation plants and systems. See Table 2 for the UNIAS outcomes that UNDP supported.

The ADR included two outcome areas of the 2008-2010 programme period for assessment, where UNDP had substantive lead responsibility in UNIAS (2008-2010).[48] These are governance, and economic recovery and diversification. Between the two periods, there is a large degree of coherence in programme areas and continuity in many projects.

Table 2: UNIAS outcomes (2008-2010) relevant to UNDP	
Governance	
Outcome 1	Strengthened electoral processes in Iraq
Outcome 2	Strengthened national dialogue and civil society for governance and reconciliation
Outcome 3	Enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Outcome 4	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes of national and local governance
Economic reform and diversification	
Outcome 1	Improved policies, strategies and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality and pro-poor economic growth
Outcome 2	Enhance key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas
Outcome 3	Strengthened electricity and transportation sector plans for rapid economic growth

Source: UNIAS 2008-2010: United Nations Country Team - Mission Statement

3.2. UNDP PROGRAMME- 2011-2014

The UNDAF 2011-2014 provided for an integrated UN country strategy based on the NDP 2010-2014. Accordingly, UNDP transitioned to its current full Country Programme for 2011-2014 with four priority areas: (1) fostering inclusive participation; (2) strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; (3) promoting inclusive growth, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation and MDG achievement; and (4) restoring the foundations for development.[49] UNDP also changed its programmatic focus from infrastructure rehabilitation, to upstream initiatives including capacity development and policy support to key national institutions.[50] Annex 2 outlines the strategic linkage between national priorities represented in the NDP, UNDAF and UNDP country programme.

UNDP country programme 2011-2014 for Iraq is structured around five programme outcomes. Each outcome is intended to be achieved through several component programmes (see Table 3).

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[48] Since UNIAS covered the programme areas of all UN agencies, it had other programme outcomes that were not directly relevant to UNDP's work.
[49] UNDP Country Programme Document for Iraq (2011-2014), 15 Oct 2010
[50] UNDP and Government of Iraq, Country Programme Action Plan, 2011-2014

Table 3: Country programme outcomes (2011-2014)	
Country Programme Outcome	
Outcome 1	Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation.
Outcome 2	Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards.
Outcome 3	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels
Outcome 4	Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies.
Outcome 5	Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development.

Source: UNDP Iraq Country Programme document

3.3. PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

There are important features of the Iraq programme that not only distinguish it from UNDP's programmes in other countries, but also have implications for how the programme is managed. Since the 2003 bombing of the UN offices in Baghdad, the programme has been implemented in large part remotely from an office located in Amman, Jordan. Although a section of the programme staff returned to Iraq a large proportion of the country office operations was based in Amman. In 2013, UNDP decided that the Amman office will be closed by the end of the year and all the operations will henceforth done within Iraq. In the last quarter of 2013, the entire country office has moved to Iraq.

UNDP supported Kurdistan Regional Government and implemented parallel programmes, given the special status of this region. UNDP has thus run parallel projects in a number of programme areas, one with the Federal Government in Baghdad and another with the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Erbil sub-office that was set up to support programmes in Kurdistan Regional Government has since further consolidated its operations. According to the country office there are plans under way to open a programme support office in Basrah, in addition to the main office in Baghdad and one in Erbil for to improve engagement with national stakeholders.

The remote operation from Amman has affected the performance of the programme with reduced interactions with national partners, and to some degree among UNDP programme staff who were dispersed between three offices (Amman, Baghdad and Erbil). The access to national partners and stakeholders by international programme staff has been severely curtailed by the security restrictions of UNAMI, which have been an issue particularly in Baghdad. The current UNDP Iraq management is exploring options to mitigate the negative impact of security restrictions on programme performance, such as increasing national programme staff, and locating national staff in the ministries and local offices where international staff cannot stay due to the security rules.

3.4. RESOURCES

The ITF was established in 2004 and UNDP was allocated approximately USD 400 million to disburse from 2005. The amount of funds available for UNDP to implement the programme

amounted in 2005 to approximately USD 160 million, of which about 70 per cent or approximately 135 million was spent. After two years that followed with the budget of 90-100 million and about 70 per cent expenditure rate, UNDP had another increase in the budget in 2008 to approximately 135 million presumably to expedite the spending of the remaining funds. The operation of the ITF was to be officially closed in December 2013.

With the drop in foreign aid from 2009 (see Figure 4), UNDP's programme budget has been on the decline, although not as precipitously because the programmes are budgeted over a number of years and there is a delayed effect. The trend in the budget and expenditure is depicted in Figure 1. For 2013, the budget allocated for programming was about USD 60 million, less than half of what was budgeted in 2008.There are indications that there may be further reduction in the funds.

In terms of budget performance or the expenditure rate, it has remained by and large around 70 per cent, except for the two year span of 2009-2010 when the rate dropped to 50-60 per cent. Figure 4 shows the distribution of resources among the programme areas for the period 2006-2011. The budget for each outcome is presented in Table 4.

Figure 4. UNDP Iraq budget and expenditure

Table 4: Country programme outcomes, component programmes and budget (2011-2014)		
Country Programme Outcome		Budget (in US$)
Outcome 1	Support to elections Support to the Council of Representatives Empowering civil society organizations Peace and reconciliation	49,427,491
Outcome 2	Rule of law Human rights and access to justice Security sector reform and small arms light weapons programme	60,432,393
Outcome 3	Public sector modernization Anti-corruption programme Donor coordination mechanism UNDP-Global Fund support to national anti-tuberculosis programme	75,303,877
Outcome 4	Achievement of MDGs Local Area Development Programme Environment and sustainable development	250,133,204
Outcome 5	Private sector development programme Reconstruction	208,084,988

	Loan management	

The nature of projects supported by UNDP has varied– from infrastructure rehabilitation to training and policy studies – and the budget size does not always reflect the importance of the programmes. The categorization of projects into different programme areas has not been consistent and sometimes appears arbitrary. The UNDG ITF created pressure to complete of individual projects. As a result, UNDP could not seriously pursue coherent programming to achieve long-term development results. Nevertheless, with the large sum of funding available and the focus on reconstruction and recovery, this approach has produced tangible benefits to the country.

CHAPTER 4. UNDP CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

This chapter analyses UNDP's contribution by country programme outcomes, applying the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Each of the sections below is an analysis of the outcome of the current programme and related projects from the previous programme. For each outcome overall findings are presented, followed by an analysis of projects in each programme area of the outcomes.

4.1. STRENGTHENED PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS

Outcome 1 includes four programme components, i.e., support to Elections, Council of Representatives (Parliament), civil Society Organizations and peace and Reconciliation was in response to national needs and priorities. Two of them, support to elections and Council of Representatives, pertained to governance reforms in the country. More details about the outcome are presented in the Box 1 and Table 5.

Box 1: Outcome 1 Statement and Indicators

> **Outcome Statement**
> Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation.
>
> Outcome 1 includes four areas of work: Elections; Council of Representatives (Parliament); Support to Civil Society Organizations; Peace and Reconciliation
>
> **Outcome Indicators**
>
> - IHEC has a permanent voter registry with safeguards to prevent fraud and mechanisms for inclusion of
> - all Iraqis in elections (2010: no; 2014 yes)
> - Number of personnel, disaggregated by gender, and representatives of relevant Iraqi partner institutions engaged in capacity building activities to enhance electoral management policies and processes (2010: 0; 2014: 450)
> - Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation
> - Number of political parties participating in the capacity development events (2009: zero; 2014: 10 political parties)
> - % of legislators elected in 2010 trained on legislative and oversight functions (2009: zero; 2014: 50%)
> - Women candidates have the capacity to undertake effective electoral campaigning (2010: no; 2014 yes)

Table 5: Programme activities under Outcome 1					
Programme activities under Outcome 1					
Programme	**Project**	**Duration**	**Original Budget $000,000**	**Source**	**Location**
Support to Elections	Institutional Development: Organizational and Capacity Development for IHEC	2005-2010	7.2	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Technical Assistance to IHEC Phase II	2008-2012	5.5	UNDG ITF	National
	Institutional Development Support to the IHEC	2010-2013	10.1	UNDG ITF	National

Support to the Council of Representatives	Support to the Council of Representatives	2010-2013	1.4	UNDP core funds UNDP DGTTF UNDP BCPR	National
Support to Civil Society Organizations	Empowering CSOs in Iraq	2012-2014	2.7	UNDAF fund	National
Peace and Reconciliation	Support to National Reconciliation	2010-2013	0.5	UNDAF Fund	Nineweh
	Support for Rights of Minorities	2010-2012	0.5	Government of the Netherlands	Nineweh and DIBs
	Nineweh Minorities – Interfaith Dialogue Component	2011-2013	0.18	Government of the Netherlands	Nineweh and DIBs
	Peace and Development Analysis	2010-2013	0.52	UNDP core funds CPR TTF Conflict	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

Support to elections has been a flagship programme for UNDP, having achieved considerable results. Performance in the other programme areas of the outcome is reduced by the lack of synergy among programme areas, in meeting the expectations of the national counterparts and the small scale and stand-alone character of the activities undertaken.

Support to elections is a government priority. It has accorded legitimacy to the government-run electoral process. Assistance to the electoral commission has established the Iraq High Electoral Commission as a self-sufficient body capable of functioning on its own making it a sustainable and successful participatory mechanism. The other participatory mechanisms supported under this outcome – Council of Representatives, civil societies and reconciliation initiatives – are each, for various reasons, limited in their contribution to meeting the outcome objectives. This is partly due to UNDP's responsiveness in implementation. It is also due to increasing sectarian conflict and the unsuccessful efforts by the present government to impose order, centralizing power in the process. Government has become less inclusive and less participatory. While performance against some indicators is positive – percentage of women elected to national and governorate Council of Representatives for instance – others aiming for greater civil society involvement and progress in peace-building - show negative trends. UNDP's financial predicament and the lack of coordination between UNDP and UNAMI are also contributing factors.

UNDP's support to elections project has expressed its concerns about voter registration as well as other matters to IHEC management. In previous years, IHEC has responded openly to the concerns of international advisors but this seems to be changing. There appears to be declining interest of IHEC management to consult the UN team, for instance in introducing a biometric approach to voter registration which the UN team opposed. While the electoral support programme has been relevant to the needs of IHEC throughout the programme period, its relevance has now diminished as the real challenges faced by IHEC are no longer technical but largely political, where UNDP does not have much role.

Although UNDP's involvement has been well-regarded for the most part and UNDP may wish to continue its involvement with elections, the question is whether further UNDP involvement would continue to be desirable. Firstly, Iraq is a middle-income country and IHEC has shown that it is capable of running its own elections. While there may be aspects in which IHEC could use technical assistance, it could well source such assistance by itself without a full-fledged project by UNDP. The relevance of UNDP's technical support has thus diminished. Secondly, while IHEC may be

technically capable, it is inherently an institution that is constantly under political pressure. The value of the UN involvement for IHEC is to ensure its elections are legitimate.

If the UN is not invited to advise on key decisions, such as those related to voter registration issues, it can seriously risk its credibility by blindly associating itself with the election results. In order to avoid such a risk, there must firstly be a serious political-level involvement and clarification of the conditions under which the UN can be associated. Such political interventions are the mandate of UNAMI. However, the evaluation found no signs of UNAMI taking a political leadership on this issue in support of the whole international electoral support team. Nor did UNDP show much interest beyond trying to carve out its niche within the UN team to focus on capacity development. Thus, while a new project document for continued support for the institutional development of IHEC has recently been prepared, it is important to ask how political and reputational risks can be avoided and whether the continued focus on technical support is the right approach.

The other programme areas of the outcome – the supporting the functioning of the Council of Representatives, support to CSOs and reconciling ethnic differences – seem to hold only modest interest for the Government. The Council of Representatives is a political body whose efficacy is suffering from the rise in political tension especially since the last national elections. While mention is made of civil societies in the NDP 2010-2014, it is to caution that "their identity must be verified" and to ask whether they "really exist or are they fictional?"[51] No mention is made of peace building or reconciliation in the NDP. The political situation is challenging where understandably the Government is increasingly sensitive to measures that might benefit political oppositions, making it difficult for programmes to remain relevant.

There may well have been some results in the support to Civil Society Organizations, but its small scale and the fact that it is a stand-alone project means it does not have the scope for achieving the objective it set for itself of holding the government accountable in service delivery, promoting human rights and reducing corruption. The support to the Council of Representatives has so far accomplished far less than expected and the peace and reconciliation projects have been small, pilot initiatives that have generated little appreciation or interest.

Supporting the Council of Representatives entails significant challenges. There is a wide-spread perception that the Council is presently not in a position to make key legislative decisions on critical national issues or to effectively discharge its oversight role over the executive branch of the Government and combat corruption. Introducing reforms in the parliament must contend with this complex environment.[52] For UNDP support to be relevant, it must carefully design its approach so as to overcome these challenges. The current project does not seem to be successful in this regard as it has failed to garner political and financial support for its initiatives.

Peace and reconciliation support involved small pilot projects, premised on the expectation that lessons learned from the project will greatly enhance the capacity of UNDP and other agencies to undertake local community dialogue projects in Iraq.[53] There has been, however, no indications of significant support from within UNDP nor were there indications of support forthcoming from other agencies. There is no question that these reconciliation projects attempted to promote UNDP values of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and protecting rights of minorities. However, the question in this case is whether the approach had the merit of addressing conflict on a wider scale, applicable broadly in the country. Very few stakeholders considered it does. Some regarded the projects as naively conceived. While the overall objective is relevant to the critical issues that the country faces, these projects have not engendered wider interest and support was found to be minimal.

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[51] Government of Iraq, National Development Plan Years 2011-2014, Ministry of Planning, 2010
[52] Milad Abdul-Jabbar **,** Iraq: the executive authority distributes the rights of citizens over the nation's COR!, BADHDAD, 20 September 2013
[53] UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for the Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewa, February 2011, p. 7

Outcome 1 is not a coherent entity, and this detracts from the overall effectiveness of its component parts. Support to elections is the exception since it continues to have significant results. Support to Civil Society Organizations may well have some results but its small scale and the fact that it is a stand-alone project means it does not have the scope for achieving the objective it set for itself of holding the government accountable in service delivery, promoting human rights and reducing corruption. The support to the Council of Representatives has so far accomplished far less than expected and the peace and reconciliation projects have been small, pilot initiatives that have generated little appreciation or interest.

The scale and scope of the pilot projects were too small to demonstrate a viable model for replication or pursuing an approach.

Pilot projects whose modest commitments are justified by the fact that their example is expected to attract donor investors and other agencies to build on these initial efforts. As it turns out, however, neither the support to the Council of Representatives nor the Support to Civil Society Organizations project nor the Peace and Reconciliation projects seem poised to bring in additional support. They are small and stand-alone. It seems that UNDP has taken them on in part because the funds, however modest, were made available; there was also the remote possibility that they would evolve into something more substantial. In retrospect, the outcome has benefited little, the benefits to UNDP have been modest and national partners – parliamentary committees, civil society in Iraq and ethnicities in Nineweh - have seen little change.

ELECTIONS

UNDP's support to the Iraq High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has been a key area of UNDP work in Iraq since 2004. UNDP has been a part of a four-agency international electoral support team, led by UNAMI, together with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the International Foundation for Electoral Support (IFES). Within the team, UNDP focused on supporting the development of institutional capacity of IHEC on dispute resolution mechanisms and public outreach, as well as developing staff capacity in the areas of electoral data collection, reporting; field coordination and management; complaints processing; and use of social media. The approach was to have advisory staff working closely with IHEC, to identify areas of improvements and lessons learned from previous elections and address gaps therein.

Two successive UNDP projects guided UNDP's contribution between 2004 and 2009 providing technical assistance, training and needs assessments. A third UNDP project beginning in 2010 and continuing to 2013 - Institutional Development Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) – was the largest programme area under Outcome 1 oriented, in principle, to institutional building. The funds come from the now terminated Iraq Trust Fund. See Table 5 for details of the various projects.

The support to elections has achieved considerable results as IHEC is now regarded as an institution that can run well-organized elections. There is still a gap in enabling voter participation.

Support to elections by the UN team has achieved tangible results. The proof has been in a succession of national, governorate and Kurdistan elections which have taken place in reputable fashion. Two elections have recently taken place under the auspices of IHEC – the Governorate Council elections in south and central Iraq and the parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan region, and both are viewed as well-managed.[54] This perceived legitimacy speaks for itself.

IHEC became self-sufficient institution capable of running well-organized elections and its technical capacity has developed. While the work of IHEC in these recent elections is seen as successful, there are some important concerns. For example, voter registration despite the support from UNDP and

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[54] Shams Network for Monitoring Elections, Report Series on Electoral Process in Iraq 2013: the Parliamentary Elections in Kurdistan Region – Report on Special Voting 19/09/2013, Election Network in the Arab World, 2013

others for a full-fledged voter registration campaign, did not generate the required momentum. Low voter turnout and popular indifference in south and central Iraq is another concern. Voter turnout in the S/C has been given as 36 per cent, unusually low. By comparison the voter turnout in the recent KRG elections is reported at 78 per cent. It is not clear how IHEC intends to address these concerns. While these may be seen as a result of ineffectiveness of the UN team's advice on the campaign to encourage voter registration and turnout, it also points to the fact that the voter registration may well be a political issue beyond the remit of UNDPs technical support.

Voter re-registration campaigns that precede each election have had little success. In spite of suggestions by the UNDP team and others for a full-fledged voter registration campaign, voter rolls continue to be made up of a patchwork of lists including those from the old food rations list with all their inaccuracies supplemented by records from the military rolls that are vulnerable to manipulation. This voter registry has sufficed up to now though its many inaccuracies invite fraud in both KRG and in S/C Iraq. The present voter registry is neither permanent nor fraud-free.

The four international organizations are acutely aware of the apparent indifference of voters in the S/C Iraq. Popular indifference and even suspicion about IHEC and its efforts to reach the population are common in S/C Iraq. A recent survey of 3000 respondents across the country assessing the impact of IHEC's media campaigns discovered that hardly more than a third of the population responded or even knew about the campaign. Table 6 summarizes these responses. The report summarizing the survey results described these results as 'frightening.'[55]

Table 6: Influence of the Independent High Electoral Commission on the Population through Media Campaigns			
Positive Effect	**No Effect**	**Negative Effect**	**Unaware of IHEC Campaigns**
36	14	1	49

Source: IHEC, *IHEC Media Impact – Sample Survey*, 2011

UNDP has addressed its concerns about voter registration as well as other matters to IHEC management. In previous years, IHEC has responded openly to the concerns of international advisors but this is now changing since, in the last two years, the management of IHEC has become less interested in the technical advice UNDP provided. IHEC management personnel participated in workshops and trainings on nearly 3,000 separate occasions between 2011 and the present.[56] But IHEC management is distancing itself from the international advisors. IHEC management is embarking on a biometric approach to voter registration which UNDP and UNAMI had opposed. Part of the reason is also that the four international organizations do not present a common front. UNDP and UNAMI are yet to agree about their respective prerogatives and responsibilities.

This poses a dilemma for UNDP. Although UNDP's involvement has been well-regarded for the most part and UNDP may wish to continue its involvement, there are now two critical considerations. Firstly, IHEC is, for better or worse, capable of running its own elections and though UNDP might like to maintain an involvement for its own reasons, IHEC has become self-reliant. Secondly, while IHEC may be technically sound, there are indications that it is also becoming increasingly caught up in party politics that will compromise its independence.

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[55] IHEC, IHEC Media Impact – Sample Survey, 2011 p. 27
[56] Capacity development data provided by the Office of the Project Manager – Elections. Capacity development and training targets have been exceeded. Note that 15 per cent of training beneficiaries are women.

UNDP's ability to work productively within IHEC is diminishing. UNDP may wish to continue an involvement, to continue to provide advisory services; however, it must recognize its presence will be increasingly less welcome and UNDP's association with IHEC may assume an undesirable level of reputational risk.

COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES

Support to the Council of Representatives has included four projects. Three of them ended more than three years ago while a fourth ongoing project, scheduled to end in 2013 involves: i) support to women parliamentarians; ii) support to the administration (the Secretariat) of the Council; and iii) support to six parliamentary committees covering, notably, programmes to which UNDP has provided funding under other programme areas. The current project was initiated two years ago when the United Kingdom and the United States withdrew. UNDP stepped in with a 30 month project beginning in 2011 with a small amount of its own core funds along with funds from UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery amounting to approximately USD 1.4 million.

The ongoing project proposes to engage with the Council of Representatives in a number of ways. An initial engagement was with the Office of the Secretary General, the administrative wing of the Council, to formulate a strategic plan for parliamentary management. Secondly, a review of five standing committees in the Council along with a needs assessment was carried out. There were plans to build on the needs assessment and create a training cell to establish rules of procedures and propose administrative changes. Thirdly, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Council was signed in a highly publicized ceremony in December 2012 with the UNDP Administrator present. The MOU set out the terms of future collaboration agreeing on a permanent UNDP presence in the parliamentary offices, activities, provision of expertise and potential cost sharing.[57]

Support to Council of Representatives has accomplished far less than expected. In a politically contentious situation, UNDP found it difficult to achieve intended objectives.

Some of the UNDP objectives have been realized; women's participation for example. The percentage of women serving as parliamentarians has continued to respect quotas established by the constitution as shown in Table 7. Other objectives are far from realized. Although two workshops and a training session were held to formulate a strategic plan, UNDP consultants subsequently discontinued their contact with the Secretariat and preparation of the strategic plan was put on hold. It was reported that very little has happened in the past six months on this matter. On the review of five standing committees, the plan to build on the needs assessment conducted seems to have been put on hold. On the permanent UNDP presence in the parliamentary offices, as well as other assistance promised in the MOU, none are yet to be in place. All in all, UNDP is seen by national partners as not carrying though with its commitments.

Table 7: Women Parliamentarians from 2005 and 2010 Elections			
Women Parliamentarians from 2005 and 2010 Elections			
Year	Number of seats	Number of women parliamentarians	Percentage of women parliamentarians
2005	230	62	27%

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[57] UNDP, Governance Section, Strengthening the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) – Progress Report, May 2011-November 2012, January 2013

2010	318	82	26%

Expectations from the project were high and as a result there has been a decline in UNDP credibility inside Council. The strategic plan for the Secretariat is a case in point. The UNDP counterparts inside the Council are generally senior politicians or senior managers who expect to work with senior experts when working with the UNDP. They are disappointed when they find their counterparts are instead junior consultants lacking the requisite experience. A recent needs assessment observed that "there is limited capacity in UNDP for managing parliamentary support."[58] In spite of a commitment from the Council to provide office space, there is still no UNDP presence inside the parliament and no mechanism for coordinating international support. This is a role that UNDP is positioned to play and its failure to do so is a missed opportunity.

Budget shortfalls was perceived by UNDP as a factor in the limited contribution. But insufficient resources are as much a symptom as a root cause. Resources available for this outcome are nowadays widely dispersed among initiatives whose justification is that they bring in donor funding to a governance programme when resources are dwindling. UNDP's positioning as the appropriate conduit for funding to the Council of Representatives would be more credible if UNDP had undertaken a more disciplined planning process.

This is not to say that UNDP's contribution to Iraq's legislative body has been nil. This project has stalled; however UNDP has impacted the Council of Representatives through other projects. UNDP's project to put a High Commission for Human Rights in place has relied on the Council's Human Rights Committee to oversee its formation and ensured this innovative High Commission has the protection of the legislative branch. Important contributions have been made to the Regions and Governorate Committee through the Public Sector Modernisation project, which has successfully helped amend the important Provincial Powers Act, Law 21. Advice on this amendment has been deeply appreciated. UNDP provided expertise to the Committee on Family, Women and Children to draft a law on women's parliamentary participation that has contributed to women's capacity to undertake effective campaigning.[59] The project to lay the groundwork for a National Security Strategy has worked under the auspices of the parliament's Security and Defence Committee. The project 'Support to the Council of Representatives' has intended to strengthen select parliamentary committees including the Security and Defence Committee; however, there have been challenges in implementing the support to parliamentary committees, Security and Defence among them.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

This programme area includes one project, Empowering CSOs, with the aim of funding CSOs to undertake initiatives that will 'hold the government accountable' in one of three critical areas. There is in addition another project, listed under Outcome 3 – Participatory Governance for Enhanced Accountability and Human Rights –where CSOs figure in one of four somewhat unconnected activities. Empowering CSOs project that began early in 2012 and scheduled to conclude in mid-2014. UNDP's involvement with civil society organizations is not part of a broader initiative to support the non-government sector and for this reason, it stands largely alone with only tenuous connections to other UNDP activities.

During the United States occupation from 2003, civil society organizations were encouraged to establish themselves and they sprang up in large numbers. At the time, UNDP supported their emergence in various ways, first in 2004 with an effort at creating a national inventory and training for new CSOs committed to humanitarian activities. Subsequently, support for CSOs in 2007 sought

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[58] Kevin Devieux, Needs Assessment of Parliament in Iraq, UNDP, 2012
[59] Other indicators of achievement have not been relevant in this case. Neither representatives of political parties nor legislators have been trained in campaigning, oversight mechanisms or legislative functions as anticipated.

to engage CSOs in training communities how to protect themselves during the worst of the insurgency. An opinion survey undertaken at the time by a UNDP outcome evaluation showed that many of them were one-person organizations and a larger number had close links to political parties.[60] This raised suspicions. Some suspected that there were as many as 4,000 CSO formed during these years. UNDP ceased its support of CSOs after 2007.

In 2011, the Government of Iraq began a formal registration process and Table 8 shows the number of CSOs which have submitted formal registration papers to the CSO Directorate housed under COMSEC. The number of opportunistic CSOs may have diminished in the interim but their total number remains large.

Table 8: CSO Registration 2011 - Present		
CSO Registration 2011 - Present		
Year	Total registered	Average per month
2011	403	34
2012	868	72
2013 (9 months)	584	49
Total	1855	

Source: Joint Analysis and Policy Unit, UNAMI, Baghdad

In 2012 after a five year interval, UNDP once again undertook a project to support CSOs. This project has selected 54 CSOs to prepare applications for funding, trained them in submitting a proposal and selected 31 organizations to receive financial assistance for their proposal. Those selected work in fifteen consortia and each consortia is guided by a proposal to "effectively monitor the Government of Iraq's compliance with due process and transparency and enhance CSO capacities for advocacy"[61] in one of three broad areas: i) human and civil rights, ii) anti-corruption, and iii) promotion of adequate service delivery. Each of these areas corresponds to a UNDAF priority. The project is now proceeding step by step, providing the CSOs with skills where they are needed and tracking the progress as the consortia work in their respective areas.

While the support to CSOs had some outputs, its small scale and standalone nature of its activities meant that it did not have the scope for achieving the objective it set for itself — of holding the government accountable in service delivery, promoting human rights and reducing corruption.

The UNDP model for implementing this Empowering CSOs project was adopted by the Civil Society Organization Committee in the Council of Representatives in drafting a law that would have empowered the Committee to fund CSOs on a regular basis. The draft law was eventually defeated. A committee spokesperson regretted that UNDP's presence in the committee was sporadic at best, that it had not done enough to support the draft law noting if UNDP was concerned to promote CSOs, there were a number of ways this could be done.

The small number of CSOs being supported in this project means that greater attention can be given to the few CSOs chosen and this is thought by project staff to distinguish it from the larger programmes supported by larger donors that stress quantity over quality. The smaller number also means that the scope of the project is inevitably modest and the likelihood of there being any significant impact on the reputability of civil society organizations is less. This might not have been

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[60] Jim Freedman, Eduardo Quiroga, John Weeks and Amal Schlash, Outcome Evaluation of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Governance and Poverty Reduction Initiatives, UNDP Iraq, June 2009

[61] UNDP, Empowering CSOs in Iraq, MPTF Generic Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report 1 January 31 December 2012, Iraq UNDAF Trust Fund, February 2013, p. 3

an issue in previous years when funds were more widely available. It is however an issue when UNDP needs to be especially conscious of using limited resources to demonstrate its comparative advantage in a few bankable areas. UNDP does not expect, with this project, to develop a comparative strength or even a minor practice area in working with civil society.

The CSO support project has not operated at a large enough scale to register a discernible impact. Being a pilot, it could have served as examples that will encourage others to follow suit. The project manager however has been rarely asked to consult with other projects. On the other hand, another agency, UNOPS, has developed expertise in working with CSOs in Iraq and this is widely acknowledged. This project may have value and it may be well managed but it did not assist in contributing to UNDP's pressing challenge at the moment of how to establish sufficient competence in building national and regional governance institutions to ensure that the services it offers in these areas are sought after.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

Five relatively minor projects – usually referred to as pilots – make up this programme component, all with a focus on promoting peaceful interaction among different minorities, sects and faiths. For the most part these small projects have taken place in Ninewa Governorate where minorities and religious groups have been caught up in disputes between Kurds and Sunni Arabs over boundaries. The projects engage communities in local peace-building. They include: i) Support to National Reconciliation, to review reconciliation activities in Iraq; ii) Rights of Minorities in Ninewa, to bring minorities together in disputed boundary areas to reconcile differences; iii) Interfaith Dialogue, to do the same with groups of different faiths; iv) Conflict and Development Analysis, to bring a particular conflict analysis tool to bear upon the situation in these areas; and v) the Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion project, to support income generation activities in tandem with initiatives for finding common ground among opposed groups. Funds have come primarily from the Dutch Government and the UNDAF fund.

The growing influence of Kurds in the border governorates of Ninewa, Erbil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala has been met by aggression from a Sunni Arab bloc and tensions in the area have escalated. Alliances have been forged with local ethnicities and in the process, local minorities and religious groups have found themselves caught up in the conflict, pitted one against another. Long-nascent antagonisms have surfaced, increasing tensions in these disputed border areas. Two of the UNDP pilot projects proposed to train facilitators to bring these different ethnic and religious groups together and applied a technique developed by transitional justice programmes, namely to assemble adversaries to air grievances and discuss their concerns about each other and find a common ground on which to build peaceful interaction.

In another project, a Conflict Development Analysis was conducted to ascertain the root causes of conflict in these areas and a report was produced. A plan to initiate a successor project – the Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion project – has been approved with the aim of integrating local economic development initiatives with efforts to address the roots of violence and intolerance, again in Ninewa.[62]

The Peace and Reconciliation projects have achieved very little, not only because of its small scale but also because they failed to convince national partners that the reconciliation model they adopted was effective and worth replicating.

The two reconciliation projects followed a similar scheme. Members of the minorities in one case and faiths in another were selected and trained in peace-building exercises. Once trained, these facilitators then selected communities where they brought local ethnic and religious leaders together for workshops "to build inter-community understanding and identify initiatives that communities

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[62] UNDP Iraq, Project Initiation Plan – Community Development, Safety and Social Cohesion Project, October 2012, p. 2

can undertake themselves to improve inter-community understandings."[63] Ninewa was considered a logical place to pilot the exercise since it is home to a number of ethnicities and religious groups who live together in an uneasy truce. At the same time, because of this diversity and the tensions among them, it is a particularly difficult environment for promoting inter-ethnic and inter-faith tolerance. The project confronted a number of set-backs. In the Inter-Faith Dialogue project, an Inter-Faith Advisory Committee was created, but members were reluctant to participate and reluctant to publicize their involvement out of fear of reprisals. Community workshops did not involve discussions on topics that ethnic representatives felt uncomfortable addressing. Some mutual understandings endured while others were short-lived. Views were expressed that the technique was culturally insensitive, bringing in a Western conflict-resolution approach without the cultural context of Iraq.[64] Reports from project organizers on the real achievements were lukewarm.[65]

These are all pilot projects, premised on the expectation that "lessons learned from the project will greatly enhance the capacity of UNDP and other agencies to undertake local community dialogue projects in Iraq."[66] There are, however, no indications of significant support from within UNDP nor are there indications of support forthcoming from other agencies. These reconciliation projects promote UNDP values of addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and protecting rights of minorities; on this matter there is no question. The more pertinent question in this case is whether the approach also has the merit of addressing conflict on a wider scale, applicable not only to the communities of north-west Iraq but also more broadly to Iraq north and south. Very few think so. Some regard the projects as naively conceived. It is perhaps better to regard these initiatives as stand-alone projects than as pilots since their potential for engendering wider interest and support seems modest.

This reconciliation model has nevertheless continued to receive support in UNDP and the final report for the Inter-Faith Dialogue project recommended it be implemented on a larger scale to ensure greater impact, that trained facilitators should receive continued support and the Inter-Faith Dialogue Advisory Committee should continue to receive funding. It would be prudent to re-examine the approach and seek ways to address issues surfaced in the pilot initiatives.

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[63] UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewa, February 2011
[64] For instance, the reconciliation technique involved adversaries openly airing grievances against each other. It was mentioned that this was not considered appropriate in the Iraqi cultural context, and the participants have refused to do so.
[65] UNDP Iraq, Ninewa Inter-Faith Dialogue Initiative – Final Report, February 2013, pp 15-21
[66] UNDP Iraq, Project Document – Support for the Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups in Ninewa, February 2011, p. 7

4.2. ENHANCED RULE OF LAW

The outcome 2 comprised three areas of support, i.e., Rule of Law, Human Rights and Access to Justice, Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Light Weapons (See Box 2).

Box 2: Outcome 2 Statement and Indicators

Outcome Statement
Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards

Outcome Indicators
- % of courts that have court administration harmonized to minimum international standards (2010:0%; 2014: 15%)
- % reduction in backlog of civil and criminal cases (2009:base : 2014 10% less)
- % of registered cases with the family response units with legal proceedings initiated (2009: zero; 2014: 50%)
- % of periodic reports submitted as required by international human rights treaties ratified by Iraq (2009: to be determined; 2014 50% increase)
- % of cases referred by Human Rights Commission (2009: zero; 2013:50%)
- Development of the National Security Sector Strategy presented to the GOI (2010: no; 2014: to be presented)
- Database of small arms and light weapons created and managed (2010: no; 2014: yes)

For each of these thematic areas, Table 9 gives projects, their duration, location, funders and geographical coverage.

Table 9: Programme activities under Outcome 2					
Programme activities under Outcome 2					
Programme	**Project**	**Duration**	**Original budget $000,000**	**Source**	**Location**
Rule of Law	Support to Rule of Law and Justice	2008-2013	20.4	European Commission UNDP core funds	National
	Support to the Development of Justice and Rule of Law	2008-2012	9.2	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Reforming the Judicial Development Institute	2010-2012	0.6	Government of Germany	National
	Strengthening the Administration of Justice and Rule of Law	2010-2014	3.2	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency	National
	Justice Data Management Project	2011-2015	3.8	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency UNDP BCPR	National
Access to Justice and	Family Protection Support, Justice and Security for	2010-2013	0.7	Government of Norway	National

Human Rights	Survivors of Domestic and Gender Based Violence I				
	Family Protection Support, Justice and Security for Survivors of Domestic and Gender Based Violence II	2012-2015	2.5	DANIDA UNDP core funds UNDAF Fund	National
	Human Rights	2007-2009	1.4	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	UNAMI Human Rights	2008-2009	0.8	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Participatory Governance and Human Rights Project	2012-2014	1.2	UNDAF Fund	National
Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Light Weapons	Security Sector Reform	2012-2014	1.15	UK Conflict Pool (FCO, MoD and DFID) UNDP core funds	National
	Small Arms Light Weapons	2012-2013	0.15	UNDP BCPR	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

The Rule of Law programmes have achievements in some areas and close to none in others. The Rule of Law programme is relevant to the government development plan in principle, but not wholly accepted in practice. In Kurdistan, the Rule of Law programme shows potential though it is still at an early stage.

The Government included good governance within its NDP 2011-2014, of which rule of law and access to justice are a part. Areas of support such as courtroom efficiency, accessibility to clients, providing resource materials, training for judges, and creation of a commission for human rights, relate to broader objectives of the national strategy and the Government supports the initiatives in principle. However, within the good governance chapter in NDP 2011-2014, rule of law and access to justice constitute a minimal component.[67] Court reform and access to justice are mentioned only obliquely and limited primarily to the potential contributions of the legal system in overseeing the proper division of responsibilities between the provincial and central governments and among government departments. Government collaboration with UNDP appears to have increased over the last year. UNDP's Rule of Law section reports that Rule of Law programming is now 'guided by government priorities most notably the Five Year Plan of the Higher Judicial Council.' UNDP reports that their judiciary projects are fully accepted and an indication of this is the strategic partnership framework between UNDP and HJC which will be signed in Iraq on 10 April 2014."

Judicial practices, prison management, access to legal remedies and matters having to do with human rights and national security all involve institutions whose reform inevitably raises questions of national sovereignty. Changing how judges make decisions, how lawyers work and how courts and investigators carry out their business are delicate matters. There are contextual and political challenges in pursuing judicial reforms.

The Access to Justice and Human Rights programme has yielded considerable outcomes both in the federal system and in Kurdistan. The National Security Strategy and the Small Arms Light Weapons programme are yet to produce any results at this stage. The KRG has been more receptive to reforms of court proceedings, availability of legal aid and legal protection for women. The KRG has directly solicited UNDP intervention and was considering cost sharing of the programming. The programme is hence relevant to both the needs of the region and the government plan in Kurdistan.

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[67] Government of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2011-2014, Baghdad 2010, p. 179

There is recognition of the value of promoting discussion on an inclusive approach to national security in Iraq, where such a discussion could eventually contribute to addressing the root cause of the challenges that the country faces.

The sustainability of the Rule of Law programme in the federal system has, until recently, been open to question. In Kurdistan, where the Government welcomes the modernization of its judiciary and has embraced the programme, sustainability is more promising. The sustainability of the Access to Justice and Human Rights programme appears promising in both the federal system and Kurdistan.

UNDP has implemented programmes to improve court efficiency, to provide techniques for criminal investigations and to train judges in order to make their management of courts more efficient. These programmes have perhaps stopped the further deterioration of the judicial system but have not been able to meet their objectives. Members of the judiciary, esteemed that they are, are hesitant to rely on foreign advisors to reform their long-standing institutions. This has further diminished the impact of UNDP interventions in S/C Iraq, especially in training judges, investigating cases and managing court information. There have been some distinct successes, however, in improving access to justice in the KRG, in providing effective legal representation for those who cannot do so for themselves and in providing formal and informal assistance to women victims of gender based violence. Two recent in-depth evaluations of the programme raised questions about the on-going commitment of the government judicial institutions.

For activities under the Rule of Law programme, those involving key judiciary institutions in the federal system in particular, the stance of the national counterparts has ranged from mildly supportive to indifferent. The commitment of national partners may be increasing somewhat since its low point a couple of years ago, particularly since the recent signing of a 4 years partnership framework between the UNDP and the HJC. There were no assurances that pilot court experiments will be expanded or that the legal aid experiments in Basrah would be duplicated. This raises questions about its sustainability and given the limited results in this thematic area, about its future prospects.

In the Access to Justice and Human Rights programme, the situation is somewhat different. Here the Ministry of Interior has strongly supported the Family Protection Units providing police and legal assistance to women, children and families to respond to domestic disputes. There is also strong support in the KRG where there is full collaboration in supporting judicial training, in providing legal aid, in setting up a Board of Human Rights, in supporting the Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women and in supporting women's shelters.

Instead of responding to declining resources by consolidating the programme to increase synergy and effectiveness, UNDP has accepted contributions for project financing with little regard to whether the project adds to the outcome's internal consistency. There are indications this may be changing, however. There are efforts by the country office to develop a strategy to enhance programme coherence and ensure greater coordination in implementation.

In outcome 2 projects are linked in some way with the outcome statement. The statement is certainly broad enough. But the array of initiatives under this outcome includes initiatives that are too varied to make for a coherent outcome. An initial project included a number of initiatives to make the court system more attractive to Iraqi clients by increasing its efficiency and accessibility. Training judges may have had some impact. The case management system, however, did relatively little. Training judicial investigators has had very little impact, something that could have been predicted given the tense relations between the Ministry of Interior and the High Judicial Council. Preparing a progressive National Security Strategy during a time of active conflict is probably not realistic. Support for a database of small arms is tangential to the outcome statement. Discipline in planning is essential for building coherence in which the investments represent a concerted set of initiatives.

The recent Outcome 2 evaluation has observed that the outcome is made up of projects that projects are 'siloed' since they are implemented "with minimal regard to one another or to how the projects fit into a larger strategy for rule of law, justice and human rights in Iraq."[68] Planning has not consistently been focused on well-targeted and well-defined outcomes ensuring that all investments contribute integrally. The projects themselves may have merit, they may have the support of contributors, they may appeal to the government or they may strike a sympathetic chord among some influential programme staff. They do not however add up to a disciplined approach to achieving specific, limited and achievable objectives.

National ownership of the support extended by UNDP has been fraught with limitations. There were a few areas where ownership was demonstrated.

UNDP made efforts to promote collaboration with national partners, which include the federal and KRG judiciary, parliamentary committees, Ministry of Interior and the National Security Advisor's office among many others concerned with justice and human rights. At stake is not only the practical acceptance from national partners but also the prospect – increasingly on the minds of UNDP staff – of encouraging national partners to share the cost of UNDP's presence and expertise.

For activities under the Rule of Law thematic area, those involving key judiciary institutions in south and central Iraq in particular, the attitude of the national counterparts has ranged from mildly supportive to indifferent. The commitment of national partners may be increasing somewhat since its low point a couple of years ago,[69] but the question remains, how seriously the judiciary institutions take UNDP's contributions. This raises questions about its sustainability and given the limited results in this thematic area, about its future prospects.

For activities under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area, the situation is somewhat different. Here the Ministry of Interior has strongly supported the Family Protection Units providing police and legal assistance to women, children and families to respond to domestic disputes. There is also strong support in the KRG where there is full collaboration in supporting judicial training, in providing legal aid, in setting up a Board of Human Rights, in supporting the Directorate for Eliminating Violence against Women (DEVAW) and in supporting women's shelters. The KRG is more than prepared to support these services to needy clients, certainly more than the judiciary institutions in S/C Iraq are.

RULE OF LAW

The springboard for the present Rule of Law thematic area has been the Support to Rule of Law and Justice Project that began in 2008 and continued with extensions to 2013. This initial project undertook activities in a number of areas, some of which are now followed up under the Rule of Law thematic area and some under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area. Four Rule of Law projects have subsequently received funding: i) Support to the Development of the Rule of Law project aims to increase the efficiency of courts with a case management system delivered to pilot courts, for developing curricula for training judges, and for penitentiary reform; ii) Reforming the Judicial Development Institute supports refresher courses for practicing judges; iii) Strengthening the Administration of Justice and Rule of Law links the Iraqi and Dubai judiciaries in a twinning arrangement supporting also the training of judicial investigators; and iv) Justice Data Management Project, also supported by the United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency, facilitates the exchange of data on criminals and criminal activities among government departments. See Table 9 for more details about the projects.

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[68] Richard Langan II, Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards, UNDP, August 2013 p.

[69] Jim Freedman, Iraq - Support to the Rule of Law and Justice Project - Final Project Evaluation, European Union, UNDP and UNOPS, March 2012

In Kurdistan, a new project, Promoting the Rule of Law in Kurdistan Region, has recently started with an agreement from KRG partners to contribute USD 6 million for co-financing to support this programme.

The Rule of Law programme opened the doors for future reform but concrete achievements are modest. The number of judges and the number of cases in criminal courts have increased. However, there is little evidence of increased court efficiency, a reduction in case backlog or an increase of public confidence in the justice system.

The Rule of Law programme in the federal system has supported automation of case management, legal research, training for judges, training of judicial investigations and sharing of data on criminal activity among government departments. Meeting the targets for this outcome in south and central Iraq has required improving court administration to international standards for 15 per cent of all courts and achieving a 10 per cent reduction of case backlogs. To meet such targets, it would have required a considerable progress in: (i) the computerization of court records, (ii) capacity building of judges to bring them up to speed on key issues and (iii) improving the process of pre-trial investigation.

On computerization of case records, although the software was first introduced to three pilot courts during UNDP's first Support to Rule of Law and Justice project, it is only recently that some court records (300) at the Commercial Court in Baghdad have been entered into the case management system.[70] This was a progress but it is a small step that has been long in coming. Widespread computerization – at least enough to have an impact - will require a further and consistent effort by the court administration. There were similar implementation difficulties that confront the Justice Data Management project aiming to computerize criminal records kept by different ministries and departments. Thus, the initiative was a step in the right direction but failed to gain full support and commitment from the national partners critical in achieving the objectives.

On capacity building of judges, lack of adequate collaboration in reforming the curriculum at both the Judicial Development Institute (under the High Judicial Council) and the Judicial Training Institute (under the Ministry of Justice) has undermined the expertise of the judges.

There were efforts at continuing the up-dating of curricula at the Development Training Institute which would have replaced the *ad hoc* short courses under the first large project, but in the end there did not seem enough support for this within the High Judicial Council and funds were shifted elsewhere. UNDP forged ahead with a plan for institutional development but once completed, neither the High Judicial Council nor its training wing, the Judicial Development Institute, endorsed the plan. This brought the reform of training institutes essentially to a standstill.

Improving investigation into criminal cases is a special issue. Iraq provides for special judicial investigators instead of police to conduct pre-trial criminal investigations. Recently, the High Judicial Council has sought help in training judicial investigators.[71] UNDP proposed to train two groups of Judicial Investigators as part of the project, Strengthening the Administration of Justice in Iraq that has been running between 2010 and 2013. Training judicial investigators to work under the Higher Judicial Council inevitably diminishes the role of police in criminal investigations who work under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, and the support to judicial investigators has consequently generated friction between the Higher Judicial Council and the Ministry of Interior. There are also a number of international players including the United States Department of State, EUJUST-LEX and the Government of the United Kingdom who work in this area and look to UNDP to coordinate their inputs.

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[70] Website (Arabic only) of the High Judicial Council http://www.iraqja.iq/view.2077/
[71] Richard Langan II, Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards, UNDP, August 2013, p. 21

UNDP was slow to begin implementation, and this delayed addressing the inevitable friction among the ministries as well as coming to agreement on a common approach among international stakeholders. The recent Outcome Evaluation concludes that "given the delays in UNDP's implementation … it is difficult for this evaluation to attribute improvements in the functioning of the Judicial Investigation Officers to UNDP."[72]

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the country programme targets have been met. UNDP programmes have opened up areas of reform which would otherwise have remained closed and this is positive. There is evidence that the number of judges has increased overall and the number of cases in criminal courts has increased across Iraq.[73] However it is doubtful that the backlog of cases has been reduced to any significant degree. It is even more doubtful that any proportion of courts, certainly not 15 per cent, would operate now to international standards. There are three main reasons.[74]

a)   Judicial institutions have not been fully engaged. On a number of occasions, they have chosen not to endorse the results of UNDP programmes. The High Judicial Council decided not to fully endorse the effort to introduce a computerized system of managing cases. Desk books prepared for judges to use at the bench have not been adopted. Institutional reforms designed by UNDP for training centres have been rejected by judicial authorities.

b)   The different institutions dealing with judicial matters – the High Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior – do not readily work with each other. This has been an impediment when reforms require their collaboration. Training of judicial investigators for example with responsibility for investigations into criminal cases has lacked the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior whose police would, as a consequence, have their functions diminished. Improving the training of judges has involved two training institutes – Judicial Training Institute and Justice Development Institute – and the different departments managing these separate institutes have been reluctant to work together.

c)   UNDP's management has not effectively engaged with national partners. In some instances, UNDP has been slow in its implementation. In others, it has not sustained productive and on-going interactions with national partners, the High Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice particularly.

The European Union, which was a major source of external financing, withdrew funding for UNDP Rule of Law programme.[75] It now looks to its own source of expertise, EUJUST-LEX, for expertise or to the more operationally efficient UN agencies such as UNOPS for implementation.

Since the Rule of Law programme in Kurdistan is in early stages of implementation its effectiveness remains to be seen. Still, the regional government's political and financial commitment makes UNDP's interventions promising. The KRG officials show eagerness to engage UNDP's expertise in rule of law matters, specifically in assembling a legal database and increasing the level of training for judges.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The original Support to Rule of Law and Justice Project planned to introduce legal aid help desks in south and central Iraq and in Kurdistan. Very little was done in south and central Iraq. But a legal

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[72] Richard Langan II, Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards, UNDP, August 2013, p. 44
[73] Justice Raheem, Analytical Study on Performance of the Judicial System, Justice and Human Rights in Iraq 2007-2012, Appendix 1, produced for UNDP, Appendix 1
[74] Two recent evaluations of UNDP Rule of Law programming concur on these reasons: Jim Freedman, Iraq - Support to the Rule of Law and Justice Project - Final Project Evaluation, European Union, UNDP and UNOPS, March 2012; Richard Langan II, ibid.
[75] After the EU withdrawal, the US has become the major funding partner, accounting for approximately 70 percent of donor pledges to the Rule of Law programme.

help desks operated inside the Erbil Investigative Court and Sulymaniyah and only quite recently has been able to operate inside the court in Dohuk. Funding from the original Support to Rule of Law project concluded in 2013 and now two projects, Delivery of Justice and Citizens Access to Justice, are continuing support to legal aid help desks in Kurdistan and south and central Iraq with an estimated USD 300 thousand from UNDP core funds to build on previous achievements. The Bar Association in Kurdistan is now managing the legal aid services in Erbil, Sulaymania and Dahuk. The first legal aid help desk in south and central Iraq has opened in the Basrah Court, and managed by an NGO. See Table 9 for more details about the projects.

The Family Protection Support project and the Justice and Security for Survivors of Domestic and Gender Based Violence project were originally for a period of 30 months. The project has put in place Family Protection Units in both south and central Iraq and Kurdistan, staffed by female police officers to assist victims of domestic violence. The number of these Family Protection Units has increased steadily as have the number of women clients seeking assistance. Two additional social protection initiatives, limited to Kurdistan, include support to establish the Directorate to Combat Violence against Women and a Women's Shelter assisting women exposed to domestic violence.

Two projects in support of human rights, Human Rights and UNAMI Human Rights, have supported multiple human rights initiatives between 2007 and 2009. These were completed and closed and, three years later, the Participatory Governance and Human Rights project has included 4 multi-faceted components, two of which were to support the creation of a High Commission for Human Rights in south and central Iraq and the Board of Human Rights in Kurdistan.

The Access to Justice and Human Rights programme has had concrete achievements. The Ministry of Interior has collaborated in setting up Family Protection Units providing tailored legal assistance to women and children. A High Commission for Human Rights has been established in the federal system against considerable odds.

Activities under the Access to Justice and Human Rights thematic area are performing well. The number of Family Protection Units has increased to 16 throughout the country. The number of cases in which they have intervened has steadily increased in south and central Iraq. From 2012 to 2013, there has been a 44 per cent increase in cases per month from an average of 653 per month in 2012 to an average of 940 cases per month in 2013. Table 10 reviews these data. In Kurdistan, the number of Family Protection Units has risen to 7 in the course of the project and the number of cases has increased to nearly 400 per month in 2013 before tapering off.

Table 10: Activity of Family Protection Units 2012 and 2013				
Average cases per month				
	South and central Iraq		Kurdistan	
	2012	2013	2012	2013
Number of cases received	653	940	398	305
Number of cases resolved by FPUs	517	462	0	0
Number of cases resolved by Court	80	85	397	0

Number of cases being processed	47	1	119	305

Source: UNDP, Access to Justice programme area project data

In south and central Iraq, the number of clients whose cases have gone to court is 12 per cent, a relatively low proportion because resolving disputes within the offices is deemed preferable to waiting a year or two for the cases to go to trial. The situation is different in Kurdistan where 99 per cent of the cases are sent to the courts for adjudication. Both approaches have their merits.

The legal aid help desks show similar achievements, mainly in Kurdistan where legal aid help desks are operating in Erbil, Sulaymaniya and Dahuk. Two of these – Erbil and Sulaymaniya - are operating inside provincial courts. After lengthy efforts, there is now one legal aid help desk in south Iraq operating out of the Court of First Instance in Basrah. Table 11 shows the trend in consultations and representations.

Table 11: Legal Aid Help Desks– Consultations and Representations			
Legal Aid Help Desks– Consultations and Representations			
	2012	**2013**	**2013 (6 months)**
Legal consultations	132	156	62
Legal representations	22	18	10

Source: UNDP, Access to Justice programme area project data

After an initial rise, the number of clients dropped off in 2013. Originally, the legal aid help desks in Erbil and Sulaymaniya were managed by NGOs who pro-actively promoted the service and especially among women. For a subsequent project and in an attempt to ensure greater sustainability, the management of the legal aid help desks was given to the Bar Association in Kurdistan. When this occurred, services were less readily available and women were less explicitly the target group they had been under NGO management.

Support for the establishment of the High Commission of Human Rights in the federal system continues to have a complex evolution. UNDP has worked step by step with the parliamentary Committee on Human Rights to create the High Commission. A group of 11 commissioners has been brought on board, all eminent persons with deep commitments to protecting human rights. Following their selection, the chosen members received training on the operation of Human Rights Commissions in other countries of the region. Considerable progress has been made in spite of two difficulties: i) pressure has been placed on the selected commissioners from political blocs seeking to control the Commission; and ii) the executive branch has been against the formation of the Commission on the basis that the existing Ministry of Human Rights is able to handle such affairs.

The commissioners have been unable to collectively agree on key issues and make critical decisions. They are unable to agree on where to locate their offices; some are afraid to work in offices outside the International Zone while others insist on being accessible to citizens in the city at large. The commissioners have not been able to agree on a president due to political reasons. There appears to be a distinct possibility that the High Commission for Human Rights will at some point be dissolved and reconstituted with a membership less mired in political affiliations.

UNDP support has been thoughtfully provided and commissioners are devoted and qualified individuals and the selection process has been above reproach. The odds against the High Commission's survival may be too great to overcome but the process has been well-coordinated and it is a testament to UNDP's intervention that the process has gone this far. It is also indicative of the

commissioners' commitment that now, prior to having all facilities in place, individual members of the High Commission for Human Rights receive cases of human rights violations and attempt to deal with them. There is the concern that this may be premature; cases should not be dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis.[76] Commissioners argue, however, that something must be done to ensure their credibility.

One of the assets of the Human Rights Board in KRG is that it has replaced the KRG Ministry of Human Rights and does not need to contend with duplicating a Ministry's functions. The process, however, took almost three years. The Ministry was abolished in 2009 and the Board of Human Rights was not fully operational until 2012 and by then, trained members of the Ministry had found jobs elsewhere leaving the Board of Human Rights with little capacity. Like the High Commission of Human Rights in the federal system, the Board receives complaints and attempts to address them but only on an *ad hoc* basis. UNDP is taking steps to increase the staff members' level of competence. It has also been advising the Board to constitute itself as the federal one is constituted, of independent individuals instead of government officials.

Neither the High Commission in the federal system nor the Board in KRG are prepared to submit periodic reports as required by international treaties; nor is the machinery in place for formally receiving and adjudicating violations. Steps have nevertheless been taken in this direction.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND SMALL ARMS LIGHT WEAPONS

Two small projects make up this thematic area (see Table 9). Support to Security Reform is a two year project to lay the groundwork for drafting an update of the National Security Strategy. The Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) project aims to reinforce the government's present efforts to stem the proliferation of small arms by undertaking, as a first step, a capacity assessment of available SALW mechanisms.

In the first initiative, UNDP has provided a consultant to the Office of the National Security Advisor to lay the foundation for up-dating the National Security Strategy originally drafted in 2007 during the United States occupation. There have been consultations with an impressively diverse group of stakeholders including academics, civil society organizations, members of parliament, youth groups, and others. The next step is to constitute a high level steering committee to deepen the strategy and to address a number of specific areas recommended by the consultant's report.

UNDP supported preparation of a draft national security strategy, which is yet to be formulated. Support to a strategy to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons made limited progress.

Since March 2012, UNDP was expected to complete a capacity assessment of mechanisms and competencies among Iraqi authorities for controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The project built upon UNDP's prior contributions to SALW in Iraq, including technical advice and a previously attempted (but abandoned) effort in 2008 to establish a database and registration system in Basrah.[77] Ultimately, the objective was to lay the groundwork for a data base and a set of policies based on a greater understanding of the proliferation of weapons. The capacity development component was not completed however. Interaction between the project consultant and national counterparts was infrequent and a report has not yet been produced.[78]

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[76] Richard Langan II, Outcome Evaluation of Country Programme Action Plan Outcome 2 Rule of Law & Human Rights in Line With International Standards, UNDP, August 2013 p. 65

[77] An earlier (2006-2008) UNDP/JICA funded pilot in Basrah "Project BLUE" had attempted to establish a SALW registration data base and system and construct two Community Police Stations along with an awareness campaign in that governorate that were placed on hold for strategic reasons after discussion with the MoI, Basrah Police and the donor.

[78] Richard Langan II, ibid., p. 87

4.3. ACCOUNTABLE, TRANSPARENT AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

The Outcome 3 includes four programme areas, i.e., Public Sector Modernization, Anti-Corruption, Donor Coordination/Capital Investment Tracking Mechanism, and UNDP-Global Fund Support to National TB and HIV/AIDS Programmes (See Box 3 and Table 12).

Box 3: Outcome 3 Statement and Indicators

Outcome Statement
        Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels

Outcome Indicators
- Civil Service Reform and Modernization Plan adopted taking into account the national strategy for women and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) (2009: no; 2012: yes)
- % of decentralized service delivery pilot projects implemented based on dialogue at the municipal, district and governorate level (2010:0; 2014: 9)
- Number of Ministries having the capacity for gender-responsive budgeting (2009:zero; 2014: 3)
- National anti-corruption law for adherence to United Nations Convention against Corruption in place (2009: no; 2014: yes)
- Advocacy and training programs conducted to support women's advancement in decision-making positions (2010: no; 2014: yes)

Table 12: Programme activities under Outcome 3					
Programme	**Project**	**Duration**	**Original Budget $000,000**	**Source**	**Location**
Public Sector Modernization	Iraq Public Sector Modernization Phase I	2010-2012	55	Iraq Trust Fund	National
	Iraq Public Sector Modernization Phase II	2012-2014	17	UNDAF Fund	National
Anti-Corruption	Anti-Corruption Support in Iraq	2008-2013	9.8	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency	National
	Supporting Iraqi compliance to the UNCAC and combatting corruption at Governorate level.	2008-2013	3.0	United States of America	National
	Enhancing Transparent Participatory Governance and Human Rights	2012-2014-	3.0	UNDAF Fund	National
	English Language Training for the Commission of Integrity	2011-2013	1.6	United States International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency	National

				UNDP BCPR	
	Support for the Office of the Inspectors General	2011-2013	4.7	United States Department of State	National
	Institutional Development for the Anti-Corruption Academy	2012-2014	1.2	UNDAF Fund	National
Donor Coordination / Capital Investment Tracking Mechanism	Support to the Government of Iraq in Implementing the Paris Principles	2010-2012	2.6	Iraq Trust Fund UNDP core funds	National
	Implementation of KRG Development Management System	2012-2013	0.5	Kurdistan Regional Government	KRG
Global Fund Project in Iraq	Support to National TB and HIV/AIDS Programs I	2008-2013	32.7	GFATM	National
	Support to National TB and HIV/AIDS Programs II	2013-2015	14.1	GFATM	National

OVERALL FINDINGS

The Good Governance section in NDP 2010-2014 begins with three issues that are central to two programme areas under this outcome: (i) public sector modernization, (ii) decentralization of public services and (iii) anti-corruption. The NDP states that: "Current government structures are characterized by excessive centralization; functional overlaps; weak inter-ministry coordination; lack of developed and efficient data systems and analyses; wide expansion in civil service; lack of adequate skills; weak human capital; inadequate financial management and monitoring capabilities; and the absence of proper mechanisms ensuring citizen participation in the decision-making process. Therefore, the reform process requires modernization of the functional structure of the country's institutions, organization of their relationships, and training of its staff to ensure efficient and professional participation by the entire population."[79] The plan further reaffirms that financial and administration corruption is one of the more important challenges to good governance in Iraq. Overall the emphases in the Government's governance agenda mirror those of UNDP in this outcome.

UNDP programme efforts are modest first steps in achieving the outcome objectives. Programme strategies followed by UNDP, however, do not fully meet the practical reality of Iraq. UNDP failed to gain critical national support for the programme to remain relevant.

While the programmes in this area are in accord with the Government's development plan, their relevance also depends on whether its concept and design could realistically gain political support. UNDP found it challenging to obtain the high-level government support for many of its initiatives in this area.

The Public Sector Modernization programme has been driven by an ambitious, whole-of-government approach that is more conceptually satisfying in design than pragmatic. Key government interlocutors and selected ministries remained suspicious of Public Sector Modernization reforms in Phase I. In Phase II, with recent approvals and interest expressed at the highest levels, there are indications of greater commitment than before.

A key element in the anti-corruption design – the Office of Inspectors General - is imported from a United States model with little consideration given to the Iraqi institutions that functioned for

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[79] Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan 2010-2014, Ministry of Planning, 2010, p. 178

decades even under adverse conditions in previous regimes. Here the design may make sense conceptually but in practice it is neither consonant with the traditional Iraqi institutions nor with the circumstances within which it is meant to function. Further, there seems little possibility that key national actors – Council of Representatives and the Council of Ministers – will alter their opposition to this principal pillar in the anti-corruption mechanism, the Offices of Inspectors General.

The donor coordination design was a model intervention undertaken globally and brought into Iraq with little modification. Again, while the model may be good in concept, it really does not apply in practice. Further, the Ministry of Planning has never committed itself fully to maintaining the donor database, perhaps because donor funds are comparatively minor sources of revenue. The Iraqi Development Management System now provides a far more critical service, tracking capital investments projects for all departments, and still the Ministry of Planning has not committed itself fully to this tool.

Containment of tuberculosis has been one of the priority health-sector objectives of the Government and international community in the country. It was estimated that tuberculosis was causing more than 3,000 deaths annually in Iraq and the number of infected persons was estimated to be large and potentially expanding due to the deterioration of health facilities from the military invasion and internal conflicts. Therefore, UNDP-Global Fund programme were relevant to the national challenge.

However, the UNDP-Global Fund programme does not have much substantive linkage with the focus of this programme outcome, and no programmatic linkages with other component programmes in this portfolio. It is on the other hand clearly relevant to the achievement of MDGs, specifically MDG 6 aiming to "combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases." Therefore, this programme is misplaced.

Under a challenging political environment UNDP aimed to support government in addressing complex issues. UNDPs programme approach was either too elaborate or too theoretical to have tangible results.

The programmes under this outcome have yielded some results: a public administration reform roadmap has been approved by the cabinet. But significant progress in decentralizing the delivery of public services, reducing corruption, improving management of development and capital investment resources, has not yet occurred.

Sustainability for programmes in this outcome area depends on national ownership and strong government support. This requires, at a minimum, regular contact and collaboration between UNDP and national partners. IDMS database has not had the full support of the Ministry of Planning in the central government. Contact and collaboration has taken place in the Public Sector Modernization programme and in the UNDP-Global Fund tuberculosis programme but contact between UNDP and national partners in other programme areas is intermittent, casting doubt on their sustainability.

For those reform initiatives requiring the Government support one must reckon further with the fact that, with the election looming and popular discontent rising, the Government is not likely to take any decisions that may be politically sensitive. It is therefore a challenge for the programmes in this portfolio to find an approach that would achieve their objectives but at the same time which can be politically acceptable for the Government and key national partners.

PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME

The initial phase of the Public Sector Modernization project was an ambitious programme of public administration reforms that involved seven UN agencies collaborating in a multi-faceted array of activities aimed at improving the service delivery performance of the public sector in three federal ministries under the overall direction of the Prime Minister's Advisory Committee. The project ended with little achievement. It has now been revived for a second phase. A total of USD 33 million, unspent in the first phase, was available for Phase II. However, at the conclusion of the Iraq Trust

Fund, the EU refused to transfer the funds originally committed through the UNDG ITF leaving Phase II with only half the projected amount.

Phase II has greater focus, greater government backing and greater collaboration among agencies. Early indications are promising. An original civil service reform programme, developed for Phase I has been re-worked as the roadmap for the Public Sector Modernization Programme and adopted as the strategic plan for the Public Administrative Reform Higher Committee constituted under the Prime Minister Advisory Committee and approved recently at the Council of Ministers. It is a concise, well-crafted document, approved at the highest level with clear targets.

The Public Sector Management programme in KRG has just begun and a project document has just been drafted. It is based on an in-depth needs assessment[80] commissioned by the KRG's Ministry of Planning, which detailed many of the shortcomings of the public administration under the executive branch. One of its observations which is particularly appropriate was the need for "clear ministerial mandates, clarity of sub-entity roles and staff terms of references."[81] At present the project is being largely managed under the authority of the Director General for Capital Investments.

A major achievement of Public Sector Modernization —Phase II programme was the adoption of a roadmap for public administration reform by the cabinet, reflecting the fact that its concept and value have been accepted by the government at the high levels. Implementation of the roadmap and mobilization of government officials to this end would be the next biggest challenges for this programme.

The Public Sector Modernization project, Phase I did not succeed in getting full backing from the Government and though the collaborating agencies did their work, the impact on reforming public administration and decentralizing services was minimal.[82] There were concerns that UNDP's leadership in the programme has in some ways compromised full collaboration among agencies. It was noted that agency formulations of sector plans with selected ministries was not well coordinated. UNDP was neither able nor prepared to exercise its authority to ensure that the participating agencies worked in close concert.

The Public Sector Modernization programme Phase II has succeeded in obtaining critical support from the key national partners in both the central government and KRG. For Phase II, the roadmap for public administration reform was developed and approved by the Council of Ministers. Although it is not yet clear to what extent the roadmap will be realized, high-ranking government officials, members of the Prime Minister Advisory Committee and the Council of Ministers do understand the concept and see its value. This was not the case with the Phase I design.

The real question has been whether UNDP would be able to marshal enough commitment from government stakeholders to ensure implementation. One crucial element in particular seems especially challenging, decentralizing the delivery of public services. This was a prominent objective in Phase I and is less so now perhaps in recognition of the challenges faced in Phase I. In the present roadmap, the issue of decentralizing services appears fourth in a list of four objectives, following training on management, linking promotion to merit and training tailored to upper management. From one perspective, this is being realistic and may be necessary to garner the support of the Government. From another perspective, this relegates what was once a principal focus to an element that will receive far less attention. Phase II is more practical in this regard and perhaps at a cost.

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[80] Geopoliticity, Assessment of Kurdistan Regional Government's Public Administration Reform Efforts – Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme (I-PSM), UNDP and KRG Ministry of Planning, May 2012

[81] Geopoliticity, Assessment of Kurdistan Regional Government's Public Administration Reform Efforts – Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme (I-PSM), UNDP and KRG Ministry of Planning, May 2012, p. 30

[82] "The programme design was fuzzy in conception and in presentation. The intended outputs were poorly formulated, with the results framework providing few objectively verifiable indicators of achievement. The programme document gave little indication of how actual work was to proceed, while no inception report or useful work plan was produced." Alan Taylor, Iraq Public Sector Modernization Progamme, Phase I Evaluation Report, December 1 2011, p. 7

The programme has nevertheless made some contributions to decentralization in three areas: (i) transferring e-governance functions to governorates; (ii) assisting in the reformulation of the Provincial Powers Act (21) which was completed in 2013; and (iii) providing policy support for the devolution of responsibility over the administration of the ration card to nine governorates. The Prime Minister has indicated some support for these initiatives by suggesting, during a regular meeting of the High Coordination Committee of Provinces, that a number of federal ministries will be dissolved and functions will be devolved to the provinces – namely, for ministries of education, health, and municipalities. Not coincidentally, these are the three ministries covered by the programme. It remains to be seen whether this suggestion becomes a reality.

Achievements in this programme cannot be measured exclusively in concrete deliverables. A great deal of effort is expected to go into mobilizing senior government staff to take initiatives, to change management styles at all levels and to focus on delivering services at governorate levels. The challenge this poses in Iraq is considerable. Mobilizing senior public servants means increasing awareness and establishing the right kind of mechanism to guide these reforms. Increasing awareness and creating mechanisms do not themselves yield immediate tangible results and here is a concern. UNDP's credibility is being questioned in some quarters in part because some of its projects remain unattended or have little to show for results. Phase I of this project was occasionally cited as a contributor to this credibility gap. Without some concrete interim targets that are reasonably achievable, concerns about UNDP's credibility are likely to continue.

The KRG is a different environment and the Public Sector Modernization programme has evolved differently there than with the central government. The entry point for UNDP to KRG was more straightforward and its Ministry of Planning was open to the engagement with UNDP for this programme. The programme however finds itself in the web of one Directorate's eagerness to exercise tight control over foreign-funded programming and to some extent alienated other ministries, departments and agencies. The participation of others, whose involvement is essential, was hence not ensured despite the 'whole of government' approach to government reform that the programme propagates.

ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME

The anti-corruption programme is the sum of five separate projects all supporting a national oversight mechanism. An initial project supported the drafting of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy[83] along with efforts to put institutions in place and disseminate the principles of the strategy nation-wide. Three subsequent projects have provided English language training to investigators, supported the creation of an Anti-Corruption Academy and put in place the Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs), a new mechanism central to Iraq's emerging oversight structure. A final project devotes some small assistance to the Board of Supreme Audit in KRG. UNDP is presently the only international agency providing support to the anti-corruption programme in Iraq.

After ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2008, the Government of Iraq elaborated its own National Anti-Corruption Strategy.[84] This strategy has been adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers and by the Council of Representatives. The UNDP supported this strategy with a public awareness campaign, the creation of a Commission of Integrity, the creation of an Anti-Corruption Academy and the establishment of the Office of the Inspectors General. The oversight mechanism in the KRG is still in the conception stage. UNDP has provided support to the KRG's branch of the Board of Supreme Audit on some technical matters.

The Anti-Corruption programme has yielded tangible results in adoption of National Anti-Corruption Strategy and establishment of anti-corruption institutions. The oversight mechanism — the Offices of Inspector General — is failing to gain the government support

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[83] Government of Iraq, The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010 – 2014, Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010
[84] Republic of Iraq, Joint Anti-Corruption Committee, The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010-2014, Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010

and its survival is in question. To achieve the long-term goal of reducing the corruption, the programme may need to consider a different approach.

The major achievement of the anti-corruption programme is the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy[85] that the programme supported initially. The support to the establishment of the Commission of Integrity, Offices of Inspector General and the Ant-Corruption Academy bore fruits in these institutions.

Central to the oversight mechanism in south and central Iraq is the system of the Offices of Inspectors General. However, both the Council of Representatives and the Council of Ministers were not convinced about this mechanism. Since it places inspectors within ministries, it has provoked considerable opposition within those ministries that found it uncomfortable to be overseen continuously by the inspectors. Because of this, many of the inspectors have been replaced with temporary officers who fill the position but do not have their full authority, rendering them essentially unable to perform their functions. The estimated number of "temporary or interim" Inspectors General in ministries, at this writing is 26 out of 33, leaving only 7 fulfilling their duties as expected.

It is perceived that the resistance to the Inspectors General system is a proof of its value. But the reality is that many of the inspectors have either been rendered incapable of doing their job or have ended up in a feud with senior officials; in either case, the oversight mechanism has generally been regarded as ineffective. The evaluation found that, while the inspectors themselves viewed their role and performance so far in a more-or-less positive light, they were uniformly pessimistic for the survival of the programme.

A recent UNCT paper prepared in advance of UNDAF discussions has observed that the "necessary integration and procedures for collaboration among the three main entities (of the oversight mechanism) is lacking," and noted that "in practice, this theoretically comprehensive system is severely limited in its effectiveness and capability and susceptible to manipulation and abuse."[86] Its ineffectiveness, the lack of support within the Government, the exclusion of the Board of Supreme Audit from the oversight mechanism and the near exclusive reliance on the United States for support, all suggest that a different approach is worth considering.

The oversight mechanism in the KRG is still in the development stage. UNDP has provided support to the KRG's branch of the Board of Supreme Audit. However, the KRG Board of Supreme Audit itself did not appear to be fully aware of UNDP's support and when questioned, referred the evaluation team to the Ministry of Planning which, according to the Board of Supreme Audit, manages such affairs. UNDP's support to the Board of Supreme Audit has achieved very little so far, and further support is likely to have the same minimal effect until more progress is made toward elaborating a viable oversight mechanism. A Commission of Integrity for KRG is being formed at the moment for this purpose. The design has an opportunity to learn from the experience with the federal system. It must ensure a close link between the oversight mechanism and the KRG Council of Representatives, and it must also be part of the overall reform process of public administration to ensure that it fits and functions well within ministries and departments whose interests it serves.

DONOR COORDINATION /CAPITAL INVESTMENT TRACKING MECHANISM

The initial donor coordination programme, the Donor Assistance Database, was launched as a project in 2006. It was succeeded in 2012 with a follow-up project, Support to the Government of Iraq Implementing the Paris Principles, a two year project. The Iraq Development Management

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[85] Republic of Iraq, Joint Anti-Corruption Committee, The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2010-2014, Joint Anti-Corruption Council, 2010
[86] Joint Analysis Unit, UN Iraq Synthesis Paper – Preparation for UNDAF 2015-2019, Baghdad, Joint Analysis Unit, 25 November 2013 p. 20

System and the Kurdistan Development Management System (KDMS) have both emerged out of efforts to implement the Paris Principles project.

The initial support for a donor coordination mechanism was rightly abandoned in favour of supporting databases to track capital investment and NDP indicators in both the central government and KRG. In the central government, the database still requires data entry and has not yet been put in use while, in Kurdistan, it is ready to be used. It would require government decisions and actions to fully utilize these databases to achieve the long-term goal of having the government manage capital investment more effectively towards development results.

The donor coordination projects, implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning over the past seven years, exist now in name only. Donors rarely forward their information on a regular basis and the International Cooperation Directorate in the Ministry of Planning has not pursued them diligently enough, or made the best use of the facilities for recording and coordinating donor contributions. Maintaining a donor database never had much promise in Iraq and two years ago the project essentially ceased providing significant support for maintaining a database to track annual contributions by development partners.[87]

The Iraq Development Management System, on the other hand, has the potential to track capital investment projects and NDP indicators. 2011. Training has been provided to specially equipped locations in ministries and departments where data is to be entered. USAID's Tarabot project has supplemented UNDP resources with funds and technical assistance of its own. The idea has been a good one; but there were tedious delays and data entry seems to be half-hearted as staff in the data entry cells were losing interest waiting for the revisions to the software. Its full use is still awaiting changes requested by the Minister of Planning. Meanwhile, data for 2011 has not been fully entered and the data for 2012 and 2013 are yet to be tackled. The IDMS has potential and could make a considerable contribution when the data are entered and the system is put in full use.

The Kurdistan Development Management System in (KDMS) benefits from the close supervision and control exercised by the Director General for Capital Investment who has brought its operation into a room near his office and intends to use it not only to manage development expenditures but also to ensure that the expenditures meet real needs identified in the system that also tracks development progress across a number of sectors. The information will facilitate budgeting and ensure that expenditures respond to real needs.

NATIONAL TUBERCULOSIS AND HIV/AIDS PROGRAMMES

Given the urgency to restore national capacity to contain tuberculosis, damaged by the long period of war and sanctions and internal conflicts, UNDP was assigned as the principle recipient of the Global Funds to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to manage a large grant for restoration of national tuberculosis containment capacity. The programme is implemented in partnership with the World Health Organization, which provides the technical framework for the containment and plays technical advisory role in the programme. The UNDP –Global Fund Project, Support to National Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Programme Phase I, provides testing and treatment for TB patients between 2008 and 2013. It has recently been renewed for three years beginning in 2013.

The programme objectives included: expansion and enhancement of national containment strategy implemented both at the national and local levels; supporting the procurement of medical and related

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[87] It continues to exist even though hardly more than one or two donors provide data on annual contributions.

supplies; addressing critical tuberculosis problems faced by vulnerable groups such as inmates and refugees or those in remote areas; and partnerships for awareness building and social mobilization.

UNDP supported the implementation of the national tuberculosis strategy, helping to restore basic health services for tuberculosis and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism. UNDP contribution has been important jointly with WHO.

The UNDP-Global Fund programme has supported the restoration of basic service on tuberculosis. It has financed renovation and equipment purchases for clinics throughout Iraq to screen clients and provide treatment where necessary. In the immediate years following invasion, there were only 18 laboratories capable of testing tuberculosis in the country. The number of laboratories increased to 234 by the end of 2012. Improvements have been observed in tuberculosis containment among prison inmates. It was reported however that the programme has not provided capacity training for the beneficiary clinic or laboratory staff as they claim.

Regular tuberculosis review meetings at the national level and at the governorate level were instituted with the participation of the Ministry of Health, UNDP, WHO and partnering NGOs to monitor the progress in implementing national tuberculosis strategy. Following the project, treatment success rate rose to o 89 per cent in 2010, higher than the WHO threshold of 80 percent. Significant challenges still remain in case detection due to a number of social and technical factors that need to be overcome.[88]

4.4. SUPPORT TO PRO-POOR STRATEGIES

The Outcome 4 of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP 2011-2014) was comprised of 32 projects (see Table 13). Of these, 25 were "legacy projects" that originated prior to 2010, and were largely funded by the UNDG ITF. Only four projects commenced between 2011 and 2013, when the current CPAP came into effect. These included two Environment and two Local Area Development projects

The scope of activity in the Outcome 4 portfolio, therefore, declined over the evaluation period. The ADR was aware of only two projects that were projected to continue into 2014, although noting that that several were under development. The portfolio is significantly smaller both in terms of the number of projects and the contributions from donors. The reduction tracks the closure of the UNDG ITF for new funding in 2010, and the overall decline of ODA to Iraq. The Government of Iraq did not emerge during this transition as a funder, including in priority areas such as Environment, Local Areas Development and continuing work related to National Human Development reporting.

Table 13: Programme activities under Outcome 4						
Programme	**Project**	**Start Date**	**End Date**	**Original Budget ($ 000 000)**	**Source**	**Location**
CPR	Support for Construction of Basrah Children's Hospital	2007	2012	40.9	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	South
	BCPR preparatory Assistance fund	2008	2011	9.6	UNDP	National
CPR / Environment	Umbrella Project- Energy and Environment	2008	2012	2.3	UNDP	National

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[88] Khatri, G.R, et al, "Evaluation Report for National TB Programme, Iraq, covering the period of 2008-2011," conducted for WHO and UNDP, 2012.

CPR / Electricity & Health	Rehabilitation of Ramadi General Hospital	2007	2012	25.8	Japan	Central
	Rehabilitation of Tikrit General Hospital	2007	2011	28.6	Japan	North
	Establishment of Maternity and Children's Hospital in Falujah	2008	2012	36	Japan	North
	Support to Electricity &Health	2007	2010	6.2	Swedish Int'l Development Cooperation	National
CPR / Service Delivery	Budget Execution Support Basra	2008	2011	2.3	United Kingdom	South
	Budget execution support - Recovery Programme in Kurd Region	2008	2014	6.4	U.S., Iraq, UNDP	North
	Support to the Expanded Humanitarian Response Fund (ERF)	2008	2013	22.7	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
	Muthanna Governorate Capacity	2009	2012	3	Japan	South
CPR / Water	Addressing Short and Long Term Water and Sanitation Needs for Umm Qasr	2006	2010	1.3	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	South
	Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation for Abu Al-Khaseeb	2007	2010	1.9	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
Environment	Preparatory Assistance for the development of Economic Reform and Diversification Initiatives	2008	2009	0.6	UNDP	National
	Preparatory Assistance for the Development of a Comprehensive Area-Based Recovery Programme in Al-Anbar Governorate	2008	2011	2.1	U.S., UNDP	National
	Institutional Strengthening for the Ministry of State for the Marshlands	2009	2011	0.1	UNDP	National
	Decision Support System for Water Resources Planning in Iraq	2009	2013	3.5	Italy, UNDP	National
	Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building Programme	2010	2012	6.2	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
	Preparatory Assistance to GoI on Climate change	2010	2012	1.3	UNDP	National
	Preparatory Assistance for Energy Strategy Formulation	2010	2012	0.5	UNDP	National
	Poverty Reduction & Environmental Sustainability	2010	2011	0.3	UNDP	National
	National Communication to the UNFCCC	2011	2013	0.5	GEF	National
	Development of National Framework for Integrated Drought Risk Management in Iraq	2011	2013	0.3	UNDP, JP UNDAF Fund	National
	Regional Water Initiative	2007	2011	0.5	UNDP, Stockholm Int'l Water Institute	National
Governance / Health	Support to TB and HIV Programs	2007	2013	38.5	GFATM, UNDP	National

	Capacity Development on MDG Monitoring and Reporting	2008	2012	2.6	UNDP	National
	Iraq NHDR III	2010	2013	1.1	UNDP	National
MDG / Service Delivery	Bridging for Local Area Development Programme (LADP) Phase II	2010	2012	6.7	Swedish Int'l Development Cooperation, UNDP, Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	5 Governorates
	Area Based Development Program	2012	2013	2.9	Swedish Int'l Development Cooperation, UNDP, Iraq	National
	National Human Development Report	2006	2009	0.8	Japan, UNDP	National

Box 4: CPAP Outcome 4 Statement and Indicators[89]

Focus Area: Poverty Reduction and MDG Achievement
Key Result Area: Promoting inclusive growth, gender equality and MDG achievement
Outcome Statement: Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies
Outcome Indicators:
1. Number of conflict sensitive Provincial Development plans with localized MDG targets (2009: 0; 2014: 6)
2. National policies and programmes informed by gender disaggregated data (2009: no; 2014: yes)
3. Percentage of achievement of targets of localized MDGs indicators: (2010: 0; 2014: 50%)
4. Increased proportion of women, and youth (age group 20- 24) in the economic active labour force (2007: 42.9% for youth, 12% for women, 2014: 50% for youth, 25% for women)
5. Inter-Ministerial structure and technical secretariat on trans-boundary water resources established (2009: 0; 2014: yes)
6. MoWR Decision Support System governs water resource allocation (2009:no; 2014: yes)
7. A National Adaptation Strategy approved by the Cabinet and initiated implementation at local levels (2009: no; 2013: yes)

OVERALL FINDINGS

UNDP programmes, while relevant, are focused on localised recovery activities and not consistent with the policy and institution building orientation of the country programme.

A large part of the outcome 4 was designed as part of the strategic plans formulated by government, donors and the UNDP for 2005-2007 and/or 2008- 2010 periods. These plans focused largely on the emergency restoration of public service and the rehabilitation of related physical infrastructure. Reflecting contextual changes, both the *National Development Strategies* for 2010- 2014 and 2013-2017 and the UNDP's programme response have a development orientation. As such, the legacy projects had limited potential to make a direct contribute towards either the outcome 4 objective (strengthening Iraq's institutional framework for policies and strategies) or the CPAP indicator (crisis prevention and recovery principles and approaches incorporated into national development frameworks and strategies). However, they remained relevant to the Government's priorities related to MDG achievement. Also, fragmentation within the portfolio resulting from large legacy component undermines strategic focus.

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[89] The complete UNDP CPAP 2010- 2014 Outcome Four Results Matrix with Country Programme Outputs and Country Programme Output Indicators is included in Annex 2.

Most projects were delivered during a transitional period; as Iraq emerged from the violence of 2005 to 2007 and before conditions began to deteriorate again in with breakdown of the Erbil Agreement government during 2011. The various projects had the possibility of helping consolidate positive trends as conditions improved: expanding the delivery of basic public goods and services; improving the lives of beneficiaries through their access to services, and; legitimising the Iraqi State as the provider of these services, and opening a compact between State and society, among other potential contributions.

All projects were affected by extreme security conditions prior to 2008. These conditions produced security-related restrictions on operations that are still in effect. However, performance variables also included poor quality of design, weak management oversight and implementation capacity and under-estimation of risk and lack of mitigation. External factors also played an important role; beginning with uneven national ownership, limited capacity and the politicization within some ministry counterpart.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

The *Crisis Prevention and Recovery* (CPR) component of the CPAP assumed that Government would take the primary role in recovery and physical reconstruction projects, given the significant investments required. The UNDP's objective was to transition upstream to building institutional capacity and policy support, moving from the direct implementation roles outline in the previous *United Nations Country Strategy* (2008).[90] UNDP would also support public-private partnership, to strengthen private sector participation in the economy.

The CPR portfolio for Outcome Four included 14 projects. All projects focused on: i) the restoration of essential public services in urgent need sectors (water, electricity and health) and geographic locations, and/or; ii) building government capacity to plan service delivery and improve budgets execution. Public service infrastructure projects usually involved some combination of assessing unmet needs and the condition of public service infrastructure, physical works to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure, and the provision of new equipment and training for personnel. Several projects focused on building planning systems, particularly in the water sector. One project addressed urgent and unmet humanitarian needs for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) during the period 2008 to 2010. Short-term employment creation appears as a secondary objective, usually through construction activity.

UNDP responded to the basic infrastructure needs post 2007 crisis. In most cases there was tangible evidence that the projects met their objectives, implementation delays notwithstanding.

CPR projects made a tangible contribution to the recovery of public services and infrastructure, with some limited support to institutional capacity. The combined target population for the three projects was approximately four million persons, living in the immediate urban area and surrounding communities. ADR field visits confirmed that, after the rehabilitation was completed, the public use of the services at two of three hospitals assessed by the ADR doubled. The evaluation found that civil works were generally completed to project specification, and of good quality. Project training components were also delivered, and well evaluated by participants. UNDP's role as project manager was acknowledged and appreciated by hospital officials in a majority of cases, although oversight of the infrastructure was not always of adequate standard.

While there is no data to illustrate the projects' impact on health care results, however, officials perceived that the projects had an important and positive impact on health service capacity and

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[90] The CPAP cites work in the electricity and transport sector to develop national master plans and regulatory capacity, in addition to supporting public private partnerships to fund recovery.

access. At one of the health facilities, there was a perceived improvement to child and maternal health in the community, based on improved treatment, but could not quantify.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORTING

There were four outputs as part of the support to MDG reporting. UNDP provided support to: i) two iterations of the National Human Development Report (2018 and 2013), ii) three Millennium Development Reports, and; iii) and technical support to Iraq's statistical agencies, in the federal Ministry of Planning and to the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office.

Two projects supported drafting of consecutive *National Human Development Reports* (NHDR 2008 and NHDR 2013),[91] while a third project helped establish and maintain government systems to monitor development trends against MDG targets. The NHDR and the MDG projects were part of a larger effort to build up data, analysis and baselines, as inputs into Iraq's development planning and policy.[92] The projects were done in collaboration between the national (Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology- COSIT), and regional (Kurdistan Region Statistics Office- KRSO) statistics offices

The NHDR and MDG-related reports contributed to Iraq's institutional capacity to develop policy, regulatory and planning frameworks.

The NHDR and MDG-related reports delivered tangible results that contributed to strengthening Iraq's institutional capacity to develop policy, regulatory and planning frameworks**.** Concepts emerging from these reports have been integrated into national development planning processes, and data used to support both analysis and policy. Officials in the Ministry of Planning (MoP) expressed strong satisfaction with the quality of the assistance provided by the UNDP, and for the agency's sustained engagement over the six year period. Officials believed that "UNDP provided committed and high calibre staff", and appreciate access to the global HDR and MDG personnel and standards. They also appreciated training and orientation on post-2015 development goals.

At their inception in 2007/8, the MDG and NHDR projects were part of the original research contributing to knowledge on development conditions in Iraq. Results became available as Iraq was making its transition from a recovery to development orientation, in the 2008 to 2010 period. They built on several earlier MoP/COSIT initiatives,[93] and contributed to the baselines against which progress is now being measured. Perhaps most important, the projects introduced development concepts, standards and methodologies used as a framework for articulating national development priorities

The NHDR and MDG projects contributed towards Iraq's overall planning framework and establishing development priorities. Most importantly, the NHDR and MDG reports were used as primary inputs to the national development plans for 2010-2014 and 2013- 2017, and to related sectoral plans and policies: Both development plans:

a) *Were based on human development concepts and indicators*. Analysis and data from the 2008 NHDR was used extensively as part of the 2010 planning.[94] In this regard, the NHDR and Government's interaction with the UNDP contributed to framing Iraq's overall approach to

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[91] Government of Iraq, National Report on the Status of Human Development 2008, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Baytal Hikma Iraq, Iraq, 2008. The Ministry of Planning advised the 2013 NHDR will be available in 2013. Supporting documentation is available at http://iraqnhdr3.wordpress.com/
[92] National Development Strategy, 2007- 2010 and the National Development Plan, 2010- 2014
[93] Officials cited the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (2009) and basic needs mapping done by the MoP in 2011.
[94] The 2013 NHDR was not available on time to contribute to the National Development Plan 2013- 2017. However, the current plan made extensive use of HDI concepts and indicators.

development planning.[95] Officials also stated that use of global standards helped strengthen the quality of national planning.

b) *Made extensive use of MDG reporting data.* The plan for 2010-2014 used specific MDG indicators and concepts as the basis for establishing national priorities, and the strategies for achieving them. The indicators are less apparent in the current plan, in large part because the MDG framework will expire half way through its implementation. *Related concepts and data were also integrated into the regional planning document, Building the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.*[96]

The projects have contributed to building the capacity of statistical agencies, in the federal Ministry of Planning and in the KRG. Government is now able to produce annual MDG reports, with some on-going technical assistance from UNDP. One final report anticipated, with MDG tracking closing as the global MDG campaign itself comes to a conclusion in 2015. UNDP has provided some initial orientation, as the global campaign transitions to Sustainable Development Goals after 2015.[97]

The MoP/COSIT advised that it still requires technical assistance to produce the *National Human Development Report*, without which it may not be able to produce the next report.[98] However, reporting systems and procedures are being consolidated, and Government now has the objective of producing the NHDR on a bi-annual basis. Importantly, for the 2013 report Government was able to work within approved UNDP global standards for human development reporting, after some initial difficulties with the 2008 report.[99]

LOCAL AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The Local Area Development Programme was implemented over three phases, beginning in 2008. The project was ongoing in 2014. Phase I was implemented under Outcome 5, reflecting its focus on economic recovery. The Bridging Phase and Phase II situated under Outcome 4, as the project concept shifted to strengthening planning capacity and systems at the Governorate level. However, all three phases are summarised under Outcome 4, for coherence of presentation.

All three iterations of the LADP have been influenced by two contradictory trends; constitutional decentralization versus political centralization. Prior to 2003, Iraq had a highly centralized constitution and political system dating to the British Mandate period. Constitutional reform in 2005 established Iraq as a federal state, devolving some power, responsibilities and resources to sub-national government — Governorates. The role of Governorates in Iraq's development has become increasingly important, as analysis shows the spatial dimensions of poverty. However, the reform process left important elements of the constitution incomplete or vague. Issues such as the division of power within the federal system and authority over natural resources remain contentious. Also, the institutions and systems needed for cooperation between different levels of Government needed to be strengthened. At the same time, political authority remains highly centralised at the federal level, with the possible exception of KRG.

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[95] For example, see Republic of Iraq, National Development Plan, 2013- 2017, p. 30
[96] Kurdistan Regional Government, Building the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Ministry of Planning and the UNDP, December 2012
[97] United Nations Sustainable Development Goals http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
[98] MoP officials requested continuation of support for the 2015 NHDR, but have not received an indication from the UNDP on whether support will be available. They also noted that important gaps remain within COSIT's overall institutional capacity, particularly related to statistical analysis. These affect the MoP/COSIT's ability to produce the report without assistance. However, they are outside of the scope of the NHDR and require a larger and sustained intervention that is beyond the UNDP's current capacity.
[99] The 2008 NDHR was published by the Ministry of Planning, endorsed by the GoI and used extensively,, at the federal level and in the Kurdistan Region. However, the report was assessed by the UNDP Human Development Human Office (HDRO) as not meeting global standards on some procedural and technical issues. Accordingly, the 2008 report was not approved by UNDP as a national report. The HDRO participated in the planning for the 2013 report, and formal endorsement is pending.

Within existing arrangements, the Federal Government began scale-up resource transfers to the Governorates and the KRG in 2006. Initial transfers covered reconstruction projects and service delivery (*General Federal Budget Law*, 2006). By 2011, the total federal transfers to Governorates under the Development and Reconstruction mechanism approached USD 3.7 billion. Governorates also receive transfers from other sources, for administration and through federal line ministries for sectoral programmes. Accompanying new responsibilities under the 2005 constitution and the growth in transfers, the *Provincial Powers Act* (2008) required that *Provincial Development Plans* be prepared by the Governor's Office and approved by the Provincial Councils. There was also a requirement for Governorates make a contribution into the sectoral plans of ministries, on both projects of strategic national interest and local development. Transfers also began at the same time as the spatial dimensions of Iraq's development challenges were being defined within national planning processes. The importance of local strategies for reducing income poverty and deprivation of access to public goods and services began to emerge.

As of 2007, Governorates were not positioned to use resource transfers effectively, or otherwise contribute to meeting recovery and development challenges. Governorates were not integrated into national planning processes. They lacked the capacity to develop their own Governorate-level plans. Systems were neither institutionalised within Governorates, nor standardized between the Governorates/the KRG and the Iraqi Federal Government. A good indicator of is low budget execution rates, which averaged 44 percent in 2011; at least seven governorates showed execution rates of less than 50 percent. Weak performance has a particular impact on Iraq's capacity to address the spatial dimension of its development priorities. In this context, LADP Phase I differed from earlier economic recovery activities, with its emphasis on building the capacity to plan, deliver and assess development priorities through local authorities and institutions.

Overall LADP Phase I, joint Programme contributed to establishing development planning systems at the District level, and a large body of economic recovery activities. However, gaps in project design meant that LADP-I had limited impact strengthening systems at the Governorate level.

LADP Phase I was designed in 2006/7, as Iraq was defining both its recovery priorities and governance arrangements within the new federal constitution. The first phase (2008 to 2010) was implemented in three Governorates, with the objective of strengthening the capacity of local authorities to prepare and implement local area development plans. The plans were intended to stimulate local economic development and strengthen District level planning capacity. Focus at the District level was intended to push resources out to the community level. UNDP's contribution to the Joint Programme framework focused on strengthening planning systems. UNDP also collaborated with the participating UN agencies on delivery of 132 fast track economic recovery projects.

The most important medium-term achievement of LADP Phase I was establishing initial systems and procedures for development planning. Evaluation reporting does not identify outcome-level achievements resulting from the District Plans, including for the economic recovery projects. Available evidence indicates that the plans were either partially implemented or not used. They generally lacked the institutional framework and resources to be fully implemented and sustained. The design gap was limited coverage and lack of integration into overarching systems. The plans appeared as anomalies; they were implemented in less than 10 percent of Iraq's Districts and used a model that was not recognised or understood by Governorate planning and resource allocation systems. Phase I was also not designed to address the institutional capacity issues contributing to low budget execution.

Regardless, LADP Phase I was an early effort to establish and institutionalise sub-national planning systems. The programme was unique; few other international organisations worked at the District level given poor security. Working within the federal structure, the programme offered a locally-focused model for planning, service delivery and economic diversification in a centralised political and institutional context. It also contributed to identifying the required linkages between District,

Governorate and Federal planning and resource allocation systems. The good quality of work and relevance of the model from LADP Phase I produced demand for an expanded second phase, which will be implemented in all 18 Governorates with the potential of establishing a standardised planning model at the national level.

The LADP Bridging Phase made a contribution to strengthening planning systems at the Governorate level, and to the process of building vertical linkages between the Governorates and regional and federal planning frameworks. The contribution remains unique; ongoing insecurity and the declining international presence in Iraq mean that few if any international organisations are working on governance issues at the Governorate level.

The LADP Bridging Phase built on the initial work done by Phase I. The Bridging Phase made a tangible contribution to development planning systems. It resolved LADP Phase I design gaps by focusing at the Governorate level. Phase II scales up nationally, and works with the vertical linkages between federal and regional and Governorate planning institutions. Related work continues under Phase II of the project.

The most important design change from Phase I was the shift in focus from individual Districts to whole-of-Governorate planning. The methodology involves all Districts in the participating Governorates, as well as consultation across the Governorate-level institutions with development-oriented responsibilities. The project introduced a standardised planning model, with a focus on strengthening coherence between stakeholders. This occurred where processes were previously *ad hoc,* with limited transparency or coordination. Governorate ministries prepared their individual plans, often with different methodologies, and the vertical linkages to Districts were weak.

UNDP generally met is output targets within the Bridging Phase Joint Programme framework, implementation delays notwithstanding.[100] The programme delivered five *Integrated Provincial Development Plans,* one in each of the participating Governorates. All of the plans were approved by the appropriate Governorate entities (Provincial Council and Ministry of Planning), integrated into overall planning and resource allocation and appear to have political and public support.[101] The plans piloted the revised LADP model, and prepared the basis for national scale-up in Phase II. Lessons learned are incorporated into Phase II design, which is under implementation in all 18 Iraqi Governorates, and with participation of the federal Ministry of Planning.

Counterparts interviewed considered the development plans to be of good quality, and include a sizable number of development projects. For example, in Babel, counterparts advised 385 projects were integrated into the plan; 315 new and 70 ongoing.[102] The ADR was not able to verify the extent to which the plans or the projects were being implemented, the development results achieved or the impact of planning on budget execution rates. Interviews with officials in three of the participating Governorates indicated that at least a portion of the plans were under implementation.

LADP Bridging Phase achievements remain fragile. The revised programme model has only been through one implementation cycle. Delays with resource mobilisation resulted in a one year funding gap, undermining progress on institutionalising LADP-supported systems. In at least one Governorate, progress towards implementation was interrupted by the funding gap. Counterparts in two Governorates (Suleimanya and Thi Qar) also noted that the 2013 elections disrupted the planning process. They also noted that on-going technical support is still required. In this regard,

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[100] The ADR field study was able to meet with LADP Bridging Phase stakeholders in three of the five participating Governorates (Suleimanya, Babel and Thi Qar), in addition to reviewing documents and interviews with UNDP and KRG officials and one Donor. Outputs were confirmed in UNDP and Ministry of Planning, *Final Narrative Report; Bridging for Local Area development Programme* Phase II, May 2013

[101] The ADR was able to confirm support from Provincial Council representatives in three Governorates.

[102] The observation is based on interviews with Iraqi officials in three of the five participating Governorates.

planning remains vulnerable to political and institutional conditions and Bridging Phase achievements are pending institutionalisation during Phase II.

These factors notwithstanding, the LADP Bridging Phase made an important contribution to initial strengthening of development planning institutions and systems at the Governorate level, using a whole-of-Government approach. In three Governorates, LADP activities were complemented with technical support to improve budget execution.[103] These are also technical inputs into the larger process of clarifying Iraq's federal arrangements, and strengthening planning and resource allocation systems. They position the LADP programme to strengthening the effectiveness of Iraq's federal system, and decentralisation of some authority and resources to the Governorate and regional levels.

In the KRI, the Bridging Phase established a linkage Governorate and Regional planning systems, noting the unique arrangements within the KRG. The linkage between planning and budget execution was also established, through coordination with the *Budget Execution Support* project. Efforts were ongoing and have not been evaluated. However, they further reflect the shift towards taking a "whole of Governorate" or "whole of systems" approach within the LADP programme model at the Governorate level. Cooperation between the LADP and *Budget Execution Support* projects strengthens the linkage between planning and the budget process, and to improved budget execution.

ENVIRONMENT

The 13 projects in the Environment portfolio were intended to strengthen Iraqi capacity to manage environmental challenges. The National Development Plan 2010- 2014 noted that lack Iraq lacks comprehensive policy and systems to manage key resources, such as water, and address deterioration of the country's environment. This has led to increased and tangible pollution of all environmental elements; air, water, and soil.

Most Outcome 4 projects focused on strengthening Iraq's institutional framework, including policy development, and strengthening planning and operational capacity. The projects tended to be short term interventions, focusing on a specific policy or institutional deliverable. They were spread over key areas of environmental concern; water resource management, climate change, drought preparedness and mitigation, and energy.

The projects made a contribution, direct or indirect, to Iraq's *National Environmental Strategy and Action Plan* (2013- 2017). The plan was published by the Ministry of Environment (MoEnv) in 2013, with technical assistance from the UNDP. The UNDP will contribute to implementation of the plan, through the project Support to Environment Sustainability and Energy Efficiency in Iraq, which was under development in 2013.

The UNDP contributed to the Joint Programme, *Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building with UNICEF, UNHABITAT and WHO*. UNDP served as the lead agency, with responsibility for project outputs related to the formulation of water and sanitation master plans at each location. As key outputs specific to the UNDP's contribution, included — delivery of five Long Term Master Plans for the Governorates of Thi Qar and Suleimanya and for Tikrit City in Salah al-Din, Kut City in Wassit and the Makhmoor District in Erbil.

Most environment projects were focused at the federal level. The most significant exception was the *Water and Sanitation Master Plan Joint Programme*, which was designed to strengthen planning capacity and service delivery in five participating Governorates. Another project addressed environmental concerns in the Marshlands Governorates. Some work was don't, therefore, to strengthen Governorate-level systems.

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[103] There was no evidence that the support has improved budget execution rates. However, insufficient time has passed for results to be demonstrated. Iraqi officials interviewed in two Governorates showed strong support for the project linkage between planning and budget execution systems.

UNDP supported government efforts in strengthening environment policies and institutions. The primary concern was UNDP's capacity to sustain its engagement in this area.

UNDPs support in the area of environment were focused on policy and institutional development. UNDP contributed to preparation of the *National Environment Strategy 2013- 2017*, including through technical support to the drafting. The strategy is integrated into the *National Development Plan 2013- 2017*, and outlines a plan of action to address further degradation of the environment. Prior, UNDP also contributed to policy discussion, research and institutional development related to decision-making systems within the Ministry of Environment, water resource management and sharing across Iraq's internal boundaries, climate change, drought management and dust storms.

Of particular importance was UNDP's contribution to the current *National Environment Policy* (2013), with officials also noting UNDP's contributions on drought risk and water management were informed the Prime Minister's Higher Water Committee, and the development of new legislation.

There were also several recovery-oriented initiatives, funded by the UNDG ITF and implemented in specific communities in Southern Iraq. UNDP delivered support to restoration of potable water and solid waste management services in the city of Um Qasr in southern Iraq, with a positive outcome for local health. It also contributed to restoration of potable water services in the town of Abu Al-Khaseeb, Basra Governorate. Available information indicates that these projects met their output targets, and contributed towards local MDG achievement (MDG 7).

Most recent environment projects were short term, of limited scope and focused on the delivery of a specific report or activity. UNDP has not been able to build a coherent country programme on the environments that allows it to sustain its engagement with issues and counterparts. Funding has been the major obstacle. Staff turn-over disrupts programming and is not well communicated externally; several counterparts were not aware that some officials had left and made reference to communication or commitments that were pending. Based on the available information, there were no projects in the pipeline and no new confirmed funding.

In these regards, there UNDP has not been able to build on its success. Officials in the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Environment expressed an interest in continuing international cooperation, including with UNDP and focused on technical assistance and access to global networks and competence. However, the Ministries are looking for long term relationships, preferably with some expertise embedded in Iraqi institutions. Remotely managed relationships are of less interest.

UNDP was not successful in providing viable water and sanitation plans. Poor monitoring and oversight undermined UNDP contribution.

UNDP's objective of strengthening governorate-level planning systems in improving water and sanitation service delivery was only partially met. Weak local ownership, and poor monitoring and oversight by UNDP were contributing factors. There were challenges in the implementation of the Water and Sanitation Mater Plans. ADR assessment points that there were governorates where officials considered the Water and Sanitation plans to be of poor quality and not keen to implement the plans. Performance concerns were not captured in UNDP monitoring and evaluation documentation and it was not clear if similar issues were experienced in other locations. Evaluation points to specific concerns.

Among the specific concerns expressed by governorate officials, was that they were not consulted during project design, and were not part of the outsourcing of implementation of the WATSAN plans managed by UNDP. Officials, therefore, were uncertain of the scope of work that had been outsourced, and could not negotiate corrective action or have informed discussions with the implementing firm. UNDP oversight performance appeared weak, as did communication with the governorate. Monitoring and evaluation reports did not assess quality of the WATSAN plans or capacity development, whether the outputs were in use and the outcome that resulted.

The company contracted delivered generic water and sanitation plans, based on earlier surveys commissioned by the Governorate between 2006 and 2009 and interviews with some officials. The company did not undertake original survey work and added little value to the information already available. The Arabic translation of the plans was poor, making them difficult for local use. For example, the water plan finally presented was based on a system design that has not been used in Thi Qar since the 1950s, with a fundamental difference in approach that governorate does not intend to adopt. Governorate officials have since contracted different water and sanitation works, based on a planning survey done in 2006. Further works are planned for 2014, based on technical work that is now underway without UNDP participation. The UNDP, therefore, did not appear positioned to sustain a working relationship with WATSAN officials in Thi Qar.

4.5. ENABLING POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Outcome 5 was comprised of 28 projects, with a total value of USD 208,084,989. All projects were developed under the Practice Area of *Crisis Prevention and Recovery* (CPR), and further sub-divided into six sectoral areas: Civil Aviation; Economic Recovery and Inclusive Growth; Mine Action; Infrastructure; Private Sector Development and; Housing. Outcome indicators were assigned in each of these areas.

Of the 28 Outcome 5 projects, 24 were "legacy projects" with inception dates between 2006 and 2010. Of the legacy projects, 15 were funded by the UNDG ITF. Five projects had inception dates in 2010 or later, with only one new project funded within the current CPAP 2011- 2014 period. UNDG ITF projects comprised 60 percent of the total Outcome 5 projects by number, and about 80 percent of the portfolio's total value.

Most legacy projects in the Outcome 5 portfolio had a recovery orientation and focused on public service delivery and infrastructure. There were some exceptions, the most visible of these the *Private Sector Development Programme* (PSDP-I). Regardless, projects were written to the priorities of planning frameworks that expired prior to or during the evaluation period, and with limited relevance to the CPAP 2010-2014. Also, the UNDG ITF funding criteria had an important impact on project design, including favouring short term recovery interventions rather than the medium term policy and institutional impacts sought.

Portfolio composition meant there was limited possibility for results against the intended outcomes. Only six Outcome 5 projects were fully consistent with the objective of strengthening "enabling policy and frameworks" for economic recovery and private sector development, with the direct potential to contribute towards effectiveness. Diversity and weak relevance in the portfolio emerged from the need to bring an orderly closure to the large body of UNDG ITF projects from the 2007-2009 period, most of which experienced were affected by insecurity-related implementation delays.

Taking relevance into account, the ADR focused on six projects/thematic areas: Private Sector Development Programme- Iraq and the Private Sector Development collaboration between UNDP, Shell Oil and Government); Local Area Development Programme (Phase 1); all projects in the Mine Action portfolio; the Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent, and Civil Aviation Master Plan. While mostly "legacy" in origin, the design of these projects was generally consistent with the objectives of the Government, United Nations and UNDP planning frameworks for 2010-2014. They reflect an upstream focus on working with Government to strengthen legislative, policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks. This is in contrast to recovery-oriented projects that were designed to strategic objectives dating back to 2005.

In the regard, an important task accomplished during the evaluation period was bringing an orderly closure to UNDG ITF and recovery-oriented projects from previous programme periods. Significant institutional resources were needed to complete the work, while the UNDP was at the same time looking forward and adapting to a rapidly changing and volatile country context.

Programme	Project	Start Date	End Date	Original Budget ($ 000 000)	Source	Location
CPR	Civil Aviation Rehabilitation and Update	2006	2008	0.5	UNDP	National
	Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan	2008	2011	5.8	U.S.	National
CPR / Economic recovery / Inclusive Growth	Al-Muthanna Governorate Electricity Network Reinforcement Programme	2006	2009	9.9	Japan	South
	Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme – IREP III	2006	2009	14.3	Japan	National
	Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent	2009	2013	4.6	JICA, UNCDF	National
	Basra Governance Support	2009	2011	2.5	DFID	South
CPR / Housing	Improving the Housing Delivery System in Erbil	2008	2013	3.7	UN-HABITAT, Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	North
	Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing sector	2010	2012	0.5	UN-HABITAT, Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	North
CPR / Infrastructure	Rehabilitation of Mussayib Gas Power Station (Phase 2)	2006	2012	70.1	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
	Reconstruction Priority Community Public Services and Infrastructure in Samara	2006	2007	03	UNDP	South
	Restoration of Al Askari Shrine in Samarra City and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Sites Throughout Iraq	2007	2011	4.7	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	South
	Electricity Sector Reconstruction	2007	2010	1.0	JICA, UNCDF	North
	Sustainable System of Navigational Aids for Approach Channel (Umm Qasr & Az Zubayr)	2009	2013	5.6	DANIDA	South
	Electricity Sector Reconstruction Kurdistan	2009	2013	9.2	Iraq	North
CPR / Mine Action	Mine Action Support-JPN	2007	2008	0.41	United Nations	National
	MA NGO 1 Development	2006	2008	3.6	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
	Conflict Victim Assistance	2007	2012	12.8	Japan	North
	Conflict Victims Assistance - North	2007	2012	4.3	Japan, Australian Agency for Int'l Development	North
	WHO Conflict Victims Assistance - North	2007	2011	2.1	Japan	North
	Strengthening of National Mine Action Organisation in Southern Iraq	2007	2011	5.8	Australia, DFID	National

	Institutional Development Support - National Mine Action Authority	2007	2013	4.4	Italy, UNDP	National
	Mine Action in Southern Iraq	2008	2011	3.6	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	South
	Operational Capacity Development	2010	2013	5	Australian Agency for Int'l Development	National
	Victim Assistance Capacity Development	2010	2013	1.1	Australian Agency for Int'l Development, UNDP	North
	Private Sector Development Programme	2012	2013	1.2	Shell Iraq Petroleum Development, UNDP	National
CPR / Private Sector Development	Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq	2008	2013	10.8	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	National
MDG / Economic recovery / Inclusive Growth	Area Based Development Programme (LADP)	2007	2010	16.1	Adm. Agent UNDP Iraq TF	5 Governorates
	Local Area Development Plan	2007	2009	3.0	Swedish Int'l Development Cooperation	5 Governorates

Box 5: CPAP Outcome Five Statement and Indicators

Focus Area: Crisis Prevention and Recovery
Key Result Area: Restoring the foundations for development
Outcome Statement: Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development
Outcome Indicators:
1.   Iraqi airspace and air traffic regulated and managed in line with international standards (2010: no; 2014: yes)
2.   Volume (US $) of growth related and bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors (2009: below 1 billion; 2014: 2 billion)
3.   Change in national level perception of improved electricity supply (2009: 40%; 2014: 70%)
4.   Number of State-owned enterprises restructured with adequate social mitigation measures (2010: 0; 2014: 2)
5.   % increase in employment in the private sector disaggregated by gender and age (2008: 22%, 2014: 35%)
6.   % of female professional and technical workers (2008: 61.8%; 2014: 72%)

OVERALL FINDINGS

Managing changes in the Iraqi context was an important programme challenge for UNDP. Difficulties left UNDP unable to sustain its engagements in key programme areas, including private sector reform. Contributing factors included weakness in UNDP's transition strategy, the lack of coherent demand from Government backed up with national funds, and the sharp reduction of international funding as donors scaled back operations.

The ongoing country programme was prepared during a period of transition and optimism (2008-2010), with conditions deteriorating as soon as the plan became effective in 2011. UNDP was confronted a series of parallel transitions in its programme and funding environment. These produced deteriorating security conditions and a sharp reduction in the resources and activity, just as UNDP was attempting to shift into a development-oriented programme. At the same time,

significant institutional effort was used bringing the UNDG ITF to an orderly closure. Importantly, the Government of Iraq has not emerged as a funder of UNDP activities, with the exception of some support from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

UNDP had difficulty managing this combination of factors. It developed a credible portfolio that addressed core Government priorities for recovery, economic diversification, private sector development and local area development. Many of the core projects showed a sustained engagement over time, with evolution and innovation in their design, and a strengthening of relations with Iraqi counterpart institutions. UNDP demonstrated an ability to learn and manage knowledge, although individuals rather than systems appear to have played the main role. However, relevance of the portfolio arguably declined over the duration of the CPAP 2011- 2014 cycle.

The UNDP was unable to sustain its involvement in most project areas, with the exception of ongoing work with the *Local Area Development Programme* and a smaller, less diversified programme in private sector development. The successful *Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent* project also continues based on demand from JICA and Government. Economic diversification and private sector development will remain core priorities for Government, as outlined in the *National Development Plan 2013- 2017.* However, Government has not articulated a clear demand for the services of UNDP, or attached national funding support to requests. Also, UNDP has not been assertive in clarifying its own strategic direction on related priorities, or in resource mobilization. This was particularly the case for Private Sector Development, where there was demand and opportunity to build on success.

UNDP's involvement in Mine Action showed strong relevance to the country context, UNDP's corporate and normative mandate and to stated Government priorities in 2010. UNDP had a corporate responsibility to advocate for effective mine action, given the extent of landmine and ERW contamination in Iraq. However, the relevance of Mine Action to Government priorities declined, as Government failed to take effective action to improve its own performance. UNDP's position was untenable by the end of 2013, given weak Government performance after ten years of assistance. Mine Action donors gave to the same conclusion and withdrew from Iraq.

Outcome 5 generally showed good output level effectiveness. However, outputs were not always well used. Project design flaws and inefficiencies within Government were both contributing factors. Regardless, the portfolio contributed to only a limited number of outcomes, in large part resulting from the deteriorating situation In Iraq after 2011.

Outputs were generally met project targets, implementation delay notwithstanding. While the PSDP-I supported the drafting of the *Economic Reform Act* and its underlying policy and regulatory framework, the *LAPD* is strengthening Governorate development planning systems and the PSD is building linkages and between the oil and non-oil economies. The PSFMA also demonstrates strong performance improving the delivery of key public survive infrastructure. In each of these cases, there was evidence of a contribution has or could strengthen national institutions. There is also evidence that most of the recovery-oriented projects delivered tangible outputs, used to strengthen public service delivery.

There were two primary exceptions. Important outputs from the *Mine Action* portfolio were not used, given the limited effectiveness in some Government institutions. For the *Civil Aviation Master Plan*, poor project design and management combined with changing political conditions, with the result that the project's regulatory outputs were not used while its institution building outputs were used.

The linkages between portfolio outputs and the desired national outcomes are limited, any concerns regarding output delivery notwithstanding. National development trends often contradict the outcome objectives; the trend has been for further concentration of economic activity in the oil sector, and of economic resources and power in the State. Political gridlock has slowed progress towards needed reforms, and the actions of Government institutions are not always consistent with

the policy of diversification. The overall political and security context remains volatile, and the actual incentives for important stakeholders to devolve economic power from the State are unclear.

The State, therefore, has an important responsibility for broken linkages between project outputs and limited effectiveness in achieving the outcomes desired. In turn, the lack of diversification or private sector development had consequences for Government's overall human development strategy. Successive national development plans were based on the assumption that private sector growth would create new economic opportunity and reduce poverty, particularly for the large youth cohort entering the labour market. This has not occurred.

There were important differences in the efficiency of legacy projects with earlier start up dates, and projects implemented later in the portfolio. These demonstrate progress with institutional learning on the Iraq context and on project design.

The delivery-focused approach under UNDG ITF contributed to a lack of programme coherence and synergy among portfolio component. The transition to a more programme approach intended since 2008 has not been fully realized, affecting programme efficiency in delivering results. In general, the efficiency of legacy project, and of most international interventions in Iraq during the period 2003 to 2010, was mixed and affected by the some combination of the following factors:

a. Pressure for rapid delivery of outputs under difficult conditions, and collaborating with institutional counterparts that had limited capacity.

b. Uneven national ownership of projects, often based in individuals rather than strategic position and agreement at the institutional level within Government. In part, this reflected the dynamics within Iraqi institutions.

c. Deficiencies in project design, often resulting from limited contextual knowledge or working in areas outside of core UNDP institutional competence.

d. Limited direct access to counterparts and projects sites, contributing to difficulties with project governance, communications with counterparts, and with project management and oversight.

These conditions produced implementation delays, mixed quality of some outputs and changes in scope, with the large majority of projects needing to be revised and extended. Later projects in the Outcome 5 portfolio showed much improved efficiency, based on important design and management improvements. UNDP tended to:

a. Develop more effective relationships with Iraqi counterparts. The change results from a combination of some strengthening of Iraqi institutions and better ability within these programmes to establish and sustain working relations over an extended period of time.

b. The ability to sustain engagements and relations was a key performance variable. This allowed the UNDP to present itself as a credible partner in processes of institutional change, particularly as its presence within Iraq strengthened, including through the use of LTA arrangements with trusted national implementers.

c. Demonstrated better context knowledge, with designs that embedded projects with counterpart institutions and processes, and with improved project governance.

d. Worked in areas of core institutional competence allowed UNDP to field programme teams with a combination of subject matter experience and good knowledge of UNDP. This appeared to include fielding more expert staff with Arabic language skills.

Sustainability was best when Government had strong ownership, projects were embedded into national strategies and institutions and UNDP was able to sustain its engagement over an extended period of time.

The PSDP-I, LADP, PSD and PSFMA continue operations and show good possibility for sustainability, at the output level. These projects are integrated into government priorities and systems, and have effective governance arrangements. Sustainability will be determined by Government's use of the outputs, noting that most for these projects were of good quality. *Mine Action* shows poor possibility for sustainability, given inefficiencies in Government.

Legacy projects show mixed sustainability. Many legacy projects had sustainability measured build into their design, and most outputs designed for integration into public systems. Examples would include projects in the electrical sector, which have high importance to Government and are fully integrated into the power grid. Other public service delivery projects showed the level of design effectiveness. However, an important minority of the projects showed poor ownership or strategic integration in their design. The *Civil Aviation Master Plan* project was the main example. These projects were not well owned by Government, and have not been effectively used or sustained as a result.

However, the most important sustainability concern is UNDP's inability to build on previous achievement and sustain its engagement with Government. The proximate reason is a dramatic reduction in funding; LADP, PSD and PSFMA are the only Outcome 5 projects able to continue activity into the next programme cycle. UNDP shows limited success with resource mobilization or new project development. The overall institutional capacity of the UNDP, therefore, was significantly reduced, and lacking a revised strategic orientation to focus the remaining capacity. Government counterparts are generally aware of the reduction, and it influences their perception of the UNDP as a counterpart.

For PSDP-I, the UNDP did not have a strategy for sustaining its engagement after UNDG ITF funding ended, and has not generated new resources. Senior management did not act effectively to develop a transition strategy, or to articulate future possible contributions. The programme team has been disbanded and activity will close with the presentation of the Private Sector Development Strategy paper, which is currently in the PMAC. UNDP, therefore, does not have the personnel or resources to follow up in a systematic manner, to advocate for the new law or support its implementation. This means that UNDP completed part of the work, but will not be present during the equally difficult implementation phase which is essential to outcome achievement.

CIVIL AVIATION AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

The outcome indicator for the Civil Aviation project was not achieved. Only a portion of the Civil Aviation outputs were delivered and/or used by aviation authority. As a result, the project had limited possibility of contributing to achieving the outcome desired.

The Civil Aviation portfolio comprised two sequential projects. *Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan* was implemented over a three year period between 2008 and 2011. By bringing national civil aviation regulatory frameworks into compliance with international standards, the project would help "maximize accessibility of the country to trade flows through reliable and efficient air routes, airports, waterways and sea ports, ensuring the prompt delivery of goods needed for Iraq's recovery and development".[104] The 2008 project built on an earlier Civil Aviation project implemented between 2006 and 2008.

Support to Civil Aviation Master Plan had eight supporting outputs, of which the two most important were: i) a ten-year Civil Aviation Master Plan prepared and adopted by the GoI, and; ii) a comprehensive package of training and capacity building initiatives for the Iraqi Civil Aviation

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[104] UNDP, *Master Planning and Capacity Building for Iraqi Civil Aviation Sector; Project Summary Information*, undated, 2008

Authority (ICAA, Ministry of Transport). The projects received funding from the UNDG ITF (Government of Japan) and the United States Department of State, with the ICAA as the Government Counterpart. Technical support for the master plan was contracted through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), while the UNDP was able to embed a technical specialist in the ICAA's office at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).

There has been limited progress towards the outcome objective. At the end of project implementation, Iraqi airspace and air traffic are not regulated or managed according to international standards. Slow progress towards reforms and the modernization of Iraq's aviation infrastructure remain constraints on the sector's expansion, Iraq's economic development and improved flows of persons, goods and services. The *National Development Plan 2013- 2017* cites a "continued lack of strategic vision" as a factor contributing to the lack of progress (2013: 13).

The technical assistance by UNDP strengthened the capacities of the Iraq's Civil Aviation Authority. However, the Master Plan was not implemented and there was no contribution to improving regulatory frameworks. Contributing factors were weak design and project ownership among Iraqi authorities, who changed frequently.

Support to the Civil Aviation Master Plan made an important contribution to strengthening Iraq's Civil Aviation Authority, by providing training to 257 officials.[105] The training programme was assessed as being of high quality and relevance, with the knowledge and skills acquired used by authority officials. Technical assistance provided by the UNDP's specialist at ICAA's BIAP facility was also assessed as being of high quality, contributing to the effectiveness of ongoing operations and implementation of the training programme. Iraq officials noted the positive impact of embedding the UNDP specialist within the authority's operational centre.

Otherwise, important outputs from the civil aviation project were either not delivered or not used by Government, including the centrepiece Civil Aviation Master Plan. As such, the project did not contribute to improved regulation of the sector, or moving it towards use of international standards.

The Civil Aviation project delivered only four of the original eight outputs, with the Donor and Iraq counterpart showing dissatisfaction with overall quality of the UNDP's contribution. A *Civil Aviation Master Plan,* written by specialists from the International Civil Aviation Organization, was presented to the ICAA in March 2009. The authority never formally acknowledged that it received the Master Plan, and it was not implemented.[106] The plan appeared poorly suited to the context and too complex for use by the authority. Informants noted that the ICAO authors had limited or no previous experience working in conflict-affected and low capacity environments, which influenced the realism of the draft plan under Iraqi conditions

As contributing factors, the UNDP had insufficient management capacity and aviation sector credibility to oversee the process. UNDP also did have the capacity to engage the ICAA on implementation of the plan. Institutional weakness within the ICAA and the limited ownership of Iraqi counterparts during the early design stage were also factors. The Director General of the authority changed four changes over the life of the project, with frequent changes also in subordinate officials. Successive DGs had different priorities and loyalties, and the ICAA's commitment to the project eroded over time. At the same time, political gridlock meant limited progress was made on legislative and regulatory reform.

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[105] Findings are summarized from UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Iraq 2011-2014*, January 2012, Section 2.6. They were updated and confirmed for 2013 with two interviews.
[106] The original CAMP report was 450 pages. Government and the US Department of State requested UNDP prepare an 80 page Executive Summary, which could be managed by the ICAA. The revised report was delivered in Sept 2009. However, the ICAA never officially acknowledged receipt of either the report or the Executive Summary. No action has been taken by the ICAA or Ministry of Transportation to implement the report, in whole or in part.

In contrast, the UNDP successfully implemented an addition project in the transport sector; *Navigation Aid for Approach Channel- Umm Qasr and Az Zubayr Ports* (NAVAID). The NAVAID project contributed to improved capacity at the Um Qasr facility, Iraq's only deep water port. Navigation systems dated to the 1970s, did not comply with international standards, and were in poor operating condition. The objective of the NAVAID project was to improve maritime traffic by updated the systems and strengthening the institutional capacity of the General Corporation for Ports Iraq (GCPI, Ministry of Transport). Improvements were seen as a prerequisite for expanding oil exports.

Navigation buoys were in place and operational by 2012. There was no data available to link the project with increased maritime traffic or safety. However, informants from the Port Authority credit the aids with improvement to overall safety, which was a reason some shippers previously avoided Umm Qasr facility. The introduction of an AIS/VTS navigation systems and training was also credited with improved traffic management. Iraqi counterparts and the Donor (Denmark) credited the UNDP with effective project management.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

The Economic Recovery and Inclusive Growth portfolio was comprised of six projects, including one in the electricity sector and a second focused on reconstruction and employment. The main components of the portfolio were projects related to *Local Area Development* (LADP), the *Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent* (PSFMS) and UNDP's support to budget execution in two Governorates. Two subsequent iterations of the LADP and budget support projects appeared in Outcome 4 portfolio, reflecting a shift to focus on governance and strengthening planning and budget systems at the Governorate level.[107]

UNDP contributed to improving the performance of a USD 4.5 JICA loan to the Government of Iraq, supporting implementation of 17 public service infrastructure projects. UNDP's contribution also helped to improve economic governance in the public sector.

Through the 2009 Partnership Services for Fiduciary Monitoring Agent (PSFMA), the UNDP provides ongoing technical and advisory services to the Monitoring Committee of a Japanese concessional loan to the Government of Iraq, valued at USD 4.5 billion. The Committee includes representatives of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Government. It oversees a portfolio of 17 large scale infrastructure projects being implemented by various federal Ministries.

UNDP is contracted through an agreement with JICA to work with the implementing GoI institutions to: i) develop and monitor procurement planning; ii) support financial management and planning; iii) identify capacity development needs and provide related services, and; iv) report to the Monitoring Committee on a regular basis. UNDP's overall role is to improve the performance of projects funded by the loan. Implementation of the loan agreement was at its mid-point by the end of 2013, with most projects are scheduled for completion between 2014 and 2017. JICA anticipates that UNDP will continue to provide support until closure of the loan.

Evidence from the early implementation phase is that UNDP's contribution helped to improve economic governance in the public sector, and effectiveness of projects in the loan portfolio. In this regard, the project made a positive contributed towards the outcome indicator of increasing the number of "bankable projects developed across infrastructure sectors", although the relative contribution is difficult to quantify.

Overall performance in the portfolio is satisfactory. Stakeholders from JICA and the Government expressed a high level of confidence and satisfaction with the UNDP's contribution. Specifically

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[107] The LADP projects are all addressed in the Outcome 4 paper. The projects were implemented in sequence, with the design of subsequent iterations evolving based on lessons learned and changing requirements. For the purpose of coherence, therefore, the three LADP projects are assessed together.

cited, UNDP enabled effective start-up of the portfolio, with technical support to design and management of JICA loan requirements. UNDP also contributed to strengthening procurement procedures, and otherwise identifying implementation bottlenecks that require Steering Committee action. It supported planning and project management within the implementing ministries, with stakeholders perceiving that UNDP's contribution had generally strengthened capacity and project performance.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The Outcome 5 infrastructure portfolio included six projects, focused on restoring Iraqi's electrical and transportation infrastructure and rehabilitation of damaged religious sites. The latter was intended to support reconciliation after attacks on religious sites. Four of the projects were developed prior to 2008, when UNDP gave priority to the rehabilitation of public infrastructure. As a result, projects do not always have clearly identified outcome and output indicators in in the CPAP results matrix.

Outcome 5 included the last of 18 projects implemented by UNDP in the electricity sector between 2004 and 2013, valued at approximately USD 190 million and funded either by bilateral donors or the UNDG ITF. Total national and international investment in the power sector between 2004 and 2008 was approximately USD 8 billion. Projects implemented by UNDP, therefore, comprised only 2.5 percent of the total investment and their possibility to improve overall sector outcomes or public opinion was limited.[108]

The *Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project* was implemented over two phases with the Regional Ministry of Electricity in Kurdistan (RMEK).[109] The projects aimed to improve the availability of electrical power, through rehabilitation of three transmission sub-stations. The second phase delivered mobile sub-stations, in addition to equipment. UNDP provided project management, technical assistance and advisory services to the RMEK, as part of a Yen16 million (USD 6.4 million) loan agreement between the ministry and Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). UNDP did not play a direct implementation role.

The project *Restoration of Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra City, and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites throughout Iraq,* aimed to rehabilitate the Al-Askari Shrine, damaged in 2006 during sectarian violence. The project was done jointly with UNESCO, with the UNDP component focused on rehabilitation of other public infrastructure in Samarra City (two schools) and measures for reconciliation and restoration of stability.

Iraq made some progress reducing the gap between capacity and demand and stabilising the electrical grid. UNDP projects contributed to stabilising the power grid and preventing the further deteriorating of strategic production facilities. However, Iraq did not achieve the national outcome objective of improving public perception of service delivery.

UNDP's contribution in the electrical sector was modest in relation to overall needs, accounting for about 2.5 percent of the total investment into Iraq's electrical sector between 2004 and 2008. These were the peak years of UNDP activity in the sector. The Outcome 5 portfolio, therefore, had limited ability to influence overall the quality of service delivery or public perception. Regardless, UNDP projects helped to stabilise the electrical grid.

The power supply increase from UNDP projects was credited with helping to avert an even greater crisis. While modest, UNDP projects were effectively targeted at strategic production sites. The contribution helped mitigate damage from collapse of the grid in 2003. However, the effectiveness

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[108] Estimate cited from UNDP, *Evaluation of "Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development"; Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011-2014*, Baghdad, Iraq, 2012, p. 36

[109] UNDP, *Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project; Project Document*, undated 2007; UNDP, *Electricity Sector Reconstruction in Kurdistan; Project Document*, undated 2009

of outputs was undermined by long implementation delays, meaning that projects were often delivered after the immediate crisis, and with reductions in scope of work. Late delivery may have also undermined the ability of projects to influence public perception of service quality.

As the two projects specifically assessed by the ADR:

a) The Mussayib Power Station has been finalized. The project contributed to stabilisation of the station's power generation capacity, and improved reliability through reduced shutdowns. As a result, overall stability of the Iraqi power grid was enhanced, given the Mussayib station's strategic position in the central region of Iraq. The effectiveness of project outputs was diminished by reduction of the project's scope and lengthy implementation delays; the project took eight years to complete instead of the two years originally planned. As such, the project did not meet its objective of helping stabilize the grid during the immediate crisis period. In large part, delays related to difficulties working at Mussayib, particularly during the peak years of violence. However, UNDP planning and management of the project were also cited areas of deficiency.[110]

b) The *Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan* was based on a cost-sharing agreement between the RMEK and the UNDP, for implementation of a USD 150 million JICA loan. The UNDP provided technical assistance and project management support, to construction of electrical substations, which improved the overall effectiveness of the distribution grid in Kurdistan Region. The project has been completed to the strong satisfaction of the Regional Ministry of Electricity of Kurdistan (RMEK), and evaluated in 2012 as being "satisfactory", the second highest rating on a five point scale. Performance has been enhanced by the combination of strong Government ownership and investment, and by project governance, oversight, and quality assurance system.

Improvements to generation capacity and supply notwithstanding, electrical power supply is the worst rated public service in Iraq. Public opinion polls show a high and consistent level of public discontent with the quality of electricity services. In a 2011 opinion poll done by the UN and Government, 79 percent of the population stated that the quality of electrical power service was "bad" or "very bad".[111] The exception was in the Kurdistan region, where public approval was high.[112] Another poll from 2012 done by *Oxford Research International* found that 64 percent of Iraqis had a negative view of the supply of electricity, while a 2010 poll by the *International Republican Institute* concluded 66 percent of Iraqis believed poor public service delivery, including electricity, was the most serious problem facing the country. Nationally, 60 percent of respondents stated the situation had gotten worse, compared to 2008.[113] These polls also show a growing concern with economic issues, corruption, employment and the general delivery of public goods and services as security conditions improved after 2009. Electricity emerged as an issue of the highest concern and political sensitivity.

Through the *Electricity Sector Reconstruction Project in Kurdistan,* the UNDP demonstrated its competence in the strategic role as a fiduciary agent. These roles have often been allocated to multilateral financial institutions, and represent an important future opportunity as cooperation with Iraq moves from grants to soft loans and technical assistance. The UNDP also successfully competed in the open market place as a programme manager.

[110] UNDP, *Evaluation of "Enabling policy framework for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development"; Outcome 5, UNDP Iraq Country Programme Action Plan 2011-2014*, Baghdad, Iraq, 2012, Section 2.5

[111] United Nations Iraq, *Synthesis Paper for Preparation of the UNDAF 2015-2019 (draft)*, Joint Analysis Unit, Amman and Baghdad, 25 November 2013, p 11

[112] UNDP, *Outcome 5 Evaluation*, 2012, pp. 36- 38

[113] UNDP, *Outcome 5 Evaluation*, 2012, pp. 37- 38

MINE ACTION

The Mine Action programme comprised of eight projects. UNDP's contribution to Mine Action dates back to 2004, beginning with support to the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) first efforts to establish a national mine action authority.[114] More recently, UNDP has collaborated with the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA), located within the Ministry of Environment, and the Kurdistan Regional Government.[115] All active projects will be completed by the end of 2013. UNDP, Government and Donor officials all advised that no future Mine Action projects are being considered, and the programme will be closed.

Mine Action projects were implemented with a broad set of institution building and service delivery objectives. These included: i) support Iraqi accession to the *Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention* (APMAC); ii) establishing the national-level legal, policy, regulatory and institutional framework for Mine Action programme; iii) technical assistance to establish Iraqi National Mine Action Standards (INMAS) to guide operations, an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), and landmine impact technical and non-technical surveys; iv) assisting victims with rehabilitation assistance and vocational training services, and; iv) building the capacity of the Ministry of Environment's Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC). UNDP also engaged in advocacy work, with national authorities.

Despite efforts, UNDP contribution to the improvement of Mine Action institutions and systems was modest. Iraq has not established an effective legal or regulatory framework for Mine Action. There has also been limited progress in reducing contamination from landmines or Explosive Remnant of War, and Iraq is not on track to meet its 2018 target to complete clearance. The lack of progress cannot be however attributed to UNDP alone.

UNDP sustained its engagement over a ten year period, and the Mine Action portfolio was based on a coherent design concept. UNDP was a minor actor in financial terms, relative to other international Mine Action stakeholders. However, this was offset by the sustained engagement with Iraqi stakeholders, the good quality of UNDP's technical assistance and advice, and its unique position relative to the international normative framework for mine action. The UNDP also enjoyed Donor confidence, and there was a broadly held perception that it was impartial in a context marked by tensions within and between some Iraqi institutions.

The outcome objective of improving the regulatory and coordinating mechanisms for Mine Action in Iraq was not achieved. There has been some limited progress in recent years. Iraq adopted national mine action standards in 2012 that are consistent with international standards, and has submitted four transparency reports to the mine ban convention process since 2008.[116] In 2013, the Ministry of Defence formed four units of 500 personnel each for mine action. The units are budgeted and scheduled deploy in 2014. Together with the growth in commercial demining in the oil sector, these have the capacity to increase the scope and quality to clearance activity. The KRG manages well-established Mine Action institutions and programmes that date back to the mid-1990s, and are now self-sufficient with KRG funding.[117]

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[114] The total number of projects between 2004 and 2013 was 10, with two projects concluding prior to 2008 and the scope of evaluation. Total value of the portfolio was USD 35 million. During this period, UNDP worked with the CPA, the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC), and with the DMA, which was formed in 2010.

[115] There are two entities under the KRG responsible for mine action; the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) in Dahouk and Erbil Governorates and the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA) in the Suleimanya.

[116] Government and UNDP informants did not consider the Transparency Reports reliable, given the lack of functioning information systems and weak institutional capacity within the DMA.

[117] UNDP, *Outcome Evaluation of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Iraq 2011-2014*, 2012, Section 2.6

Regardless, there was limited or no progress towards the CPAP outcome of strengthening Iraq's legislative, policy and institutional framework for Mine Action. Nor were there improvements with the performance of Iraq's overall Mine Action effort and its compliance with mine ban convention obligations. UNDP outputs also made a limited contribution to the equitable economic recovery foreseen in the CPAP. Much of the clearance is now linked to oil production, with limited benefit to affected communities or non-oil sectors of the economy. Victim assistance programmes outside of the Kurdistan Region are almost non-existent.[118] As a result, the current *National Development Plan* concludes that "landmine areas continue to remain untreated [with an impact on] human security, land exploitation and development projects in these areas."[119]

As specific concerns, Iraq still has no approved legislation or legal framework for Mine Action. Likewise, no national strategy for mine action or ERW removal was approved during the evaluation period.[120] Also, the institutional framework for mine action remains ineffective, after ten years of support from the UNDP and other international entities.

The primary reason for lack of progress rests with Government, and the absence of both a legal framework and effective institutions. The DMA has overall operational responsibility for mine action in Iraq. However, the Directorate is undermined by important institutional shortcomings. It lacks qualified personnel, and its internal management, planning, oversight and reporting systems do not function in an efficient or transparent manner. The DMA also lacks the technical ability to coordinate mine action activities, plan technical and non-technical surveys, gather reliable data on contamination or clearance activities, or to quality assure that clearance is done to agreed standards. Importantly, the DMA does not maintain the mine action information system. Without this data, Government is unable to track and quality-assure clearance activities, regulate or plan mine action activities or accurately report to the mine ban treaty.

These and other concerns have been identified in numerous reports since the Directorate's formation, without corrective action being taken. As a result, Mine Action lacks credibility and institutional coherence. It is also not prominent in Government planning. In particular, Mine Action does not appear in the national development plans for 2011- 2014 or 2013- 2017. Responding directly to the lack of progress, Donors effectively ended their funding to related activities by 2012. Government informants note that the lack of progress is notwithstanding the high quality of technical support provided by the UNDP. According to one official, "the UNDP did all that it could reasonable do in this situation. The problems were with [government] and not with UNDP… without DMA reform they could not do more."[121]

The UNDP generally met its project-level output targets, assessed by Government as being of good quality. This includes technical assistance and capacity building to the DMA, and its support to mine action information systems. However, Government, in particular the DMA, did not make effective use of the outputs. Poor outcome level performance in the Mine Action portfolio, therefore, was the result of political and institutional constraints that are beyond the ability of the UNDP to resolve. A 2012 evaluation also cited a lack of support for the Mine Action portfolio within the UNDP, at the senior management and corporate levels. As a result, the UNDP's position has been described as "untenable" and UNDP's activity will close at the end of 2013.[122]

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[118] UNDP and Government informants noted that victim surveys were completed in two Southern Governorates during 2013. However, concerns were expressed regarding high costs, inconsistent methodology and the accuracy of data. They noted that there are no plans for a victim assistance programme based on the data.

[119] Republic of Iraq, *National Development Plan 2013-2017*, p. 26

[120] A law was drafted in 2011 and is with Parliament. However, the law remains pending and there was no indication when ratification might occur. A *National Mine Action Strategy* was approved in 2011, but has not been effectively implemented.

[121] From interview with Government official to the HCMA

In contrast, the UNDP's support to victim assistance in the Kurdistan Region showed tangible outcomes. These included two projects contributing to the physical rehabilitation of victims, education and livelihood training. The projects supported expansion of victim assistance services and were highly regarded by the KRG. Project outputs have been absorbed into public service delivery systems, and are sustained with KRG funding. In this regard, the UNDP successfully completed its cooperation with the KRG; public systems are established and self-sufficient, programmes have national funding and no further UNDP assistance is required.

PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Economic diversification and private sector development was a core Government development priorities in consecutive national development plans, starting from the first *National Development Strategy 2005- 2007*.[123] There were two projects in the UNDP's Private Sector Development (PSD) portfolio. The *Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq* (PSDP-I) was a Joint Programme between the UNDP and six other UN agencies.[124] UNDP played the lead role and/or support roles with programme objective related to: i) strengthened national capacities and policies for private sector development; ii) developing a roadmap for the restructuring of Iraqi's 192 State Owned Enterprises (SOE), including social mitigation measures, and; iv) establishing a public micro-lending programme. UNDP also collaborated in activities to promote local economic strategies and strengthen the operational, regulatory and legislative environment for development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME).

PSDP-I formed the core of the CPAP Outcome 5 portfolio in several respects. The project accounted for almost a third of new financial allocations during the evaluation period. It was aligned with post-2008 UNDP framework, positioned at the centre of Government's policy objectives for economic recovery and had strong national ownership through its full life cycle. The PSDP-I was implemented with numerous ministries under the coordination of *Prime Minister's Advisory Commission* (PMAC), and through seven thematic working groups that comprised the *Task Force for Economic Reform* (TFRR).[125] Among its coordination and other roles, UNDP played the lead with outputs for: i) strengthened national capacities and policies for private sector development; ii) improved efficiency of public micro-lending programme, and iii) strengthened operational, regulatory, and legislative environment for SMEs development. UNDP was also involved with local economic development and restructuring of State Owned Enterprises.

The UNDP is also collaborating in a public private partnership, with Shell Oil, the Ministry of Oil (MoO), the Southern Oil Company (SoC) and local authorities in the Basra Governorate. The objective of *Vocational Training and MSME Capacity Development in Basra* is to promote economic diversification and strengthen the private sector's role in local area development by: i) building the Vocational Training system's capacity to meet the growing demand for skilled labour, and; ii) strengthening local MSME capacity, to respond to opportunities in the oil sector and elsewhere. The project also contributes to several community development initiatives in the Majnoon district, near Shell operations.

UNDP made an important contribution to developing Iraq's legislative, policy and regulatory framework for economic reform and private sector strategies. The desired outcome of economic diversification was not achieved during the evaluation period. However, the programme contributed to laying the foundations for future action, including pending ratification of the Economic Reform Act, which was one output of the PSDP-I process. Regardless, the programme in now closed and UNDP is not positioned to build on the PSDP-I achievements.

There was limited progress towards achieving the outcome objective of economic diversification and job creation, through enabling policies or regulation. The overall trend was for further concentration of economic resources and power within the State at the federal level, with no structural changes that would promote diversification or private sector job creation. The trend contradicts Government's policy objectives and is driven by rapid expansion of the hydro carbon sector. As a result, the economy was not well positioned to contribute towards poverty reduction or spatial development priorities. This is particularly the case with absorbing Iraq's rapidly growing youth population into the labour force or addressing deprivation in some areas of the country. Outcome achievement was constrained by structural trends and a lack of political consensus on the State's economic role.

The PSDP-I Joint Programme made a substantial and positive contribution to early design of the Government's economic reform strategy. Activities were fully aligned with the Government priorities outlined in both the *National Development Strategy* (2007- 2010) and *National Development Plan* (2010- 2014). The final outcome could not be determined within the evaluation period, as the main output- a legislative reform package- was still pending ratification as of November 2013. Regardless, there was a direct linkage between the PSDP-I, presentation of the legislative package, and the formation of a structure within Government to develop the reforms and implement them.

The PSDP-I was fully integrated into, and strengthened, the Government's coordinating structure; through the *Task Force on Economic Reforms* and under management of the PMAC. The UNDP was able to establish itself as a credible institutional partner by being physically present in Iraq, sustaining its involvement over four years and by making available highly qualified personnel. The United Nations was able to play these roles as other international organisations were not in a position to work in Iraq's difficult security conditions. UNDP lost this advantage when the PSDP-I closed, without any provisions for continued UNDP involvement on follow to the PSDP-I achievements.

In the context of limited progress towards economic diversification, UNDP supported legislative formulation of policy, regulatory and institutional reform. The draft *Economic Reform Act* legislative package, which brought together the work done by all seven TFER Working Groups was approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2013. The bill was sent to the Iraqi Parliament, and is pending ratification. The act is a comprehensive framework for reform. Among other elements, it included legislation related to the restructuring of SOEs; changes in National Investment and Foreign Investment laws allowing private purchase of SOEs and the injection of private capital into the companies, and; tax reform to expand the Government's revenue base.

The *Economic Reform Act* addresses key structural issues hindering private sector development. If implemented, legislation has the possibility of "a transformational effect in the economy, scaling down government dominance, building up the private sector and establishing a market orientation in the economy." It built on a body of policy and legislation that Government to developed, with the PSDP-I support over the life of the project. This included policy and legislation for MSMEs and on land and housing. The project was further credited with helping create a structure within Government to develop the reforms and carry them forward, and to promote cultural change within State institutions.

A *Private Sector Development Strategy* was being finalized by the UNDP, as a final output from the PSDP-I. The strategy was developed by Government, with the UN agencies that participated PSDP-I and in consultation with the private sector. Its purpose was to develop a consensus within Government on policy objectives, and between Government and the private sector. The strategy was described as a roadmap for clarifying policy and priorities, and for implementation of supporting legislative, regulatory, financial and institutional reforms. In this regard, the strategy was intended to build on the reforms already developed by the TFER process and elsewhere, and focus on their implementation.

The first draft of the *Private Sector Development Strategy* was presented in January 2013, with revisions expected for the end of 2013. Finalisation came after UNDP had closed out most of its PSDP-I activities; key staff had left and financial resources were depleted. UNDP, therefore, had limited capacity to sustain its involvement. The strategy document was being completed by a team of UNDP-retained consultants using TRAC funding, and working with in the PMAC. UNDP, therefore, was not positioned, therefore, to sustain the same level of engagement on economic issues, or contribute to the actual implementation of the private sector or larger reform initiatives.

UNDPs support to public private cooperation between the Ministry of Oil and Shell Oil shows good initial performance, in building linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors.

The public private cooperation between the Ministry of Oil and Shell Oil shows good initial performance. The project is on track to build linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors, to increase the availability of skilled workers in the labour market and strengthen local business development. These achievements are consistent with the Government's economic development priority of diversifying the economy and strengthening the private sector. The PSD project also has good potential to be scaled up, in Iraq and elsewhere.

The *Private Sector Development* project is early into its implementation phase; no outputs have been finalised for vocational training, small business development or community projects. The exception is two schools that were refurbished in the Majnoon area, in close proximity to Shell operations. Also, ten companies completed the first round of business development training, although they advised the training has not yet resulted in acquisition of new contracts.

Implementation delays have resulted from slow decision making within Iraqi institutions, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA). Recent Governorate elections in Basra created further uncertainty, regarding Governorate representation to the project's Steering Committee. Informants also noted that the design of operational arrangements between the three counterparts (Shell, Government and the UNDP) has taken both time and an investment of institutional energy, as a public-private collaboration of this nature has not been undertaken before.

Regardless, programme counterparts considered the early performance as positive. The project strategy was based on a consensus around the needs and development priorities shared between the three counterparts; promoting economic diversification, developing linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors and strengthening the availability of both skilled workers and the number of Iraqi business that can deliver services to international standards. The project model is considered innovative, and there was discussion of replicating it elsewhere in Iraq and in other countries. The project builds on existing field implementation capacity and experience, using structures established for the *Local Areas Development Project*. These allow the UNDP to sustain its engagement with Counterparts at the field level.

Government stressed the importance of building direct linkages between the oil and non-oil sectors, and developing the national labour market and private sector. The project concept of linking Shell operations to vocational training, business development and social service delivery in communities has good national support, and is considered a pilot for scale up elsewhere in Iraq.

The Senior Shell official were of the view that UNDP has been an open and excellent partner to Shell Iraq, as regular interactions and common objectives have enhanced the sense of partnership and delivery on the ground. UNDP and Shell had compatible objectives, in developing local business and training skilled trades persons to work in the oil industry. Shell also considers UNDP to have generally met performance expectations, particularly in the area of stakeholder management, getting "buy-in" from public officials and with public institutions and operational management.

CHAPTER 5. STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP

This chapter examines how UNDP positioned itself to respond to the reconstruction and development needs in Iraq and the interface with the integrated mission.

5.1.RESPONDING TO NATIONAL PRIORITIES

UNDP programmes aligned with the priorities of the transition and development set out in the national plans. Some areas of the programme faced challenges in securing national ownership.

The NDP 2011-2014 provided the first medium-term planning framework for post-2003 Iraq. The preparation of the UNDAF 2011-2014 was guided by this NDP process and hence aligned with national development priorities, which among other areas included: infrastructure, transportation and communication; water and sanitation; health; women; children and youth; vulnerable groups; poverty; MDGs; sustainable environment; and good governance.[126] The UNDP country programme for 2011-2014 was based on the UNDAF for the same period has been generally consistent with the NDP objectives and priorities.

The issues addressed by UNDP programmes have been relevant to the challenges faced by the country. During the period when ITF resources were available, the priority was for reconstruction and restoration of basic public services. The government and UNDP generally agree that the priority for UNDP is to address governance related issues, and UNDP's country programme have had a heavy emphasis on these issues. While NDP does not have a proactive development objective for supporting CSOs, understandably in the political environment where suspicions existed about the identity of some CSOs, UNDP has nevertheless kept its intention to support them.

One recognizes, however, a number of programmes that were not accepted by the Government and other national partners. The way in which some key government counterparts criticized UNDP initiatives indicates that UNDP has not succeeded in achieving national ownership. UNDP was seen as one of the aid agencies focusing on technical support rather than a partner that could assist in the national development process.

One obvious reason has been the lack of close collaboration and regular consultations with the Government due to the remote operation from Amman and the security restriction in south and central Iraq. The relative success of support to elections programme and the recent success of the Public Sector Modernization programme in gaining the ownership of the national counterparts are due in no small part to the fact that the national counterparts were located in the International Zone of Baghdad and the project manager has been stationed in Baghdad, not in Amman. The government participation was much more forthcoming in Kurdistan where the security situation has been quite stable. The success of the Access to Justice and Human Rights programmes is commendable given the security challenges. This was not the case in many other programmes. While it is by no means justifiable to expose staff to unnecessary risks, UNDP has been particularly slow in devising ways to overcome this challenge. The lack of interactions with national partners has not only affected the relationship with them but has also hindered effective implementation of UNDP projects.

The lack of close collaboration was even graver outside Baghdad in south and central Iraq where local governments had significant capacity development needs. The progress made by Local Area Development Programme has been very slow, and the challenges faced by local partners have not always been promptly addressed. There was still a significant imbalance between the needs and challenges and the support provided to partners outside Baghdad and Kurdistan, notwithstanding UNDP in 2008-2010 had offices located in Anbar, Najaf and Basrah.

Similarly, the approach taken by UNDP projects sometimes did not fit the local context. In some cases, for instance, UNDP brought in relatively junior consultants whose expertise are based more

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[126] UNDAF 2011-2014, ibid.

on theory than practice. In the Iraqi culture, seniority and experience were important factors in gaining respect, and therefore having such consultants playing an advisory role to parliamentarians, senior government officials or local leaders was often not acceptable.

COLLABORATION WITH UNAMI AND UNCT

There were areas of long-term collaboration with UNAMI, which facilitated contribution to strengthening national institutions. Overall the relationship with UNAMI was less congenial for UNDP contribution in Iraq.

There is a scope for improvements in UNDP's relationship with UNAMI. UNAMI is an integrated mission and its work includes areas that are UNDP mandate, such as elections support, human rights and reconstruction. There has been collaboration in terms of information sharing and the Joint Analysis and Policy Unit serving the information needs of both UNAMI and UNCT. In terms of programmatic collaboration, for example, in the election support team, UNAMI and UNDP had specific areas to support. Among the four electoral support team agencies, UNDP has responsibility to address to capacity development while UNAMI addresses political and logistical aspects. Beyond the role sharing, however, the potential for deeper collaboration on substantive issues has not been realized.

Lack of role clarity between UNAMI and UNDP has been a source of contention. UNAMI is critical of UNDP for programming in areas which it considers under their mandate, without the kind of consultation that UNAMI expects. UNDP for its part, is concerned that UNAMI assumes this prerogative of a greater role without acknowledging the role that UNDP can and should play. This becomes difficult within the electoral team where UNAMI, UNOPS, UNDP and IFES all play a role, where their respective functions have not always been well agreed and where UNDP project managers find themselves required to follow UNAMI instructions even when there may not be full justification. There were also instances where UNDP has been less consultative. When UNDP undertook a peace and reconciliation programme in Nineweh, UNDP did not involve the UNAMI's team working on the disputed internal boundaries team. UNDP's Small Arms and Light Weapons reduction programme has not fully consulted with UNAMI's disarmament resource persons.

Considering the political role of UNAMI, UNDP has concerns about collaboration in some areas. An area of concern is also that, development support of UNCT should be based on a clearer understanding with the government, so as to avoid political and reputational risks. This needs a clear communication to the national counterparts about the distinctness of the mandate of the UNAMI and UNCT. From UNDP perspective, UNAMI is seen as not successful in providing the clarity needed between the political and development mandates of UN and role sharing in overlapping areas, particularly in governance area.

Efforts to address such concerns have not been effective. In 2011 there were efforts to agree on an Integrated Strategic Vision. Four areas were noted where UNAMI and UNDP could be expected to work together and these were: i) electoral team assistance, ii) the public distribution system, iii) reconciliation and arms reduction in the disputed internal boundaries in the north west of the country and iv) water resources. The Integrated Strategic Vision arising from the meeting has had little impact. Collaboration between UNAMI and UNDP has seen little if any improvement as a consequence.

Potential areas of collaboration on such issues as rule of law has not been adequately explored. UNDP's approach has been to develop capacity, i.e. training of judges and building an academy. However, there has not been political acceptance of the support provided by UNDP and the understanding on how different government agencies would be involved. As such, many UNDP initiatives on governance issues have a political dimension that could have benefitted from UNAMI's help in gaining clearer political understanding with the government on the direction of its support.

While it is too early to speculate on the roles and responsibilities of UNDP post UNAMI, UNDP has not positioned itself well in the areas of governance which fall within its mandate. The lack of field presence is an important issue for UNDP. UNDP is now considering opening up a few field offices to support UN programmes, which is a much needed step in preparing for the withdrawal of UNAMI, in addition to a more substantive role in supporting local development in Iraq.

RESPONDING TO DIMINISHING FUNDING

While UNDPs ability to provide a comprehensive programme response has been reduced because of diminishing funds, UNDP for its part has not planned for its programme to respond to declining resources.

Resources diminished precipitously at the conclusion of the Iraq Trust Fund. It is not clear the extent to which UNDP planned for this eventuality but without question, UNDP now faces a worrisome financial shortage. For example, while funding for one established thematic area, Support to Elections, may be adequate, funding for others is not. Funding for maintaining a strong presence within the Council of Representatives is not sufficient. Nor is it sufficient for meeting expectations, more generally, under the existing programme. When UNDP does not meet expectations, suspicions are raised about UNDP's capacity to deliver and UNDP becomes less of an attractive implementer for governance programming. As resource mobilization has become more difficult UNDP has become less discriminating about the projects it undertakes and, for this outcome, this means projects are taken on as much for the revenue they generate as for their feasibility or their contribution to enhancing UNDP's reputation as a credible service provider on key governance issues.

Diminished funding has affected UNDP's programme choice and is likely to do so in the future. UNDP's response to this resource decline has been to promote marketable projects to interested donors. Many donors, because of the dire security situation, were willing to use UNDP's services to implement their own programmes. The result was that UNDP's programme became a collection of isolated programmes and projects, each funded by a separate donor. This bred the culture in which each component programme was focusing on implementing its own set of projects without any substantive linkage to other component programmes aiming to achieve the same country programme outcome. Typical examples were the anti-corruption programme backed by a US agency, and the Loan Management programme implemented on behalf of JICA, each of which has been able to secure sizable financial resources but operated rather independently from other component programmes.

SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND ACCESS TO NATIONAL PARTNERS

Security constraints and the challenges of remote delivery have hindered UNDP's efforts to deliver programmes efficiently and effectively in south and central Iraq. These factors also made UNDP's Iraq operations highly costly, but the extent to which such costs were justified is not evident.

UNDP's efforts to deliver programmes in south and central Iraq has had to overcome security constraints and the challenge of remote operation from Amman. As a result, the frequency of contacts and consultations with national partners has been much less than the norm. This has greatly affected the delivery of the programmes as well as their efficacy. While the security of the staff should rightfully be a paramount concern of the senior management, some other UN agencies have devised different ways to deliver programmes under these challenging conditions. UNDP could have learned more from the experiences of other agencies, in accommodating itself to the situation.

The effect of security policies limiting access of the UNDP staff to national partners and project sites cannot be underestimated. This obstacle has been underscored repeatedly in the past. It is a pretence to believe that the present application of security restrictions is doing anything other than crippling the programme and it is remarkable that the programme has not suffered more than it has. In no instance are development initiatives risk free and in Iraq development activities will not be

risk free in the near term, but the risk of the UN being the deliberate target of aggression has passed and needs now to be replaced with a more reasoned perspective.

The security restrictions entail high cost of operations in Iraq. For instance, the UNCT agencies make payments to UNAMI for security services such as armed escorts, and the infrastructure for their operations such as electricity supply in the UN compound. These payments are extremely high, but no agency was able to clarify the basis on which UNAMI has come up with the amount. It remains unclear the extent to which these costs are justified.

Some would argue that very little can be done about the security limitation. Other agencies, however, have approached these constraints differently, overcome them to some extent and delivered programmes efficiently in spite of them. UNDP has not been creative in accommodating itself to the limitations of project implementation in S/C Iraq. There are indications this is changing. Amman-based programme managers are expected to move to Baghdad, and more programme positions are expected to be filled by Iraqi national staff. The senior management is exploring the possibility to open local programme support offices in south and central Iraq outside Baghdad, as well as to have UNDP national staff embedded in the government ministries and offices. If these measures are implemented, access to national partners would be significantly improved and the costs incurred by security restrictions could be reduced.

5.2. USE OF UNDP'S COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS

Efforts to establish confidence of the national counterparts in UNDP support remained a challenge.

In many countries, UNDP is seen as a neutral and trustable development partner to the government and its citizens. In Iraq, the UN has often been associated with the sanctions, invasions and subsequent occupation by the Coalition Provisional Authority and perceived to have represented Western interests more than the interests of the country. Still many Iraqi citizens seem to welcome the UN presence as a neutral agent useful in this time of political turmoil in a divided country – if not as a mediator, as an observer and a window to the international community. This role however, in the eyes of most Iraqi citizens, is associated with UNAMI and not UNDP.

UNDP has not yet established itself as a trusted development partner of the government but is rather seen essentially as a project implementer which could be dispensable if the funding is depleted or an alternative project implementer is found. Because of the restricted access to the citizens, UNDP also has not gained trust and support from the civil society and general public as it could have otherwise.

To regain the position of the trusted development partner through enhanced interaction with the government and the citizens may be a priority in re-establishing UNDP's comparative strength as a leading UN development agency.

Full advantage has not been taken of potential synergies in UNDP's programme.

An area where synergies could have been created has been at the local governance interface between the Public Sector Modernization and Local Area Development programmes. The Local Area Development Programme promotes local planning of public service provision based on the local needs. This planning assumes budget allocated to governorates and districts. At the same time, the sectoral departments in governorates use the budget of sectoral ministries to implement the ministerial plan for public service provision, and the Public Sector Modernization Programme has sought to improve administration of the ministerial budget for such purposes. Maintaining coherence of planning and administration of public services from these two streams, one bottom up and one top down, is obviously an important issue to tackle. However, these programmes have been conceived and implemented independently without taking advantage of such an opportunity of interface.

Support to the Council of Representatives and support to CSOs are two programmes that could also create greater impact by leveraging other programmes. While the general technical support to the parliamentary secretariat has stalled, UNDP has achieved certain results through parliament such as at the Human Rights Committee or the Regions and Governance Committee. These achievements however have not benefitted much from the general Support to the Council of Representatives project, which failed to establish the liaison function either within the secretariat or with the parliamentary committees. The support to the CSO project likewise has not provided much leverage to other projects as it has had only marginal impact. UNDP's CSO project could have focused instead on supporting CSOs as a part of broad strategy in other UNDP programmes so that it could directly contribute to the achievement of programme outcomes and development results.

5.3. PROMOTING A HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

UNDP's programmes are all based on its core values. Their promotion has been generally appreciated among beneficiaries and national partners. At times, the challenging political environment has made it difficult for UNDP to pursue value-based initiatives. Limited field operations prevented UNDP from bringing full benefits to those who need them in the field.

UNDP's programmes were designed to promote the values of equity and shared responsibility, inclusive development, justice to all, and addressing human development challenges. In the challenging political environment however, it was not always possible to push forward the initiatives to realize these values. Voter registration in the election support programme touches political sensitivity. Survival of the anti-corruption mechanism is in question. Gender equality had to be considerably toned down from the agenda of public sector modernization. UNDP's rule of law programme did not have much traction with the national judicial authorities. UNDP at times might have been too politically naive or culturally insensitive in making the case for its agenda. Nevertheless, there is no question that UNDP programmes were true to its values and their managers were committed to them.

Due to the remote operation from Amman and the limited access to the field, UNDP could not bring its programme benefits fully to those who were most in need in the regions. Where it did, such as with the Access to Justice and Local Area Development programmes, or with the reconstruction support through the Loan Management programme, its initiatives were generally appreciated by local beneficiaries. While some beneficiaries raised complaints, these were generally associated with implementation issues – a manifestation of challenges in remote operation – but not with the presence of UNDP to address the needs of local population.

Gender equity is built into all UNDP programmes to enhance participation of women in development. The implementation had limitations

Promotion of gender equality has not been without challenges, especially when it came to national policies that were politically sensitive. An instructive case was the Public Sector Modernisation programme. Gender responsive budgeting has not been considered by any federal ministries. In Phase I, the programme did not give much attention to the national strategy for women, nor has it previously accorded much attention to gender mainstreaming.[127] As part of preparations for Phase II, UN Women submitted a gender analysis of this programme.[128] Preparation of the roadmap turned out to be too political to give gender issues more than a minimal presence. The expectation that gender responsive budgeting should be introduced at federal and governorate levels appeared to be, at this point, unrealistic and including it as a key indicator turned out to be not very helpful. There is room however for expanding the treatment of gender issues within the public sector reform as the broad roadmap becomes an action plan in the near future. What transpired from this experience is

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[127] Alan Taylor, Iraq Public Sector Modernization Progamme, Phase I Evaluation Report, December 1 2011, observes: "The individual UN agencies were poorly equipped to mainstream gender into the sectoral work, while UN Women's role was limited to providing a consultant on gender responsive budgeting." p. 7
[128] Royal Tropical Institute, Gender Analysis of the Public Sector Modernization Programme, Phase II, UN Women, 30 October 2012.

that, as difficult an environment as Iraq is today in promoting gender equality politically and culturally, UNDP must be persistent yet at the same time flexible, adapting its strategy to the political and social context

There were some important outputs where the projects of UNDP made special effort to address women specific needs. For example, Family Protection Units in both south and central Iraq and Kurdistan, staffed by female police officers to assisted victims of domestic violence. The number of women clients seeking assistance has steadily increased, showing important gender-based needs were filled by the project. In addition, the establishment of the Directorate to Combat Violence against Women (DEVAW) and a Women's Shelter in Kurdistan was a major achievement supported by UNDP. The clients of the Legal Aid Centres were predominantly women, and the cases they bring relate mostly to domestic issues. This shows that the Centres have provided legal recourse for women, especially those in rural areas, who do not have an easy access to the justice system for cultural, social or financial reasons.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis in the preceding sections covers UNDPs support to the efforts of Government of Iraq towards reconstruction and transition to development. The UNDP programme has operated in the context of UNAMI as well as UNDPs own programme, and has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period. This was also period of implementation of UNDG ITF, when the UN in general and the UNDP in particular, had access to vast reconstruction and development funds. Drawing form the analysis in the previous sections this chapter presents key conclusions and recommendations.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions 1: UNDP, through its individual component programmes, delivered a number of tangible benefits to the country. These are evident in the strengthening of policies, legislation and institutional capacity in priority areas for government. UNDPs contribution has been important in restoration of public services and infrastructure, as Iraq emerged from the crisis of 2005- 2007. UNDP sustained its support despite the effect of the security situation on UNDPs operations in central and south Iraq.

The issues addressed by UNDP programmes have been relevant to the challenges faced by the country. UNDP aimed to tackle complex issues such as inefficient delivery of basic services, abuse of public trust by civil servants and the need to ensure that capital investment expenditures address real needs. UNDP has approached such complex issues with grand designs, some of them too theoretical to have tangible results.

The relevance or strategic value of the UNDP programme areas notwithstanding, the challenge is to design a strategy that takes into consideration the evolving country context. There may be little UNDP can do to support reforms in a country where conflict is on-going and where government cooperation is so difficult to assure. Programme designs, however, could be more sensitive to the difficult delivery environment by taking the practical constraints specifically into consideration. In areas such as Rule of Law programming in south and central Iraq considerable presence, tact and strategic responsiveness is required. In some instances, UNDP programming may not have approached these sensitive matters with the finesse that is required. Security constraints and the limitations of remote delivery have hindered UNDP's efforts to deliver these programmes efficiently and effectively in south and central Iraq. These factors also made UNDP's Iraq operations highly costly and the extent to which such costs were justified was not made clear.

An important consequence of operating under security restrictions is that programme implementation focuses on support primarily to the central government and almost not at all to governorate and other sub-national entities. Several programme areas would have benefited by increasing their focus on provincial and district levels. Local initiatives do figure under economic reform and diversification efforts but not under efforts to strengthen governorate level development planning institutions and systems, or efforts to integrate these into a unified approach to decentralisation within Iraq's federal structure.

Contribution to development results was constrained by trends in Iraq. After a period of optimism and improvement (2008- 2010), conditions in Iraq have again declined and it has become difficult to address core governance issues. Also, economic trends have been towards further concentration of economic activity in the State, driven by a rapid increase in the oil sector. In this context, there has been limited progress towards the government's priorities of economic diversification and private sector development, which were key elements of successive national development plans.

Conclusions 2: Since 2008, UNDP has aimed to shift its programme focus from reconstruction and recovery to development, and accordingly from a project-based approach to a more coherent and strategic programming approach. However, UNDP has yet to achieve a coherent programmatic approach to address critical development challenges in Iraq.

The legacy of UNDP operations under ITF was its project-oriented approach with attention to delivery rather than long-term development results. UNDP began to steer itself towards a coherent and strategic programme approach first with its Interim Country Strategy 2008-2010 and then its first post-2003 country programme for 2011-2014. In reality, however, UNDPs country programme is a composite of self-standing projects without much synergies or coherence among them. The failure to transform the country programme has been due to the lack of strategic leadership by the senior management of UNDP country office during the crucial period of programme transition.

Under the current country programme, while there were results achieved by individual component programmes and projects, they were operating rather independently and synergies among them were not pursued. There was no strategy to achieve programme outcomes effectively and efficiently with the combined forces of these component programmes. A clear example is the lack of synergies between Public Sector Modernization programme and the Anti-Corruption programme, or with the Local Area Development programme, all of which address from different angles the way in which the public sector operates.

The present pre-occupation with the fundraising has led to some isolated projects that, while good in their intentions and hence marketable, are too small and ad hoc to create much discernible impact. UNDP pursued programmes even when the critical political support to its particular approach was lacking, such as with Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law programme, when there are political and reputational risks such as with the Election Support programme, or when the lack of delivery has resulted in credibility loss such as with Parliament Support programme.

Conclusion 3: UNDP lacked strategic leadership at critical points in programme support in Iraq, undermining the potential of UNDP contribution. UNDP has addressed this issue recently, with the change in leadership to provide a more strategic vision to UNDP support in Iraq.

The mid-level programme managers, each in charge of a component programme, are generally competent, having led their programmes to some successes. They were left to identify funding opportunities and pursue their programme objectives and project delivery. While the senior management fully supported their individual efforts little guidance was given to integrate these component programmes into a strategic approach aiming to achieve country programme outcomes. Under such circumstances, the support provided to individual programme managers by the senior management unintentionally led to a country programme which was neither cohesive, strategic nor prioritized, where programme managers compete rather than collaborate.

The phasing out of the UNDG ITF in 2009 and 2010 has made UNDP increasingly dependent on bilateral donor contributions at a time when bilateral donors are withdrawing from Iraq. Often donor development plans play a significant role in shaping UNDP's engagement. A related issue is that in many areas of the programme UNDP has not planned adequately for reduction in donor resources. Instead of reducing and sharpening the scope of its interventions, it has diversified and fragmented its interventions.

It is essential to find ways of diminishing the inefficiencies caused by security restrictions, to do more to facilitate contact with national partners and to make sure that expert staff with Arabic language skills are readily available. In many programme areas opportunities have been missed and important expectations have not been met, at times challenging the credibility of UNDP.

Conclusion 4: UNDP brought in programme models and approaches without sufficiently customizing them to the local context and culture. This contributed to poor national ownership and undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of UNDP support

UNDP applied programme models that were used by UNDP in other countries without sufficiently adapting them to the Iraqi context and culture. For example, the Peace and Reconciliation projects applied a western reconciliation method that would not work in the Iraqi cultural context and were rejected by the local stakeholders. The Anti-Corruption Programme applied an oversight mechanism paralleling a United States model, and most national stakeholders were not optimistic about its sustainability. Poor design among some UNDP ITF-funded projects resulted in outputs being delivered but never used, or to late delivery that undermined results.

UNDP showed improvement over time in developing and adapting programme models to respond to Iraqi context, as seen in the evolution of the LADP programme model over three iterations. While this indicated UNDPs sustained efforts, the consequences for its contribution to development results was however high.

Conclusion 5: UNDPs programmatic collaboration with UNAMI has been weak and not beneficial for enhancing the contribution of UNDP.

Synergies between UNAMI and UNDP have been less than positive which undermined UNDPs programme contribution in some areas. Potential areas of collaboration were not adequately utilised. This was despite the fact that UNDP's Resident Representative has been serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for development and humanitarian affairs. The comparative strength that UNDP usually exercises in UNCT is overshadowed in Iraq, sometimes with justification and sometimes without. On critical matters, especially those in which the common interests of development partners is at stake, on security constraints for example, UNDP has not been sufficiently proactive to ensure that its interests or the interests of other important development partners are adequately represented.

Lack of role clarity between UNDP and UNAMI in areas where both had mandate contributed to poor understanding of the role and contribution of UNDP. UNDP was not successful in establishing an identity distinct form UNAMI or UNCT. Establishing a clear distinctness from Security Council mandated activities of UNAMI is essential for UNDP to convey its own positioning on key areas.

Conclusion 6: UNDP has not always succeeded in gaining full confidence of the government as a trusted long-term development partner in strategically providing support through its well-integrated programmes and delivering what it has committed.

The ownership of programmes by national partners is critical for sustaining programme achievements and informing national planning and policies. There are important examples of UNDP programmes that were embedded in government priorities and systems, with robust national ownership. Despite such examples, it was challenging for UNDP to secure national ownership of its programmes.

With exceptions, UNDP was not considered by the government as a key development partner in providing strategic policy and programme support. UNDP's lack of clear programme focus was one factor, as the agency had some difficulty in defining its possible role to government. A major factor for this was insufficient communication and interactions with the national counterparts, exacerbated by the remote programme management from Amman. The security situation in the country did not allow UNDP to have sufficient interactions with national partners. Further the complex political situation was not conducive for UNDP to engage with government partners and gain their ownership of the programmes. While avoiding exposure of its staff to security risks is justifiable, UNDP has neither been proactive nor innovative in addressing this challenge, as compared to some other UN

agencies. UNDP has in fact made the policy decision to move its country office back to Baghdad, but the decision to do so was slow in coming.

UNDP positioning of its programme was undermined by the perception among many government officials and donors of UNDP as an implementer of donor projects rather than a driver of development approach working closely with national counterparts. UNDP has not been successful in conveying to the national stakeholders the value addition of its programmes.

UNDPs ability to provide strategic support to Iraq's development depends on well integrated programmes and undertaking careful planning to ensure commitments are met. This has been compromised by the increasing need for UNDP to raise funds, hence focusing on resources rather than programme coherence. UNDP has increasingly been counting on sharing the cost of programming with the government. It seems however, that government officials are not fully convinced of the value of UNDP support to the extent that they would share its own resources. For its part, government has often not clearly articulated the contribution it wants from the UNDP.

Conclusion 7: While there is a rationale to provide more support at the central level, opportunities were not adequately taken to strengthen capacities at the sub-national level particularly in central and south Iraq.

UNDP has not effectively balanced its programme support between the federal and governorate levels. Service delivery at the governorate level has been a priority area for Iraq. While there have been projects focusing on this issue, UNDP did not adequately consolidate its strategy to respond to governorate level needs and priorities. More recently, UNDP has been considering opening up field offices to support UN programmes. This is a much needed step in preparing for a more substantive role in supporting development in Iraq.

Conclusion 8: Gender equality has not been given adequate priority in the programme implementation. UNDP was not persistent in its efforts to integrate gender in its programme support.

Despite achievements in a few projects, gender was generally neglected in UNDPs programme response. This is not to say that promotion of gender equality was not without challenges, especially when it came to national policies that were politically sensitive. UNDP lacked a strategy to systematically approach gender issues in its programme areas and to collaborate with other agencies on this issue.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP Iraq should consolidate its programme support to address a few key development challenges confronting Iraq, with adequate programme scope and depth. UNDP should move away from funding-driven low-impact activities.

In order to strengthen UNDP credibility, UNDP Iraq should develop programmes that build on its comparative strength in areas such as governance. UNDP should avoid regrouping existing projects into new overarching programmes, where project are not aligned to the intended outcomes. It should establish a strategy for each programme area and appropriately develop activities that would substantively address the development challenges in Iraq. The strategy should be realistic and flexible in adapting itself to changing political and security situations.

With the declining donor funding for its programmes, UNDP needs to be specifically conscious of using limited resources for more sustained support in a few areas. The programme is presently constructed around broad reform areas, governance being one of them. The scope of these broad reform areas is too large to impose any constructive limitations on what UNDP does. The result is that programme areas comprised dispersed and eclectic projects, without a judicious approach to reform initiatives.

It will be too risky for UNDP to proceed now without a clearly structured and focused programme. A first step is to narrow the reform areas, replace the broad mandates with specific problem-solving initiatives on which UNDP can muster serious expertise, where it has government support.

Recommendation 2: UNDP's future relevance would depend on establishing strong development partnerships with the government and people of Iraq. UNDP Iraq should make it a priority to develop and sustain partnerships with national counterparts.

A key challenge for UNDP is to restore close relationships with national partners in the government and the civil society. Other UN agencies tried various methods to overcome this challenge with varying degree of success. UNDP should learn from such experiences and strengthen its relations with the government.

Recent management changes such as the decision to move from Amman and situate the programme managers in Baghdad, and recruiting more programme managers who are Arabic speakers are critical for increasing the level of interaction between programme management and national partners. UNDP should also actively pursue a strategy to increase the number of national staff in the programme team.

Recommendation 3: UNDP Iraq should develop strategies to contribute to Iraq's development under different political and security scenarios. UNDP should be creative in adapting itself to programming under challenging security situations in central and south Iraq.

To meet both the immediate and long-term development needs in Iraq, UNDP should adapt its programme strategies and operations to difficult security situation and an evolving institutional context. The volatility of security situation should be factored into the programme planning and design. UNDP should take adequate measures to devise innovative ways of adapting to, and overcoming, security limitations in working in central and southern Iraq. UNDP should also address issues arising out of working from the International Zone that severely restricts interaction with national counterparts. UDNP should place the risk of working with partners before than the importance of UNDP's presence.

One of the problems in developing a four year country programme in a post-conflict situation is the unrealistic expectation that the programme must have a tight results framework that assumes orderly development process, not affected by political and security factors. The current country programme developed in the time of optimism had unrealistic expectations in terms of achievements. While the overarching goals of the programmes could be solidly established, there must be a mechanism to allow flexibility in adapting the strategies and, if necessary, revisiting the country programme results expectations when justifiable.

Recommendation 4: UNDP Iraq should ensure appropriate balance of programme support between the national and governorate levels and strengthen the synergies between programmes at two levels.

The lack of capacity in the public sector at the Governorate and local government level is recognized as one of the most critical challenges in the country. Although UNDP addresses this issue through the Local Area Development programme, a more coherent approach to capacity development at the local level is needed to strengthen service delivery.

UNDP is exploring the possibility to open local programme support offices in south and central Iraq outside Baghdad, as well as to have UNDP national staff embedded in the government ministries and offices. Such measures should be followed through to support strengthening governorate capacities, as well to improve collaboration access with national partners.

Recommendation 5: Promoting gender equality needs to be prioritized in UNDP programmes. Lack of conducive environment cannot be a justification for not adequately pursuing programmes that promote empowerment of women.

UNDP should take specific measure to systematically integrate gender in its programme response and set adequate resources to ensure its implementation. Gender analysis should inform programme design and implementation of the forthcoming programming. In order to maximize results in the area, UNDP should strengthen partnerships with UN agencies in its efforts to promote gender equality.

Recommendation 6: UNDP should strengthen its own technical and advisory capacity. UNDP should review programme management and develop an appropriate strategy to respond effectively to Iraq's development needs.

UNDP's role and contribution in Iraq depends on the quality of advisory, policy and programme support it provides. National counterparts in Iraq expect advisory services from senior level experts who bring cutting edge ideas. UNDP should take measures to ensure that the programme and policy support provided is of high quality and senior experts who are familiar with the national context are used. UNDP should desist from using programme models from elsewhere that are not suited for Iraqi context.

UNDP should strengthen its technical advisory capacity at a relatively senior level in key areas of programme support to be able to contribute to strengthening institutions in Iraq. UNDP staff should have adequate skills to respond to different political and security scenarios in Iraq.

Recommendation 7: The importance of the UNDP mandate in integrated peacekeeping missions has been increasingly recognized in the past years. UNDP and UNAMI should draw lessons from countries where close coordination between the integrated mission and UNDP has been mutually beneficial and enhanced contribution to peacebuilding and development. UNDP and UNAMI should make concerted efforts to solve disagreements regarding their roles in the area of governance.

Greater clarity of programme roles is needed for an effective partnerhsip between UNAMI and UNDP. Closer links should be forged between UNAMI and UNDP. This will require an administrative flexibility on both sides. UNAMI will have to recognize UNDP's expertise and capacity to take the lead on issues where UNAMI believes it has exclusive jurisdiction. UNDP, for its part, will have to recognize and respect the status that the Security Council has accorded the mission in Iraq and support it in principle and in practice. At present these do not exist. A small working group should be established representing UNAMI and UNDP to resolve differences and to chart new and collaborative direction.

Differences in the programme orientation of the peacekeeping and development mandates and how it should manifest in supporting Iraq is a factor that both UNAMI and UNDP should jointly address. UNDP and UNAMI should revisit the Integrated Strategic Vision to work out a viable plan of action to strengthen their collaboration in the areas of complementary mandate. Efforts should be made to build on the synergies of the peacekeeping and development mandates and promote integrated approaches.

ANNEX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called, "Assessments of Development Results (ADRs)" to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP's contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP's strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. The purpose of an ADR is to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board.

- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country.

- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level.

- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

ADRs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy. [129] The IEO is independent of UNDP management, headed by a Director who reports to the UNDP Executive Board through the UNDP Administrator. The responsibility of the IEO is two-fold: (a) provide the Executive Board with valid and credible information from evaluations for corporate accountability, decision-making and improvement; and (b) enhance the independence, credibility and utility of the evaluation function, and its coherence, harmonization and alignment in support of United Nations reform and national ownership. Based on the principle of national ownership, EO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with the national Government.

This is the first ADR for Iraq and will be conducted in 2013 towards the end of the current UNDP programme cycle of 2011–2014 with a view to contributing to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme as well as the forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The evaluation will cover UNDP activities undertaken under the on-going Country Programme 2011-2014 as well as those undertaken under the framework of the United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy (UNIAS) 2008-2010.

2. NATIONAL CONTEXT

During the review period of UNDP programme, Iraq moved from a transitional national government to a permanent government that was elected through a newly established democratic process. Since 2005, two parliamentary and provincial elections have been held in Iraq. Successive governments initiated reforms to better perform core state functions. The government made commitments to reform of the public sector and addressing corruption, including more inclusive institution-building and modernization of the state at the national and sub-national levels. Iraq is in the process of addressing the fundamental causes of vulnerability to conflict; and harnessing its human and natural resources to accelerate much needed reconstruction and recovery efforts. Post 2003, foreign aid focused heavily on reconstruction efforts. [130]

The National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2007-2010 and National Development Plan (NDP) 2010-2014, are medium-term development strategies aimed at providing a framework for the

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[129] See UNDP Evaluation Policy: www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf. The ADR will also be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (www.uneval.org).
[130] ODA amounts in constant 2010 US$; World Development Indicators, 2011

country's sustainable development.[131] The NDP aimed to achieve Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 9.4 percent per annum; to generate 3 to 4.5 million new jobs; to diversify the economy away from oil and into agriculture, industrial sectors, and tourism; and to create a stronger role for the private sector, both in terms of investment and job opportunities. Iraq must mobilize $186 billion in investment, create 3.5 million new jobs, and cut unemployment by half from 15 percent The Plan focused on environmentally sensitive economic and social development using available natural resources in a sustainable way. The strategy aims to reduce poverty rates by 30 percent from 2007 levels by focusing on comprehensive rural development and providing basic services such as education and healthcare, particularly for vulnerable groups such as youth and women. It also aims to strengthen the role of local governments to bring service delivery and economic development closer to the people.[132]

The new NDP for 2013-2017 continues with the policies of the previous Plan, and further emphasises strengthening administrative processes and governance systems.[133] Since the peak of violence in 2006-2007, Iraq has made a significant process in improving security and the violent incidents subsided towards the end of 2012[134]. However, there is a worrisome resurgence of violent incidents in early 2013[135] revealing persistence of political challenges. Continued lack of security, intermittent political instability at national and subnational levels, and pluralistic politics, has been a constraint in addressing drivers of conflict, pursuing reform process and strengthening national institutions. Lack of security continues to be a major impediment in social and economic development.

Challenges remain in achieving state-building and development goals. The Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2012 is 0.590 positioning Iraq at 131 out of 187 countries and territories in the medium human development category.[136] Regional and sub-governorate level inequities and discrepancies in wealth, access to services and other development indicators persist. The 2010 Poverty Assessment showed that overall poverty is 23 percent.[137] At the national level there was reduction of extreme poverty by more than half its level since 1990 but the poverty gap index continues to be low at 4.5 percent. The proportion of the population living on US$2.50 per day has dropped from 28 per cent in 1990 to 11.3 per cent in 2011 below the 2015 target of 14 per cent.[138] The low employment rate (at 38 percent) is a major issue in Iraq, in particular the high unemployment amongst youth. The representation of women in parliament increased from 13 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 2011. The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, however, has dropped and the proportion of women in the public sector and government remains low.[139] Gender based violence is emerging as an issue of concern. Inadequate security continues to disproportionately affect the most vulnerable groups, in particular women, children and persons with disabilities.

Iraq has fifth largest oil reserves worldwide with as much as 214 billion barrels. Despite the vast oil wealth, the GDP had fallen to about US$900 in 2004 from US$3,400 in 1980.[140] Institutional challenges continue to pose major constraints on economic reforms and significantly affect the country's efforts to diversify the economy and promote private sector investment. Reconstruction and development of the infrastructure throughout the country is critical for non-oil sector growth.

Institutional capacity and governance weaknesses are central to Iraq's development challenges. Weak accountability and transparency systems and rule of law, and widespread corruption constrain

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[131] National Development Plan-2010-2014
[132] National Development Plan
[133] National Development Plan for 2013-2017
[134] Brookings Iraq Report, 2012
[135] See UNAMI, http://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5397&language=en-US
[136] UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the Global South'.
[137] World Bank, 2010. Confronting Poverty in Iraq: Main Findings, Washington DC: World Bank
[138] United Nations Joint Analysis Policy Unit (JAPU), 'Progress in Iraq: The Millennium Development Goals', March 2013.
[139] United Nations, Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators: mdgs.un.org
[140] International Monetary Fund, 'Program Note on Iraq', 18 April 2013.

development. Iraq ranks 169 of 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index for 2012.[141] Institutional capacity for public finance management has limitations, which has implications for effectively managing oil revenues. Iraq faces challenges in delivering basic services, which hinder the confidence building in the government among the population and hence peace consolidation.

Federalism and devolution of powers to provinces is evolving in Iraq. The constitution of Iraq allows for governorates to form into regions and recognises Kurdistan region, providing it a special status. A law establishing the process of regionalisation was established in 2006. One of the challenges facing Iraq is the lack of policy on implementation of federalism, resulting in one province given special status, while powers are not devolved to other provinces. Iraq is yet to make the choice whether it would like to pursue federal system or decentralised local governance. While Iraq furthered reform process for decentralized political and administrative government, through devolution of power to 18 governorates challenges remain in devolution of authority for the delivery of services and transfer of revenues to local governments.

At the request of the Government of Iraq, the United Nations Assisted Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was established by the 2003 UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1500. As a political mission, its role was greatly expanded in 2007 with SCR 1770. It is mandated to assist the Government and people of Iraq in advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national reconciliation; assist in the electoral process and national census planning; facilitate regional dialogue between Iraq and its neighbours; and promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform.[142]

3. UNDP PROGRAMME STRATEGY IN IRAQ

UNDP has partnered with the Government of Iraq for over 35 years (since the Standard basic Assistance Agreement in 1976) and supported development and recovery and reconstruction efforts. Since 2003, UNDP has operated as part of the United Nations assistance strategy coordinated by UNAMI. The UNDP support aligned with the successive National Development Plans, UNIAS 2008-2010, and the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. Since the launching of this funding mechanism, UNDP played a key role in administering of United Nations Development Group UNDG ITF.

UNDP's Interim Country Strategy 2008-2010 introduced a coherent approach to programming for the first time since 1989, replacing the approval for UNDP assistance to the country on a project-by-project basis.[143] Aligned with priorities identified in the NDS 2007-2010, SCR 1700, and the International Compact with Iraq,[144] the UNDP programme focused on the two main areas of (1) governance and (2) economic recovery and poverty alleviation. UNDP focused heavily on financing reconstruction efforts and generating employment, including the rehabilitation of multiple power generation plants and systems.

The UNDAF 2011-2014 provided for an integrated UN country strategy based on the NDP 2010-2014. Accordingly, UNDP transitioned to its current full Country Programme for 2011-2014 that outlined four priority areas: (1) fostering inclusive participation; (2) strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; (3) promoting inclusive growth, gender equality, climate change mitigation and adaptation and MDG achievement; and (4) restoring the foundations for development.[145] UNDP also changed its programmatic focus from infrastructure rehabilitation, to upstream initiatives including capacity development and policy support to key national

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[141] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2012.
[142] S/RES/1500 (2003); S/RES/1770 (2007)
[143] UNDP Iraq Interim Country Strategy 2008-2010
[144] International Compact with Iraq Resolution: http://www.uniraq.org/ici/ICI_Resolution_EN.pdf
[145] UNDP Country Programme Document for Iraq (2011-2014), 15 Oct 2010

institutions.[146]   Table in the Annex I outlines the strategic linkage between national priorities represented in the NDP, UNDAF and UNDP country programme.

There are two important features of Iraq programme that distinguishes it from UNDP's other country programmes and will affect the way the evaluation is organized. Since the 2003 bombing of the UN compound in Baghdad One is that the programme has been implemented in large part remotely from the country office located in Amman. Since then, a section of the programme staff has returned to Baghdad and some have moved to Erbil, although the majority still remained in Amman. Furthermore, within the country, the access to national partners and stakeholders by international programme staff has been restricted by the security rules of UNAMI, which has been an issue particularly in Baghdad. The second feature is that, UNDP supported Kurdistan Regional Government, and has implemented parallel programmes, given the special status to this region. UNDP has thus run parallel projects in a number of programme areas, one with the Federal Government in Baghdad and another with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

4.   SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation coverage will include the ongoing Country Programme 2011–2014 and projects which UNDP has operated under UNIAS 2008-2010. It will also take into account the general evolution of UNDP assistance since 2003 to the extent relevant to the assessment and considerations for the future programme in Iraq. The evaluation is both retrospective and prospective. Retrospectively, the evaluation analyses the development contribution of UNDP in five outcome areas and provides conclusions on UNDP's overall performance and each of the outcomes. The evaluation also looks ahead to examine how UNDP can support Iraq in strengthening national institutions and processes.

The ADR will assess UNDPs contribution to the national efforts in sustainable peace-building and state-building and addressing development challenges. It will assess key results, specifically the five outcomes outlined in country programme —anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative— and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources.

 The ADR covers particularly important time for Iraq, in its efforts towards reconstruction and transition to development. UNDP programme has operated in the context of UNAMI and has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period. This was also period of implementation of UNDG ITF, when the UN in general and the UNDP in particular, had access to vast reconstruction and development funds. The scope of the evaluation will therefore include the interface of UNDP programme with UNAMI in complementary areas such as elections support. The evaluation will assess UNDPs role in administering UNDG ITF and engagement to further

Table 1: Country Programme outcomes and budget (2011-2014)		
Country Programme Outcome		**Budget (in US$)**
Outcome 1	Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation.	49,427,491
Outcome 2	Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards.	60,432,393
Outcome 3	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels	75,303,877

reconstruction and development results in Iraq.

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[146] UNDP and Government of Iraq, Country Programme Action Plan, 2011-2014

| Outcome 4 | Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies. | 250,133,204 |
| Outcome 5 | Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development. | 208,084,988 |

UNDP's contribution will be assessed against the outcomes outlined in the Country Programme 2011-2014 as well as the outcomes defined in UNIAS 2008-2010 for the two outcome areas that UNDP had the lead substantive responsibility (i.e. governance, and economic recovery and diversification) will be assessed to determine the contribution of UNDP (see tables 1 and 2 below). This is done through assessing the collective contribution of projects towards achieving the outcomes. Between the two periods, there is a large degree of coherence in the programme structure and continuity in many projects. Therefore, the assessment will not be presented with two programme frameworks as separate ones but as a contiguous programme using the structure of the current country programme for the presentation purpose.

Source: UNDP Iraq Country Programme Document

Table 2: UNIAS Outcomes (2008-2010)	
Governance	
Outcome 1	Strengthened electoral processes in Iraq
Outcome 2	Strengthened national dialogue and civil society for governance and reconciliation
Outcome 3	Enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards
Outcome 4	Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes of national and local governance
Economic reform and diversification	
Outcome 1	Improved policies, strategies and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality and pro-poor economic growth
Outcome 2	Enhance key sectors of local economy in most deprived areas
Outcome 3	Strengthened electricity and transportation sector plans for rapid economic growth

Source: UNIAS 2008-2010: United Nations Country Team - Mission Statement

5. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation has two main components; (a) the analysis of the UNDP's contribution to development results through its programme outcomes, and (b) the strategy UNDP has adopted to enhance contribution to development results in Iraq. For each component, the ADR will present its findings and assessment according to the set criteria provided below. Further elaboration of the criteria will be found in *ADR Manual 2011*.

UNDP's contribution by thematic/programmatic areas. Analysis will be made on the contribution of UNDP to development results of Iraq through its programme activities. The analysis will be presented by thematic/programme areas and according to the following criteria:

- Relevance of UNDP's projects and outcomes;

- Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of achieving intended programme outcomes;

- Efficiency of UNDP's interventions in terms of use of human and financial resources; and

- Sustainability of the results to which UNDP contributed

UNDP's contribution through its positioning and strategies. The positioning and strategies of UNDP are analysed both from the perspective of the organisation's mandate[147] and the development and humanitarian needs and priorities in the country as agreed and as they emerged. This would entail systematic analyses of UNDP's place and niche within the development and policy space in the country, as well as strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches. The following criteria will be applied:

- Relevance and responsiveness of the county programme as a whole to the challenges and needs of the country;

- Use of UNDP's comparative strength; and

- Promoting UN values from human development perspective.

The ADR will assess UNDPs performance in relation to its overall approaches, namely capacity development, gender equality, South-South cooperation, national ownership and UN partnerships. Specific attention will be paid to UNDP's support to furthering gender equality in Iraq. The evaluation will systematically assess how gender is mainstreamed in UNDPs programme support, and advocacy efforts to further gender equality.

The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. In addition to judgements made using the criteria above, the ADR process will also identify how various factors (which focus on the *means*) have influenced UNDP's performance. The following lists the initial factors that will be addressed in this ADR:

- Comparative strengths that UNDP brought to supporting Iraq in recovery and reconstruction and development

- National ownership of the programmes, as well as the implications of remote management of implementation

- Political situation in the country and political interests of international partners as factors in the scope and direction of international support to Iraq

- Programme direction provided by the senior management during the transition along the conflict-development nexus

- Management including programme management, human resource management and financial management

- Security situation that affected the mobility of the programme staff

The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. Evaluators generate findings within the scope of the evaluation and use the criteria to make assessments. In turn the factual findings and assessments are interpreted to identify the broad conclusions from the evaluation and to draw recommendations for future action.

An outcome paper will be developed for each outcome noted in Table 1 and will examine progress towards the outcome and UNDP's contribution to that change. A Theory of Change (ToC) approach will be used and developed by the evaluation team in consultation with UNDP and national stakeholders. Preparation of the ToC will focus on the assumptions made about a programme's desired change and causal linkages expected and these will form a basis for the data collection approach. The outcome papers will use the ToC approach to assess UNDP's contribution to the outcome using the evaluation criteria and identify the factors that have affected this contribution. Each outcome paper will be prepared according to a standard template which will facilitate synthesis

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[147] For UNDP's Strategic Plan, see www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp07-43Rev1.pdf

and the identification of conclusions. The findings and conclusions from each outcome paper will then be synthesized into the overall ADR report.

6. DATA COLLECTION

Assessment of data collection constraints and existing data. An assessment was carried for each outcome to ascertain the available information, identify data constraints, to determine the data collection needs and method. The assessment outlined the level of evaluable data that is available. The assessment points that: a) outcomes evaluations are available for UNDP's contribution under UNIAS 2008-2010, and a part of Outcome 5 of the Country Programme 2011-2014, excluding Local Area Development Programme; b) an outcome evaluation is expected to be available for Outcome 2 of the Country Programme 2011-2014 in the second half of 2013; c) systematic monitoring of outcomes is not available for the evaluation to build on; and d) linkages between projects and outcomes are not very strong reflecting the absence of programme approach prior to the current country programme. The data collection method and tools aims to address the data gaps, as well as the policy level information that were not covered in outcome evaluations.

Data collection methods. The evaluation will use data from primary and secondary sources, including desk review of documentation and information and interviews with key informants. Based on the Theory of Change, specific evaluation questions for each criteria and the data collection method will be outlined in the outcome papers. A multi-stakeholder approach will be followed and interviews will include government representatives, civil-society organizations, private-sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries of the programme.

The data collection requirements and the list of places that will be visited by the evaluation team are presented in Annex III Table 1. The criteria for selecting places for field visits include: coverage of all programme areas and outcomes as outlined in the UNDP country programmes except those covered well in outcome evaluations; and areas where UNDP has programmes in more than one outcome area.

There were two major factors that needed to be considered for data collection planning. First, the projects were run in parallel with the federal and the regional governments. Hence, data collection activities also need to be conducted in parallel, in the Kurdistan region and the rest of the country. The exceptions to this include the areas of work that comes under federal administration, for example, programmes in such areas as health and elections. The second major factor is the security concern. A strict security regime is imposed in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, which heavily constrains the mobility of international staff and consultants. While the evaluation team will include national consultants to overcome this constraint, some key policy-level interviews need to be conducted by the Evaluation Manager or an international consultant to supplement. See Annex III Table 2 for the initial plan of carrying out interviews in Baghdad. In the table, meetings indicated as taking place 'out of the international zone' imply those in need of security escorts and with strict limitation on time of visit to two hours. A careful planning while necessary, in reality needs to be applied flexibly and in an opportunistic manner.

The IEO identified an initial list of background and programme-related documents which is posted on an ADR Web portal. The following secondary data will be reviewed: background documents on the national context (including cross-cutting and sectoral plans and policies prepared by the government), documents prepared by international partners during the period under review and documents prepared by UN system agencies; programme plan and framework; project evaluations conducted by the country office and

Validation. The evaluation will use triangulation of information from different sources to ensure that the data is valid. All the findings must be supported by evidence and validated through

consulting multiple sources of information. The evaluation team will an evaluation matrix to present findings from multiple sources and to validate each finding. The data collection process will utilize data codification methods to facilitate analysis.

Stakeholder involvement: At the start of the evaluation, a stakeholder analysis was conducted to identify all relevant UNDP partners, as well as those who may not work with UNDP but play a key role in the outcomes of the practice areas. The evaluation will use a participatory approach to the design, implementation and reporting of the ADR. In order to facilitate the evaluation process, as well as to increase the ownership of the evaluation results, a national reference group for the ADR will be established, comprising a group of key national stakeholders, i.e. representatives from government, civil society organizations, UN agencies, donors and other development partners, as well as the UNDP Country Office.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP: UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) will conduct the ADR in collaboration with the Government of Iraq. The IEO Evaluation Managers will coordinate and lead the evaluation and provide overall management and technical backstopping to the evaluation. The Evaluation Managers will set the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, facilitate selection of the evaluation team, prepare the evaluation design, provide guidance to the conduct of evaluation, coordinate team work and analysis, organize feedback sessions and a stakeholder meeting, coordinate team inputs in the preparation of the draft report, lead the drafting of the main evaluation report and manage the review and follow-up processes. The Evaluation Managers will support other members of the evaluation team in understanding the scope, the process, the approach and the methodology of ADR; provide ongoing advice and feedback to the team for quality assurance. The IEO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR.

Government of Iraq: The key government counterparts of UNDP in Iraq will facilitate the conduct of ADR by the evaluation team by: providing necessary access to information sources within the Government of Iraq; safeguarding the independence of the evaluation; and jointly organizing the stakeholder meeting with IEO. The counterparts will be responsible within the Government of Iraq for the use and dissemination of the final outputs of the ADR process.

UNDP Country Office in Iraq: The country office will support the evaluation team to liaise with key partners and other stakeholders, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP's programmes, projects and activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report. The country office will provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with project staff and beneficiaries; or assistance for the project site visits).

During the entire evaluation process and particularly during the main mission, the country office will cooperate with the ADR team and respect its independence and need to freely access data, information and people that are relevant to the exercise. To ensure the independence of the views expressed in interviews and meetings with stakeholders held for data collection purposes, the country office will not participate in them.

The country office will ensure timely dispatch of written comments on the draft evaluation report. From its side, the ADR team will act in a transparent manner; will interact regularly with the UNDP country office and national government counterparts at critical junctures.

UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States will support the evaluation through information sharing and will also participate in discussions on emerging conclusions and recommendations as well as in the in the Stakeholder Workshop.

Evaluation Team: The IEO will constitute an evaluation team to undertake the ADR. The team will include the following members:

- *Evaluation Manager (EM),* IEO, has the overall responsibility for managing the ADR, and will prepare and design the evaluation, select the evaluation team, provide methodological guidance to the team, lead in data analysis and synthesis, lead in addressing strategic issues in particular, prepare the draft and final reports, take measures to ensure quality of the report, conduct the stakeholder workshops and take follow up actions to facilitate the use and dissemination of the report.

- *Associate Evaluation Manager,* IEO, will support EM in preparation and design of the evaluation, the selection of the evaluation team, data analysis and synthesis, preparation of the draft report, and other aspects of the ADR process as may be required.

- *Research Assistant,* IEO, will provide background research and documentation.

- *Two senior international development experts* will have the responsibility of assessing the programme for specific outcomes and preparing the outcome papers.

- *A senior national development expert* will act as *the national team leader* and have the responsibility of coordinating the data collection of the national team, and synthesize the data collected to provide the core inputs to the reports.

- Two national *development experts* will support in data collection and analysis. One will be responsible for the Kurdistan region with the Kurdish language skills, and the other for the rest of the country with the Arabic language.

Table3: Responsibilities of the evaluation team		
Outcome	**Outcome report**	**Data collection**
Outcome 1	International expert (1)	International and national experts
Outcome 2		No data collection at the technical level — Outcome evaluation available
Outcome 3		International and national experts
Outcome 4	International expert (2)	International and national experts
Outcome 5		Outcome evaluation available — additional data collection by national experts focusing on Local Area Development Programme and by the international expert on policy level information

8.   EVALUATION PROCESS

The evaluation will be conducted according to the approved IEO process as outlined in the ADR Manual. The following represents a summary of key elements of the process. Four major phases provide a framework conducting the evaluation.

Phase 1: Preparation. The IEO will prepare the terms of reference and the evaluation design, following a preparatory mission to UNDP Country Office for Iraq located in Amman by the Evaluation Managers. The preparatory mission to Amman and discussions with UNDP programme staff in Baghdad included the following objectives: i) ensure that key stakeholders understand the evaluation purpose, process and methodology; ii) obtain key stakeholder perspectives of any key development issues to be covered in the evaluation; and iii) determine the scope of the evaluation, approaches, timeframe, and the parameters for the selection of the ADR evaluation team. The evaluation team comprising international and national development professionals will be recruited.

Phase 2: Data collection and analysis. The phase will commence in August 2013. The evaluation matrix will guide data collection. The evaluation team will use data collection templates for documenting interviews and other data collected.

- Pre-mission activities: Evaluation team members conduct desk reviews of reference material, and prepare a summary of the context and other evaluative evidence, and identify the outcome-specific evaluation questions, gaps and issues that will require validation during the field-based phase of data collection

- Data collection mission: The evaluation team, including Evaluation Managers will undertake a mission to the country to engage in data collection activities. The estimated duration of the mission is 3 weeks in September (2 weeks in Baghdad and 1 week in Erbil). This is preceded by one week participation in the stakeholder workshops (in Baghdad and in Erbil) organized by the country office to discuss the findings of the evaluation of rule of law outcome (outcome 2) with national partners.

- Field data collection: Due to the aforementioned security constraints, a large part of data collection will be conducted by the national team of consultants. This will start in parallel to the data collection mission above, and will continue for 6 weeks until the mid-October.

- Outcome analysis: The outcome analysis will be conducted by international and national consultants with a view to producing outcome reports. This will be done in the second half of October.

- Data analysis and synthesis workshop: Once the preliminary outcome analysis is completed, a one-week data analysis and synthesis workshop will be organized in early November to bring together all members of the evaluation team to share their initial findings, cross-analyse them to produce findings on strategic positioning and preliminary conclusions.

- End-of-mission debriefing: At the end of the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the evaluation team will share initial findings with the country office.

Phase 3: Synthesis, report writing and review. Following the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the evaluation team will prepare the outcome reports (See Annex IV for the template of the outcome paper). The team will ensure that factual inaccuracies and misinterpretations are corrected in completing the outcome reports.

Based on the outcome papers and the discussions at the data analysis and synthesis workshop, the first draft of the report will be prepared and subjected to the quality control process of the IEO. Once cleared by the IEO, the first draft will be further circulated to relevant stakeholders to arrive at robust, evidence-based evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The second draft, which takes into account the results of the stakeholder reviews, will be prepared for the stakeholder workshops to be organized in Baghdad and in Erbil. At the stakeholder workshops, the results of the evaluation will be presented to key national stakeholders and the ways forward will be discussed with a view to creating a greater buy-in by national stakeholders in taking forward the lessons and recommendations from the report, and to strengthening the national ownership of development process and the necessary accountability of UNDP interventions at country level. Taking into account the discussion at the stakeholder workshops, the final evaluation report will be prepared. This ADR will be presented to the UNDP Executive Board in June 2014.

Phase 4: Production, dissemination and follow-up. UNDP Iraq will prepare a management response to the ADR under the oversight of RBAS. RBAS will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.[148]

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[148] http://erc.undp.org/

The ADR report and brief will be widely distributed in both hard and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new Country Programme Document. It will be widely distributed by the IEO and at UNDP headquarters, to evaluation outfits of other international organisations, and to evaluation societies and research institutions in the region. The Iraq country office and Government of Iraq will disseminate to stakeholders in the country. The report and the management response will be published on the UNDP website[149] as well as in the Evaluation Resource Centre.

9. TIMEFRAME FOR THE ADR PROCESS

The timeframe and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

Table 4: Timeframe for the ADR process		
Activity	**Responsible**	**Proposed timeframe**
Phase 1: Preparation		
ADR initiation and preparatory work	IEO	March 2013
Preparatory mission	IEO	June 2013
ToR – approval by the IEO	IEO	July 2013
Selection of other evaluation team members	IEO	July 2013
Phase 2: Data collection and analysis		
Preliminary analysis of available data and context analysis	Evaluation team	August 2013
Data collection mission	IEO and Evaluation team	September 2013
Field data collection	IEO and Evaluation team	September/October 2013
Outcome analysis and draft outcome reports	IEO and Evaluation team	End October 2013
Data analysis and synthesis workshop	IEO and Evaluation team	First week November 2013
Submission of final drafts of outcome papers	IEO and Evaluation team	End second week November 2013
Phase 3: Synthesis and report writing		
First draft – clearance by IEO	IEO	December 2013
Second draft – stakeholder review	IEO	January 2014

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[149] www.undp.org/eo/

Stakeholder Workshop in Baghdad	IEO, Country Office, Government	February 2014
Stakeholder Workshop in Erbil	IEO, Country Office, Government	February 2014
Submission of the final report	IEO	February 2014
Phase 4: Production and Follow-up		
Editing and formatting	IEO	March 2014
Issuance of the final report and Evaluation Brief	IEO	April 2014
Management response	Country Office	May 2014
Dissemination of the final report	IEO, Country Office, Government	May 2014

The above timeframe is indicative of the process and deadlines, and does not imply full-time engagement of the evaluation team during the period.

ANNEX 2. UNDP PROGRAMME RESULTS MATRIX

UNDP 2010-2014*	UNDAF Priority (2011-2014)*	UNDAF Development Outcomes (2011-2014)*	UNDP CPD Outcomes (2011-2014)
• Good governance based on rule of law, participation, transparency, responsiveness, collective opinion, justice and comprehensiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability	Improved governance, including protection of human rights	The Iraqi state has a more inclusive and participatory political process reflecting improved national dialogue.	• Government of Iraq and civil society have strengthened participatory mechanisms in place for electoral processes, national dialogue and reconciliation • Enhanced rule of law, protection and respect for human rights in line with international standards • Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes in place for accountable, transparent and participatory governance at national and local levels
		The Iraqi state has more efficient, accountable and participatory governance at national and sub-national levels.	
		Iraq has an improved legal and operational Rule of Law framework for administration and access to justice.	
		Governmental and non-governmental institutions better protect and promote the human rights of all people in Iraq, with a focus on the most vulnerable.	
• Increasing GDP by 9.38 per cent annually • Economic diversification and increased productivity in all economic sectors • Sustainable jobs and income generation especially among youth and women • Reducing levels of poverty by 30 per cent • Enhancing the role of the private sector in the national development process • Increasing the contribution of agriculture to the GDP	Inclusive, more equitable and sustainable economic growth	People in Iraq have improved access to job and income opportunities in a diversified and competitive market economy.	Enabling policy and frameworks for rapid economic recovery, inclusive and diversified growth and private sector development
		Vulnerable people in Iraq are benefiting from means-tested social transfers which stimulate economic growth and reduce dependency.	
		Government of Iraq has institutionalized a universal social security system covering unemployment, health, old age, disability and other social risks.	
• Promotion of sustainable development • Control of	Environmental management and compliance	The Iraqi state is responsive to climate change issues in line with its commitments to the	Government of Iraq has the institutional framework to develop and implement MDG-

environmental situation • Protection of air quality • Reduction in water pollution • Reduction in desertification • Environmental capacity development • Environmental awareness and regional and international cooperation	with ratified international environmental treaties and obligations	ratified international agreements. Government of Iraq has improved programmes for the prevention and control of pollution.	based pro-poor, equitable and inclusive socio-economic and environmental policies and strategies
		Government of Iraq has institutionalized improved mechanisms to prevent, mitigate and respond to natural and manmade disasters.	

*UNDP and UNDAF priorities and outcomes include only those that subsume UNDP outcomes.

ANNEX 3. LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

<u>UNDP Iraq</u>

Abdelmoula, Adam	Country Director, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Peter Batchelor	Country Director (former), UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Selmani, Vehbi	Head of Office, UNDP Sub-office in Erbil, Erbil
Ehsan, Khaled	Programme Officer, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Morel, Marc-Antoine	Project Manager, Rule of Law and Justice, Amman
Langan, Richard	Consultant and author of 'Outcome II Rule of Law Evaluation,' New York
Brouillette, Jane	Project Officer, Anti-Corruption, Amman
Cox, Richard	Programme Manager, Governance Unit, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Hanano, Jouhaida	Project Manager, Office of Inspectors General, Anti-Corruption Programme, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Hussein, Nahid	Programme Manager, Access to Justice and Human Rights, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Reza, Rini	Head, Governance Unit & Deputy Country Director, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Shabaneh, Luay	Programme Manager, Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Politis, Christopher, C.	Project Manager, Iraq Public Sector Modernization Programme, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Lopez, Teresa Benito	Project Manager, Empowering CSOs in Iraq, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Mackie, Aiman F.	Political Affairs Officer, Office of Political Affairs, UNAMI, Baghdad
Mudawi, Mohammed Siddig	Programme Manager, GFATM, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Alfandika, Sammy	Project Manager, UNDP Support to Elections, UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Allemame, Emad	Programme Manager, Anti-Corruption, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Laurens, Lionel	Programme Management Advisor, Area Based Development and Local Service Delivery, Economic Recovery and Poverty Alleviation, UNDP Iraq, Amman
Yokoi, Mizuho	Programme Specialist, UNDP Iraq, Erbil
Sutton, Jacky	Project Associate, UNDP Electoral Support Team, Baghdad
Faraj, Schno	Project Officer, Family Support Justice and Security Project, UNDP Iraq, Erbil
Allback, Zina Elyas	Project Officer, Public Sector Modernization Project, Erbil

Chardonnens, Sarah	Human Rights Support Officer, Governance Unit, UNDP Iraq, Erbil
Amin, Wissam	Programme Associate, UNDP Iraq, Erbil

UN Assistance Mission in Iraq

Badcock, Jacqueline	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General & Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Resident Representative, UNDP, UNAMI, Baghdad
Kundi, Sokol	Head of Office, Erbil Regional Office, UNAMI, Erbil
Ali, Marwan	Head, Political Section, UNAMI, Baghdad
Bezrukov, Alex	Head of Amman Office, Joint Analysis and Policy Unit (JAPU), UNAMI, Amman
Dela Cruz, Quirino	Electoral Officer, UNAMI Electoral Team, UNAMI, Baghdad
Mitra, Titon	Senior Strategic Planning Advisor, Office of the Resident Coordinator, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, UNAMI, Baghdad
Heydarov, Namiq	Advisor, UNAMI, Erbil
Willlems, Diederik	Electoral Affairs Officer, UNAMI, Erbil

Other UN Agencies and Development Partners

Pansegrouw, Jim	Director, Iraq Operations Centre and Jordan Operations Centre, UNOPS, Baghdad
Guy, Frances	Iraq Representative, UN Women, Baghdad
Haddad, Rana	Programme Advisor, UN Women, Baghdad (previously Project Manager, UNDP)
Hybaskova, Jana	Ambassador, Head of Delegation, European Union Delegation to Iraq, Baghdad
Shabaro, Nael	Deputy Chief of Party, Administrative Decentralization, Iraq Administrative Reform Project, TARABOT, Baghdad
Simons, David	Director, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, United States Embassy, Baghdad

Meininger, Laura	Deputy Director, Narcotics and Law Enforcement, United States Embassy, Baghdad
Wiktorowska, Anna	Chief of Party, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Iraq High Electoral Commission, Baghdad
Schieffelbein, Ulrich	Head of Planning and Operations, Rule of Law – Police, EUJUST-LEX Iraq, European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, Baghdad
Kirwan, Paul	Deputy Head of Mission, EUJUST-LEX Iraq, Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, Baghdad
Bådagård, Helena	Programme Manager, Swedish International Development Agency, Stockholm

National Government

Ghadhban, Thamir A.	Chairman, Prime Minister Office Advisory Committee, Baghdad
Jaafer, Ezzat Tawfiq	First Deputy Commissioner, Commission of Integrity, Baghdad
Al-Alak, Ali	Secretary General Council of Ministers Secretariat, Baghdad
Al Suhail, Qusay A.	First Deputy Speaker, Council of Representatives, Baghdad
Hasan, Hamza Shareef	Advisor for International Affairs, National Security Council, Baghdad
Matti, Sami	Deputy Minister, International Cooperation, Ministry of Planning, Baghdad
Buni, Anwaar Jamil Buni	Director General, International Cooperation, Ministry of Planning, Baghdad
Inayat, Qasim	Director General, Iraq Development Management System and Development Assistance Database, International Cooperation, Ministry of Planning
Ahmed, Sahar M.	Chief, International Training, Iraq High Electoral Commission, Baghdad
Al-Jbori, Saleem A.	Chief, Human Rights Committee, Council of Representatives
Ahmed, Ali Ismael	Public Relations Office, Anti-Corruption Academy, Commission of Integrity, Baghdad
	Madhi, Aqeel Salim Deputy Director General for Scientific Affairs,
	Anti-Corruption Academy, Commission of Integrity, Baghdad
Sharief, Mahmood K.	Director General, Directorate of Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Baghdad

Al-Zubair, Ali	Head of Literacy Board and Advisor to Minister, Ministry of Education
Ismael, Haifa Khadim	Deputy Director General, Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, Baghdad
Majid, Ayad Namik	Secretary General, Council of Representations, Baghdad
Abubakr, Muhammad	Director, Media Services, Council of Representatives, Baghdad
Muthanna, Haider	Advisor, Parliamentary Affairs Committee, Council of Representatives, Baghdad
Al-Khafaji, Saliama H.	Member, Board of Commissioners for Human Rights, Baghdad
Ibrahim, Salim P.	Consultant, Administration and Financial Affairs, Counsel of Ministers, Baghdad (previously Inspector General, Ministry of Industry
Malik, Huda	Office of International Organizations Affairs, Prime Minister Advisory Office, Government of Iraq, Baghdad
Shaker, Mokhles A.	Inspector General, Ministry of Human Rights, Baghdad
Hadi, Faten M.	Deputy Inspector General, Ministry of Human Rights, Baghdad
Mahdi, Mohammed Hussain	Inspector General, Ministry of Commerce, Baghdad
Alsaqal, Ahmed	Advisor on Administrator Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Baghdad
Al-Zubaidi, Ibraheem H.	Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Ismaeel, Noria Mekelef	Programmer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Mohammed, Rana Adil	Programmer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Muttaleb, Sinan Abdul	Programmer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Hamed, Samera Latif	Programmer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Almuhsen, Essam Abid	Department Follow-up Officer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad
Aleem, Allis	Legal Affairs Officer, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad

Kurdistan Regional Government

Talabany, Nisar	Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, Council of Ministers Kurdistan, Erbil

Fatah, Zagros	Director General, Capital Investment Budget, Ministry of Planning Kurdistan, Erbil
Silwa, Diuya B.	Head, Independent Human Rights Commission for Kurdistan Region, Erbil
Suleiman, Fareeq	Director General, Board of Supreme Audit, Kurdistan, Erbil
Fatah, Jabar	Liaison Officer with the Ministry of Planning, Board of Supreme Audit, Kurdistan, Erbil
Siwaely, Abdul Rahman Karim	Director General, Ministry of Justice Kurdistan, Erbil
Anwar, Ahmed	Director, Commission of Integrity, Kurdistan, Erbil
Saaid, Hayder Mustafa	Director General, Development Cooperation and Coordination, Ministry of Planning Kurdistan, Erbil
Bahnam, Mohd	Information Technology Specialist and Member of Project Committee, Enhanced Rule of Law Project, Kurdistan, Erbi

Civil Society Organizations

Alshrifi, Abbas	Consultant, Civil Society Organization Committee, Council of Representatives
Al-Badri, Maysoon	Salama Rafidhain Organization, Baghdad
Aref, Susan	Women's Empowerment Organization, Erbil
Mustafa, Schwan Saber	Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees, Public Aid Organization
Abdolla, Ahmad A.	Attorney at Law, Kurdistan Bar Association, Suleimaniyah Provincial Court, Erbil
Mahmood, Ari Jaza	Consultant Lawyer, Kurdistan Bar Association, Suleimaniyah Provincial Court, Erbil

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